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23 March 1983

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EGYPTIAN ATTACHE ON JORDAN, RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

TA141844 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1750 GMT 14 Feb 83

[Text] Haifa, 14 Feb (ITIM)--"Jordan wants to enter the peace process under the influence of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United States," the attache for matters of information and the press from the Egyptian Embassy in Tel Aviv (Mahpuz 'Abd al'al) said today in his lecture to a party given by the (Skol) Club in the Nof Hotel, Haifa.

The attache noted that there was a desire in Egypt among the population to bring the relations between Egypt and Israel back on track, but the events in Lebanon were making this difficult.

According to him, it would only be after an IDF withdrawal from Lebanon that Ambassador Murtada would return to his post at the Egyptian Embassy in Tel Aviv.

The attache expressed the Egyptian nation's and President Mubarak's greetings to the (Skol) Club in Israel and said that a desire to deepen the friendly relations with Israel was to be felt in Egypt.

According to him, these relations were not so deep at present "superficially" because of the influence of the events in the area and after the war in Lebanon. The speaker said that for more than 30 years there had been enmity between Egypt and Israel, but the Egyptian nation was continuing to support the late President Anwar al-Sadat's line, when he decided to end that enmity with Israel. President Husni Mubarak and the entire Egyptian nation had adopted that line, that the October War was the last war and that these problems should no longer be solved through war.

He later confirmed that Ambassador Murtada had not been recalled to Egypt in order to punish Israel but in the wake of the events in Lebanon and because of the Arab countries' pressure on Egypt.

Egypt, he claimed, had never claimed that it would make a separate peace with Israel. It adhered to the Camp David agreement according to which peace was to be made with all the countries in the area and the problems were to be solved with the other Arab countries in the region. "Not one country can live by

the sword all the time," the attache said, adding that Egypt was working to "push" the Jordanians into negotiations with Israel in order to bring peace closer. "Security will not be established if it is based on violence. If there is peace, there will be security, and peace is the best possible guarantee of security for both Egypt and Israel," he said.

In his remarks the attache referred to the phenomenon of few Egyptians having visited Israel since the establishment of the peace agreement, saying that the reason was the high cost of staying in Israel and of hospitality here. The Egyptian tourist must save his salary for many months and accumulate a sum of \$100 to waste on a week, while the Israel tourist, for the same amount, goes to Egypt, can stay there for a month and return with money in his pocket. Therefore, he said, he would raise a suggestion with the Israeli minister of tourism, A. Sharir, that he organize visits to Israel with a stay in a hotel and cheaper hospitality.

The president of the club, Moshe Elat, thanked the speaker.

CSO: 4400/241

SEVEN-MAN COMMITTEE TO VISIT LONDON

PM251513 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 24 Feb 83 pp 1-2

[Report by Talhah Jibril: "Seven-Man Committee To Visit London Mid-March"]

[Excerpts] Rabat--Moroccan Foreign Minister M'hamed Boucetta has confirmed that the seven-man committee set up by the Fes summit will visit London in mid-March. Regarding the problem of the PLO representation that has hindered this visit several times Boucetta said in a statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that it had been agreed to overcome this problem by not including PLO representatives in the delegations to capitals where such representative cannot be received. On this basis, he said, the PLO was not included in the seven-man committee that visited Washington.

Boucetta continued: "With regard to the seven-man committee's visit to London the agreement was also that no PLO representative will be included, but the headquarters of the seven-man committee sought to ensure that the Palestinian people are represented in this visit in agreement with the PLO. After the British Government withdrew its memo that was not acceptable either in content or in form regarding the implementation of the visit, it was agreed that the committee would visit London provided that a Palestinian, not necessarily from the PLO command, is included. Agreement on this was reached with the PLO and, on this basis, the committee will visit London."

Regarding relations with Algeria, Boucetta said Morocco was always ready to respond to mediation by the Arab and African brothers in order to put an end to tension in the Arab Maghreb region through a meeting between Moroccan monarch King Hassan II and Algerian President Chedli Benjedid, or in order to create a suitable atmosphere for such meeting. He said that Morocco always wished to end the fabricated tension over the Sahara problem. He said that his country has explained its views on this matter on all the levels, the African level, the world level, and the Arab Maghreb level. He said: We wish an end will be put to this problem so that it will become possible to build the Arab Maghreb.

Replying to a question regarding the possibility of holding a summit meeting in the near future between the Moroccan monarch and the Algerian president, Boucetta said: "There is nothing precise at present in this regard." Showing reservation in his reply, the Moroccan foreign minister said: "I have nothing to say regarding this meeting."

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

TABAH CROSSING FEE--The ministers of finance and transportation have complied with a request by the Knesset Economic Committee not to impose a crossing fee at the overland terminal with Egypt at Tabah. The committee's chairman, MK Gad Ya'aqobi, said that such a fee must not be imposed as it would harm the chances of tourist movement between Israel and Egypt. Following the ministers' compliance, the committee approved the imposition of fees at overland terminals on the border with Egypt, excluding the one at Tabah.
[Text] [TA021648 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Feb 83 p 2]

CSO: 4400/241

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

LEBANESE ARMENIANS PLEDGE 'TO FRUSTRATE TURKEY'S CRIMINAL DEED'

Tehran ALIK in Armenian 25 Jan 83 p 1

[Text] Recent Armenian guerrilla activity--the purposeful armed struggle that has been launched against the diplomats of the state that has emerged as the convinced heir of the policies and acts of red sultans and bloodthirsty Talats--has forced the fascist-military government of Turkey to announce on numerous occasions (through statements by President Evren, Prime Minister Ulu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other ranking government officials) that it will embark upon state terrorism to "teach a lesson" to the Armenian people, so that they will no longer dare to make territorial demands upon the Turkish government, and to end the Armenian "crime" (according to Turkish government officials, the genocide of 1915 was not criminal, but the assassination of the diplomats who represent the cause of the continuation of the genocide is a "crime").

Thus, Turkey went on stage, and in an act of state terrorism, launched with the aim of extinguishing the fighting spirit and the demanding resolution of the Armenian people, it kidnaped, through its operatives, national and public worker Apraham Ashjian on 29 December 1982.

This base act of kidnaping infuriated the Lebanese-Armenian community; there were protest demonstrations and strikes at schools and work places. The anguish and revulsion displayed as a result of this treacherous act affirmed the common resolve and unity of the Lebanese-Armenian community.

The three Armenian political parties of Lebanon (the Hunchak Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Liberal Party and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation) condemned this criminal act in joint declarations and declared that the Armenian nation "will, with united ranks, frustrate this criminal act threatening its collective will."

Thus, all Armenian parties and factions, in other words the Lebanese-Armenian community with all its segments, are resolved to defeat all threats aimed at the Armenian nation by the kidnaping of Apraham Ashjian.

The stand of the Lebanese Armenians proves the erroneous nature of the perceptions and assessments of the policymakers of Turkey's dictatorial regime about the reality of the Armenian diaspora and its political consciousness. Any Turkish counteraction--the kidnaping of Armenian public figures or any other treacherous

and insidious act--is condemned to failure because all such acts only serve to make the concept of a common cause and united struggle to take deep roots in the consciousness of the Armenian nation. It is thus that the resolve and the common will of the Armenian people, living away from its homeland, is shaped and strengthened to pursue its cause and to overcome any perils threatening its existence. Collective consciousness is awakening among the people.

Lastly, the history of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation shows that the conceivers, organizers and perpetrators of such treacheries cannot escape the hand of justice of the party.

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SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING FAMILY CODE OPENLY DEBATED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 27 Feb 83 p 3

[Article by Nadia Bouzeghrane with an introduction by A. Bellaha: "The Family Code Dossier"]

[Text] A Clear Analysis and Concrete Suggestions

After 46 general assemblies held by the various basic organizations, and after the formulation of various suggestions concerning the national family code, that subject was discussed at a governorate conference last week.

Members of the coordination bureau attended the meeting which was chaired by Mr Mohamed Seghir Helaili, member of the Central Committee and commissariat secretary; the meeting was characterized by an open debate which enabled the attending officials and militants to express their great concern for the preservation of the family cell and their attachment to it.

Following Central Committee guidelines and recommendations, a governorate commission was created to coordinate the debates that are to take place at all levels. Clerics and representatives of the judiciary and of mass organizations, especially the National Union of Algerian Women, each within its means, consistently contributed to enrich this important dossier.

Three subcommissions were created and have already started work on the preparation of the governorate report, to be presented at the next regional conference.

At the conference, after reviewing the various stages of preparation of this dossier, the commissariat secretary was to stress the importance of the subject of the debate.

Addressing the members of the governorate commission, he was to state that their participation "was decisive insofar as several ideas had emerged."

Mr Helaili also presented a brief history of the Algerian family, its attachment to Arab-Islamic principles and the part it took in the liberation war. That war, he was to say, forms the basis of our society and the spearhead of our development.

The commissariat secretary then emphasized the requirements of development and asked his audience to take them into account in the preparation of the final dossier.

The governorate commission report was then read and a large debate followed. All members took part in the debate to further enrich the major orientations.

Debate: Interesting Suggestions From a Meeting of Experts

Economists, sociologists, demographers, statisticians plus a representative of the Algiers commissariat met last Wednesday (from 9:30 to 17:00) at the Arab Labor Institute to debate a major question of the hour: the family code.

The debate was interesting by its complexity, the variety of the points of view expressed and the suggestions formulated.

"We do not purport to make an analysis of the Algerian family, but to contribute to the national debate," the participants pointed out as they read the agenda of the meeting. However, "it is an interesting fact that, at a given time, a society should pause and ponder its reproduction. This is what we can do, and we shall therefore consider the Algerian family, today."

The first part of the agenda included "the historical evolution of the family down to our time," and its characteristics before and during the occupation, and after independence. The second part was devoted to "family structures," and the third part to "the place of family in society." The last two themes received special attention as they made it possible to offer concrete suggestions. "How much do we know about the Algerian family before and during the occupation? This is a question for historians. As far as we are concerned, what is important is to discuss and examine the Algerian family as it is today. Family structures are at the center of the question. And what role should we play in this national debate?"

"There is a point of order that should be considered before we start the debate," a sociologist pointed out. "To make a proper discussion possible, we must first clarify our vocabulary. Let us agree: the family is not the household--the family is a set of ties based on kinship; a family can be divided into households which do not live together. Also, it has been said that the family is breaking up, that it is not what it used to be... Actually, it has reorganized itself, especially in space. It has kept very strong and still active ties between its members, even when they do not live together. An emigrant who maintains affective and economic relations with his parents is preserving his ties with them. Actually, strictly speaking, the Algerian family is not breaking up; it is reorganizing itself according to another model and it is that model that we must consider. How are relations between family members felt and experienced?"

Another participant: "Do conditions exist to ensure the reproduction of the family (housing, leisure, care of the children and the youth, etc.). What are the relations between the family and the school, the environment?"

Lack of Interest From the University

Another participant pointed out that the University is not much interested in the family, that it has published very few studies on the various aspects of the family and the ills from which it suffers (divorce, unmarried mothers, illegitimate children, etc).

"The Algerian family has its roots in rural areas," a sociologist was to say. "But today it has become alienated and has drifted away from its values. The family follows a western model. We are going from the extended family to the nuclear family; as a result, certain values are disappearing. Another western concept is that of day nurseries."

A participant answered:

"We should talk in dynamic terms, not according to a fixed and static set of views. Day nurseries enable women to work. They are a sign of progress which cannot be called western or oriental."

"What is the best way to approach such a debate," another participant was to ask. "We all know that a society is never static. That it evolves. How does it evolve? We also all know that the law is not going to change facts, but that facts are going to make the law. In other words, we must start with a clear analysis and ponder how this social reality may lead to a law."

Suggestions were made about the questions concerning the constitution of the family, family economy and social ills; here are some:

Concerning Marriage and Related Problems:

"We know that 'fatiha' legitimates a union and does not prevent a man from taking several wives since marriage is not sanctioned by a legal act. Now, if we wish to prevent all sorts of problems and excesses, marriage must be based on the mutual consent of the two spouses and on a contract. In addition, if the woman who gets married is of age, she should be able to marry without a guardian. That would be in agreement with the Constitution and the National Charter which say she is a full-fledged citizen."

"Also, does a father or guardian have the right to marry a daughter against her will? Should he not ask for her consent? Should she not have some recourse if she is not consenting? Even though the age at marriage is increasing, we should recommend to the legislator that he should raise it, as this would also contribute to ensuring demographic control."

Another Question: the Dowry

"The dowry should be symbolic, so marriage formalities and conditions could be simpler, but the contract should include a sum of money to be paid by the man to the woman, as a compensation in the case of a divorce," one of the participants said. Another then added: "I am not in favor of the dowry, far from it, but under present repudiation conditions and considering that

women have no resources, the dowry represents a guarantee, a security for them in case of a divorce or a repudiation."

Another participant: "The question of the dowry should be left to the individuals. It should not be legislated. In fact, it is a sign of backwardness. It is not the dowry that determines a marriage, its strength or its failure."

A sociologist intervened on the subject of repudiation: "It should be viewed as related to polygamy. As long as polygamy exists, there will be repudiations. They say polygamy will disappear because of the housing problem; but I am skeptical. In my opinion, polygamy is unjust, it is a fundamental inequality between two human beings."

"Polygamy should be codified, at least authorized in certain cases," someone else added: "when the wife is sterile or sick."

"And in the opposite case, what should we do? When it is the husband who is sterile?"

"No, polygamy should not be codified; it should disappear because it is a denial of justice to women and a source of problems."

Divorce:

"The right to divorce, according to the malekite rite which governs us, belongs to the husband; but, as Muslims, may we not draw our inspiration from another rite when national interest is at stake?"

"Divorce should be justified. It should not take place on an impulse and the right to divorce should be granted to both parties whenever it becomes necessary, when there is no other way and no possible reconciliation. For divorce is not an ordinary act."

Custody, Care and Guardianship of the Children:

"Why should the mother automatically have custody of the children? Custody should be given to either of the parents as long as he or she can assume it. The parent having custody of the children should also be given parental guardianship."

Custody and guardianship should go together. This suggestion is based on concrete cases; it takes into account the problems which many mothers must face when they have custody of the children, must care for them, without being their legal guardians.

Adoption:

"Is it not possible to give the name of the adoptive family to the adopted child when he does not have one? That would be a way of resolving the tragic problem of illegitimate children so they could have a home and a family and even social status, although giving them a name would not solve

their legal problems (birth certificates of the parents). In this respect, special measures could be considered; because of its tragic consequences, this problem must be examined with all the care it requires. Solutions must be found not only for its causes, but also for its effects."

Rights and Duties of Spouses

Rights and Duties of Spouses: "They begin with marriage. They are mutual. The contribution of the two spouses in managing the household must be integrated in the mutual rights and duties of parents and children (care of the family, of the children, etc.). As for the work of women, there is no reason to discuss it. It is an accepted fact, a principle since work is "a right, a duty and an honor for all citizens, men and women alike." (National Charter). What should be debated is the management of property within the home. If the woman has contributed to acquire property, should she not share in it? For instance, if a house is purchased or a CNEP [National Savings Bank]-Housing savings account opened. In addition, some moral obligations fall outside the competence of the law."

Duties of Parents to their Children: "The duty to support them is divided when both parents are working."

"If women are to exercise their right to work, socioeducational support (day nurseries and kindergartens) must be provided. Also, there are shocking expressions such as 'the indocility' or 'the insubordination' of the wife. Exactly, what do they mean? A woman married a man against her will; if she rejects him, is that insubordination? When is there desertion of one's family? Is it when one of the two spouses deserts the conjugal home, or does not fulfill his family obligations (obligation to provide support or moral obligations), or abdicates his family responsibilities?

Family in Society: "Its moral and social protection. Preserving it from deviations. These are widely discussed, even controverted subjects. Deviations should be defined. What are they? Are they the abdication of family responsibilities, the desertion of one's parents? Of one's children? Of one's wife? Of one's husband? Are deviations not also related to the environment? To the large size of one's family and the many resulting problems (a home that is too small, children who drop out of school or are left to themselves, abdication on the part of the parents and their inability to support their children, illegitimate children?...)."

"It is known that the number of children is more closely related to the social status of the mother than to that of the father (education, job, etc.). When a woman is kept at home, her only status is procreation, especially the procreation of boys, if she does not want to be repudiated. This is her only way of showing her worth."

What are the standards that define society?

What are the conditions that must be fulfilled to meet these standards?

There is a clear consensus. The standards are the values which are ours, our search for and our attachment to a national identity and authenticity. But we should not be set in these values. For there is also such a thing as a dynamic of progress, a universalism which we cannot ignore. Another type of reference is offered by all national political texts.

"As for the conditions that must be fulfilled to prevent deviations, they have to do with society as a whole, with education in a very broad sense (political institutions, mass organizations, mass media, family). Some socioeconomic conditions must also be met (housing, infrastructures, leisure activities, vocational training, jobs, etc.)."

Concerning the protection of handicapped and old people:

State aid is essential, independently from the family's responsibility. Laws to that effect are being prepared. Their adoption and implementation will solve a problem that is not negligible, especially that of the 800,000 or so handicapped.

Another question debated, that of inheritance:

In fact, this question is of interest only to a minority of the people; but it has one major facet: housing. Is the home an individual acquisition--by the husband--or a family acquisition? It would be desirable to adopt the second solution and indicate that, should there be a conflict or a separation of the spouses, the home would belong to the children and the parent who has custody and takes care of them, so the children would be protected and their security ensured.

Under present conditions, this is a question of vital importance.

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JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH CONGO ISSUED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24 Feb 83 p 16

[Text] An Algerian-Congolese joint communique was published following the visit of friendship and work made to the People's Republic of the Congo from 22 to 23 February 1983 by Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani, member of the Political Bureau of the FLN and prime minister of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.

The following is the complete text of that communique:

Upon the invitation of Col Louis Sylvain Goma, member of the Political Bureau of the Congolese Labor Party (PCT), prime minister and head of the government of the People's Republic of the Congo, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani, member of the Political Bureau of the FLN and prime minister of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, paid a visit of friendship and work to the People's Republic of the Congo from 22 to 23 February 1983.

Upon his arrival in Brazzaville, the Algerian prime minister went to the Marien N'Gouabi Mausoleum, where he laid a wreath of flowers.

During his visit, Algerian Prime Minister Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani was received by Col Denis Sassou N'Guesso, chairman of the Central Committee of the Congolese Labor Party, president of the republic, chief of state and president of the Council of Ministers, to whom he delivered a personal message from Chadli Bendjedid, president of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and secretary general of the FLN Party.

During his visit, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani engaged in talks with Col Louis Sylvain Goma.

Also participating in these talks were the following: For Algeria: Ali Oubouzar, secretary of state for foreign trade; Mohamed Lemkani, vice president of the People's National Assembly; Lt Col Mohamed Touil; Zineddine Sekfali, secretary general to the prime minister; Amar Benghezal, director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Boudraa, chief of staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the Congo: Pierre Nze, member of the Political Bureau, head of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, minister of foreign affairs; Rodolf Adada, minister of mining and energy; Jean Itadi, minister of industry

and fishing; Boniface Matingou, minister of tourism and the environment; Thomas Dhello, chief of staff of the prime minister; Benjamin Bounkoulou, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of the Congo to Algeria.

The meetings between the two prime ministers took place in an atmosphere of friendship, solidarity and fraternal understanding, in keeping with the traditional relations existing between the Congolese and Algerian peoples, which relations have their basis in the common struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, and in their firm determination to use every possible means in all domains to ensure the emancipation of their respective countries.

Wide-ranging exchanges of views made it possible for the two parties to conclude that the internal development of both lands requires a strengthening of their bilateral relations and a clear vision of international questions.

Making a thorough analysis of their bilateral relations, the two prime ministers expressed satisfaction with their current development and reaffirmed their firm determination to carry them further, convinced that inter-African cooperation must aim at the objectives and lines of action traced by the Charter of the OAU, especially through the granting of priority to all African possibilities of development and the emancipation of peoples on the African continent.

They took specific measures aimed at giving Algerian-Congolese relations an even broader dimension making it possible to further develop their constant exchanges in the political, economic, technical, scientific, commercial and sociocultural fields.

The two prime ministers examined the international situation in Africa and the rest of the world and noted with satisfaction a perfect agreement on all subjects discussed.

Taking up the situation in Africa, the two prime ministers noted that the action of imperialism and neocolonialism in various regions of the continent aims to prevent the total and final liberation of Africa, to arouse and maintain artificial tensions between African peoples committed to tasks of nation-building.

They strongly condemned all maneuvers of imperialism and neocolonialism tending to create and maintain zones of natural confrontation in areas of cooperation between African countries and to break bonds of solidarity linking them, in keeping with the principles and ideals of the OAU Charter.

The two prime ministers noted with satisfaction that despite all kinds of maneuvers, Africa constantly wins great victories in the achievement of its political independence and in the resolute accomplishment of economic independence.

Turning to the situation in southern Africa, the two prime ministers reaffirmed their active and unswerving solidarity with the peoples of Namibia and South Africa.

They denounced the maneuvers and evasiveness of the imperialist powers and the racist regime in Pretoria which, in flagrant violation of the decisions of the international community, made both within the framework of the United Nations and the OAU, are aimed at delaying the unavoidable independence of the Namibian people under the leadership of their sole, legitimate representative: the SWAPO.

They demand the immediate application of Resolution 435 (78) of the UN Security Council as a basis for the solution to the Namibian question, one that would respond to the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people.

Both prime ministers harshly condemned the inhumane policy of apartheid of the Pretoria regime in South Africa and denounced the cowardly aggression it constantly perpetrates against Front Line countries, mainly the Kingdom of Lesotho, the People's Republic of Angola and the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The two prime ministers renew their unswerving support for the martyred people of South Africa in their struggle to achieve their inalienable right to independence and national sovereignty.

Examining the situation in Chad, the two prime ministers expressed the hope that they would see the brother Chadian people regain peace, unity and national concord in order to achieve national reconstruction.

Examining the situation in Northwest Africa, both parties expressed their great concern over the persistent tension and risk of internationalization of the conflict in the Western Sahara, due to the intervention of powers outside of Africa.

Both sides reiterate their unswerving support for the Saharan people and their sole, legitimate representative, the POLISARIO Front.

They believe that only direct negotiations between the two sides in conflict, to wit, the SDAR and Morocco, can lead to a permanent settlement of the question of the Western Sahara.

Confronted with the blockage of the OAU as a result of the failure to hold the 19th Summit Conference of Heads of State and of Government at the places and on the dates scheduled, the two prime ministers reaffirmed their determination to work toward the strengthening of the OAU, which they consider to be the privileged instrument for the achievement of the objective of the total and final liberation of our continent and the fight for the economic and cultural development of the African peoples, as well as the establishment of a climate of peace, security and harmony on the African Continent.

Both parties paid particular attention to the crisis in the Middle East and in this connection, reaffirmed their constant, resolute support for the fight of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO, their only legitimate representative for the restoration of their inalienable rights, including the right to the establishment of a sovereign, independent state.

They emphasized that no just and lasting settlement can result from a signed agreement and recalled that a true solution to the crisis in the Middle East must be of a general nature and involve the participation of the PLO, satisfaction of the basic rights of the Palestinian people and an unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist forces of occupation from all Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

Both parties emphasized their great concern over the pursuit of the conflict between Iraq and Iran and consider that this fratricidal war constitutes a real weakening in the anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist struggle in the progression of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries.

Consequently, they issue an urgent appeal to the two brother countries to put an end to their fratricidal struggle through the peaceful path of negotiations in the spirit and according to the principles of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries.

Reaffirming their unswerving attachment to the principles and objectives of nonalignment, both sides emphasize that the policies of that movement remain more than ever an irreplaceable factor in the struggle for the liberation and emancipation of peoples, the settlement of international problems, the promotion of international cooperation on the basis of equality, the protection of peace and security in the world, the democratization of international relations and the establishment of a more just world economic order.

The two prime ministers granted particular importance to questions of development and the restoration of international relations, while emphasizing the fundamental role that must be played by developing countries in the establishment of a new type of relations between developing countries.

While reaffirming their full support for the pertinent resolutions of the UN General Assembly, they remain convinced that the strengthening of solidarity between developing countries is an indispensable element for the establishment of their cooperation. They thus reaffirmed their determination to work tirelessly for collective autonomy and solidarity between developing nations.

Col Louis Sylvain Goma expressed his great satisfaction over the visit to the People's Republic of the Congo by the delegation headed by Prime Minister Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani.

Speaking for himself and on behalf of the delegation accompanying him, the Algerian prime minister thanked the brother Congolese people and their leaders for the warm and fraternal welcome extended to them during their stay in the People's Republic of the Congo.

Both prime ministers consider that the visit was an effective contribution to the consolidation of the bonds of friendship, brotherhood and cooperation between the two nations and to the strengthening of inter-African solidarity.

Prime Minister Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani invited Col Louis Sylvain Goma to make a visit of friendship to the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. Prime Minister Louis Sylvain Goma accepted the invitation with pleasure. The date of the visit will be determined by diplomatic channels.

INTERVIEW WITH MUHAMMAD HASANAYN HAYKAL

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 1, 8, 15 Dec 82

[Interview with Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, former editor of AL-AHRAM, by Husayn 'Abd al-Raziq, on 24 November 1982 in Haykal's residence]

[1 Dec 82 pp 3-4]

[Text] The opposition to Mubarak is from within the regime, and his support comes from forces outside the regime.

There has not been any planned change which is in harmony with the reality of Egypt's society. The popular explosion of 18 and 19 January 1977 was the reaction, to the open-door policy, by those who had crossed the [Suez] Canal [during the 1973 War].

I am ready to start publishing an independent newspaper within 6 months if I can obtain a license.

For the first time in Egypt's history a plebiscite was held concerning a law in which six [articles] involved the punishment of serving a lifetime sentence at hard labor.

There has been no advance plan for dealing with the problem of corruption.

We now have a ruler who acts like a normal human being.

The problem of corruption is not a police problem, nor is it the issue of Rashad 'Uthman and 'Isamat al-Sadat. It is an issue which is a social struggle between different forces.

The revolution has retreated, wealth has advanced, the Saudi era is over, and the Israeli era has begun!

The Arab world now has more than one new Camp David.

When I went to see Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal in order to reach an agreement with him to conduct this interview, it was the first time that I had ever been in his office which is adjacent to his home and where he has been carrying on his activity and doing his work ever since he left AL-AHRAM in 1974. All during the 21 years that I had worked in the profession of journalism, there had never been an [official] meeting between us. The only dialogue there had been between us had been two articles which I wrote for the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH in 1967 in which I violently criticized some of his opinions and positions which had been published in his weekly column called "Frankly Speaking" [bi-sarahah]. However, this was not the first time that I had met him.

The first time I met him was at the gate of the "Turah Farm Annex" prison on Saturday 5 September 1981. Police cars were taking whole groups of us from the "reception" prison to this prison which had been set aside for political prisoners (that is, there were no prisoners from Islamic religious groups or prisoners who had been arrested because they were Christians!). I, and many of the other prisoners in the annex prison who were used to this kind of thing, felt some concern. Haykal was experiencing this for the first time, and we all hoped that he would be able to cope with it. After a few days this alarm and these apprehensions disappeared, the barriers fell, and there began one of the most fruitful dialogues that has ever occurred in the political history of Egypt. It was a dialogue between various political leaders, personalities, and generations. There I came to know Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the writer, journalist, and political figure who had clearly left his imprint on political life in Egypt and the Arab world during the past 30 years. I came to know him as he really is. As he himself said: "Prison brings out the best and the worst in a person, and no masks can be worn there."

When AL-AHALI began publishing once again, I did not hesitate to attempt to conduct this interview with him. He agreed to this right away, but he made one request concerning the matter. He requested that the interview be held after 25 November 1982, that is, after he had been out of prison for a whole year. He wanted to have a full year in which to reflect, think, and finish his new book called "The Autumn of Anger" [kharif al-ghadab], which will appear on the market next January.

On Wednesday 24 November we began this interview, the first part of which is being published on this page.

[Question] Since you left your job at AL-AHRAM, you have devoted your time to putting out a considerable number of books and you have played your role as a journalist by means of writing a number of articles for newspapers both in the Western world and the Arab world. In spite of the prohibition which was imposed on your articles in your own country, they nevertheless have been reaching interested readers in Egypt and, together with other writings and political activity, have contributed toward determining [people's] opinions and attitudes.

During this last year, after you were let out of prison on 25 November 1981, you have stopped writing for the press. What reasons do you have for doing

this, and when will you start writing for the press again, either outside Egypt or for Egyptian newspapers?

[Answer] In February of 1974 I left my job at AL-AHRAM because of a dispute with President Sadat. The dispute concerned a basic issue--the issue of the separate peace with Israel. This new position crystallized on a day which was decisive in the history of Egypt--7 November 1973, when Anwar al-Sadat met Henry Kissinger, the U.S. secretary of state. This day saw the emergence of the six-point plan, and these were the same points which had been proposed by Golda Meir. Relations of a new sort began between Egypt and Israel, or it might be more appropriate to say that these new relations were relations between Anwar al-Sadat and Israel via the U.S. We then entered a totally new phase of the Middle East conflict. Of course, this development did not come overnight. There certainly had been contacts made, secret relations which had previously existed were then developing, and they were directly defined on that day. I could say that the separate peace process began with the first disengagement agreement.

Since that day I came to have a definite opinion concerning what was going on. I began to write articles which were sharper in tone and clearer. I explained what had gone on between me and Kissinger, and I talked about the Israeli method of negotiation--or rather the Egyptian method of negotiation.

When the first disengagement agreement was reached, I considered this to be the beginning of a separate peace with Israel which would have negative social, economic, political, and intellectual effects on Egypt, would affect Egypt's future during the next few years, and would lead to isolating Egypt from the Arab world. I wrote what I believed, and because of this issue I left AL-AHRAM.

So I left AL-AHRAM as a result of a position which I took and as a result of defending an issue. If you have a certain position concerning a certain issue, you should not remain silent. It is your duty, after you have left your job, to tell exactly what has happened as far as possible.

Therefore I began to write concerning this subject and to talk about it here in Cairo. It was a political decision on my part to remain in Egypt and to speak up in Egypt, and I had several reasons for deciding to do this.

If you talk about the policy and positions of the Egyptian government when you are outside Egypt and totally safe, your words will not have the same credibility which they will acquire if you are inside Egypt and subject to the authority of the Egyptian government and Egyptian law. When you are in Egypt and say something, this means that you are capable of proving it, capable of defending it, and that you are ready to go to prison for the sake of it. It means that you are even ready to die for the sake of what you say. President Sadat had no choice in the matter. He had to either arrest me or refute what I was saying. My belief is that it was difficult for him to refute what I was saying. Also, it was difficult for him to arrest me, because, by arresting me, this would in itself confirm what I was saying and reveal other additional matters. Furthermore, I believed that it was necessary

to have a voice be heard in Cairo which was addressing the broad masses of Arab public opinion because this would confirm the fact that the old ties between the Egyptians and the Arabs since the days of the Wafd Party and the signing of the Charter of the Arab League--and which were embodied by the Nasser era--still existed and still had a voice in Egypt, even though this voice was prohibited from speaking inside Egypt itself. It was necessary to give signals to other parties in the Arab world which confirmed that the Egyptian patriotic forces still existed. And I believed that I was able to play this role. I had been a friend of Nasser's, I had been close to the Nasser experiment, and, in the eyes of Arab public opinion, I represent part of the Nasser experiment which was experienced by the Arab world and to which the Arab world had ties. My statements concerning this experiment could be believed by public opinion in the Arab world. Also, nobody could accuse me of having a biased position or of being tied to a party position. During all my professional journalistic life I took positions which were committed, that is, positions committed to what I personally believed in rather than positions committed in advance to a given party view.

Even with Nasser I brought up things which he did not agree with. I actually talked about freezing relations with the U.S., and he did not agree with this point of view, but he never objected to my right to express whatever opinions I wanted to because I was speaking as someone who was involved with the [Nasser] experiment and was speaking from a position of patriotism, even though I might differ with his point of view.

It was on this basis that, after I left AL-AHRAM, I chose for myself two roles which complemented each other. I wrote a series of books (seven books) in English which were published internationally and translated into a number of languages. My last book concerned the Iranian revolution, and was published while I was in prison. When I entered prison it was being translated into 17 languages, and by the time I had left prison it was already being translated into 33 languages.

I have put up this series of books right next to my desk in order to always remind me that I did not lose anything by leaving AL-AHRAM. After leaving AL-AHRAM, about every year or every 16 months I wrote a book which appeared in the international market. This was to be a means of reminding myself what I had achieved during these years. And along with the books there are hundreds of articles that I wrote for newspapers and magazines. My activity continued in this fashion until I was taken to prison.

Decision to Abolish Class Hatred

Things were different when I got out of prison. I had clearly stated that I did not want to be a party in the game of Egyptian politics or a party in the game played by the Egyptian press. I took this position approximately until 1975. I took the position in view of certain circumstances and policies, and, as far as I was concerned, it was a firm position.

After I had my dispute with Sadat and left AL-AHRAM in February of 1974, there was a reconciliation between us at the end of 1974. We met with each other,

and I participated in the Aswan talks which he held with Kissinger. If I had any role in causing these talks to fail (in March of 1975), then I am proud of this role.

During this period, that is, the period of reconciliation, I expressed some of my opinions and participated in formulating some of the positions taken such as the one concerning opening the Suez Canal. I wrote Sadat's speech in which he said that he rejected the position taken by those who said that there were two revolutions (the July revolution and the May revolution), two experiments, and two eras. I was the one who put in this speech the clear references to corruption and to the existence of aberrations, brokerage commissions, and middlemen. I also wrote what he said concerning how Egyptian citizens, with their salaries, had to live under circumstances of a high cost of living. I also wrote the references in this speech which said that it was necessary for us to create a decent life for Egypt's masses of people. These three points were not ideas which Sadat had. I had suggested them to him, and he had accepted them and I then put them in his speech.

During this period of time very heated discussions took place between me and President Sadat because I had differences with him. However, he had the idea that I could play a role with him and be useful to him. Relations were restored between us in October of 1974, he then asked me to be his national security adviser, but I turned the job down. Although I did cooperate with him in many matters, as I said, our discussions were heated ones. I remember when he decided to change Dr 'Abd al-'Aziz Hijazi's cabinet and to give Mr Mamduh Salim the job of forming the cabinet. He brought up the idea with me, and I said that, before he replaces a person who is head of the cabinet, he should define his objective or define what he wants. I told him that the regime now needs to define which social forces it represents. We were sitting in the Pyramid [Rest House], and I said to the president:

"Do not be angry at what I say. If your career in the army had progressed along its normal course and you had served well, right now you would be Maj Gen Anwar al-Sadat. Why is it that you have become President Anwar al-Sadat? The answer to this question is exactly the point which must be discussed.

"On 23 July 1952 there was a change in regime in Egypt, and then the revolution changed the economic and social composition of Egypt. After Nasser's death, you became president of the republic and your authority is based on what we call the 'alliance of the forces of the working people.' This was the social basis for the July revolution. When the open-door policy began last year (1974), the bases then changed. You should ask yourself whether you still represent this old alliance. My opinion is that this is no longer true, that the alliance must be forged again, and that its class-related foundations and identity must be defined."

President Sadat looked at me and said: "Muhammad, you are talking about the class conflict." I replied: "Something of the sort." He then said: "But, Muhammad, I have eliminated the class conflict." Then he began to write in the air the following:

"Anwar al-Sadat, the President of the Republic, announces the following decree:

Article 1. Class hatred has been abolished.

Article 2. All of our ministers, in the realms of their authority, shall carry out this decree.

(Signed) Anwar al-Sadat,
Head of the Egyptian Family"

Matters were going beyond the realm of reason. When I met Mamduh Salim, he offered me the position of being his deputy prime minister. I, of course, turned him down. After that, President Sadat said to me: "If you don't want any of these positions, then go back to journalism. But be committed." I declined this offer also. The second disengagement in Aswan had been a failure, but I saw on the horizon that he nevertheless was moving toward a second disengagement and toward bringing about a separate peace. It was then that I decided to not accept any position offered to me. My position since 1975 has been basically that I am not a party in the game played by the Egyptian press nor am I a party in the Egyptian political game. Let me come back to the time after I got out of prison. This was in November of 1981, that is, a whole year ago. At that time I declared that I was an observer party but that I was not a neutral party. I have never been neutral, and I never will be. But since that time I have not written any articles that have been published either in the Arab world or in Egypt.

As for the Arab world, circumstances there are not much better than they are in Egypt, which I had been writing and talking about since 1974. In the past we were all confronted with a definite issue, which was that of Camp David and the necessity to defend Egypt's ties with the Arab world.

Now, after everything that has happened, I believe that there has been more than one new Camp David in the entire Arab world. It is not reasonable for us to restrict our discussion to the first Camp David, that is, that of Egypt. If we say that the instances of corruption in Egypt amount to 1 million "Watergates," then I also say that some of the things which have happened in the Arab world during the last 10 years--far removed from anything that has gone on in Egypt--in turn represent 1 million Camp Davids or at least 10 or 12 Camp Davids. In the Arab world nobody will allow me to talk about any Camp David except the Egyptian one. This is something which is unacceptable, at least as far as I am concerned. In short, circumstances in the Arab world at the present time do not permit anyone to write about the issues of the Middle East.

In Egypt I have stuck to this same old position, that is, that I am outside the game played by the Egyptian press and outside the Egyptian political game.

Now a year has passed by, and I have spent that year observing what has been going on and working on my books. If I wanted to write in Egypt, where would I write?!

Frankly I am not disposed to write for the newspapers which are called "national newspapers." Also, I do not believe that these newspapers are prepared to publish what I write.

As for the opposition newspapers, each one of them represents a particular point of view with which I might not entirely agree. Also, all the newspaper space in a party newspaper belongs to those who belong to that party.

Usually I write an article which is one or two pages long. If I wrote for your newspaper, AL-AHALI, then the [Rally] Party would have the right to protest to the editor in chief for two reasons. First of all, it would have the right to do this because my trend of thinking would not necessarily coincide with the trend of thinking of the Rally Party, and secondly it would have the right to do this because the pages of the newspaper are the property of those who work for the party and hoist its banner. They have more of a right than do others from outside the party to express their opinions in their party newspaper.

Of course there is a third alternative, and I would be prepared to choose it if the possibility were available to me. This third alternative is to obtain a license to publish an independent newspaper. If this were possible, I would be ready within 6 months to publish a new newspaper in Egypt.

I am troubled by the fact that our Egyptian readers do not know what is going on around them in the world or even what is going on in their own country until after these events have become history.

You are also asking me why I am not writing anything.

My answer is that these circumstances in the Arab world and these circumstances governing writing in Egypt have led me to choose to remain silent. When you brought up with me the idea of holding this interview, it seemed to me to be a moderately good formula, that is, it is not an invasion on my part of the pages of AL-AHALI, and, at the same time, it gives me an opportunity to break the silence which I have maintained for a whole year.

Years of Unrest and Internal Strife

[Question] Since the assassination of President Sadat on 6 October 1981 the issue of change has been brought up. It has been brought up by political personalities, parties, and forces, and it has been brought up by the man in the street who is pinning many of his hopes and dreams on President Husni Mubarak.

After President Mubarak has been in power for more than a year and after we have learned about the bitter facts concerning what took place during the previous regime [of Sadat], this issue has once again become an urgent one in the hearts of our Egyptian citizens. They have become convinced of the necessity of making radical changes in the policies which resulted in the overall crisis which our society is suffering from--the most prominent phenomenon of this crisis being the corruption which we have.

In your view, what are the dimensions of the change which we need right now? What role should be played by the presidential establishment and President Husni Mubarak in order to bring about this change? What role should be played by the political opposition forces?

[Answer] No one can claim that nothing new has happened either in Egypt or outside Egypt. I feel that there is an organic relationship between what I have called the "autumn of anger"--the culmination of which was the assassination of President Sadat on 6 October 1981--and the "winter of unrest"--meaning the events which took place on 18 and 19 January 1977, which I have called a "popular explosion," and which President Sadat said was a "thieves' uprising." This whole period of time was a complete, distinct, and connected phase. The Egyptian people have done all that they could and more for the cause of liberating the [occupied] land, and they have accomplished incredible feats on the field of battle in order to achieve this liberation. Successive generations of our Egyptian youth spent years and years in the trenches thinking that they were warding off danger from their country and in order that, later on, something splendid would happen in their lives and the life of their country. Without going into any details, I can say that young Egyptians and Egyptian arms did achieve something important on the strategic level. However, Egyptian policy has not only thrown away this victory and its strategic value on the military level. It has also done this on the political level. This has had certain economic and social consequences, the most important of which has been the application of the open-door policy.

I believe that the popular explosion which took place on 18 and 19 January 1977 was a reaction to the open-door policy on the part of those who had crossed the Suez Canal [during the 1973 war]. They discovered that all of the spoils gained from this war had been taken away from them and had gone to others. This resulted in their explosion in Cairo.

What happened after the winter of unrest in 1977? There then began the business of the plebiscite. For the first time in Egypt's history a plebiscite was held concerning a law in which six of the articles involved the punishment of serving a lifetime sentence at hard labor. During that same year, 1977, and based on a report by the Israelis (!!) that there was someone in Libya who was plotting against him, President Sadat decided to deal Libya a punitive blow by means of his air force. There have been, of course, many things to criticize in Col Qadhafi's actions, and it could even be that there was such a plot. But for our president to receive his information concerning this plot from the Israelis and then to decide to deal a punitive blow to Libya's Arab army--this was no way to reply to Qadhafi.

During that same year there were also contacts made with Israel. The initiative of November 1977 was no surprise. There had been previous and direct contacts, the most recent of which had been the meeting with al-Tihami in September. I believe--as I have already said--that this initiative was something which began in November of 1973 and moved forward step by step, inevitably leading to the separate peace. Although the peace was reached in a dramatic fashion in the latter part of 1977, this did not really change

anything. After 1977 there began the business of the plebiscites concerning the Law to Protect the Domestic Front and Social Peace, the attorney general's investigations of me and others, and the series of laws promulgated and arrests made in 1978 and 1979. The year 1979 saw the beginning of the business with the religious trends, and this culminated in the events of September and October of 1981. This was a period of time which was a complete unit, was clearly delineated, and there was a constant occurrence of events during this period of time from January 1977 till October 1981. So something important did happen in Egypt, and after all of this happened no one can say that it is possible for things to go on as they are going on [right now]. We are not in need of anything new. The issue of change has been forcefully brought up, not by either me or by the political parties, but rather as an inevitable result of Egypt's situation and the reactions [of various forces to each other] which occurred from January 1977 till October 1981.

There was a period of 5 years which was full of unrest, internal strife, and reactions of various forces to each other, and for 5 years people talked about sectarian strife and class hatred. Change became a necessity. The political expression which existed no longer represented the social movement at all. There came to be a contradiction between the two. On the one side there was society's economic, social, and intellectual movement, and on the other side there were the political forces.

Does this mean that change actually occurred? I say "no." We did not see the occurrence of the necessary and definitive change which would be in harmony with Egypt's social reality.

The change which did occur took place in only two aspects--in the approach and in the atmosphere.

Right now we have a ruler who acts like a normal human being rather than acting like a god. We no longer have a ruler who carries the "key of life" in one hand and acts like he is second only to Ramses II, etc. This difference in the person of the ruler has led to a change in the approach to how things are done. This is a very important thing.

As a result of the change in approach there has also been another important change--the change in the general atmosphere in Egypt. The president, by virtue of his distinctive role in Egyptian society, has come to be, at least at the present time, outside the present process of conflict.

Other than this there has been no change in Egypt. When you and I talk about change, we have in mind planned change. This is something which has not yet happened.

But we should not forget that the change in approach and atmosphere has opened up the path to factors of change which no one should ignore, and they are part of the movement, vitality, and dynamics of the process of change when the time comes for this change to take place.

Plan For Dealing With Corruption

Let us take, for example, the issue of corruption. One can say that there has been no advance plan for dealing with the problem of corruption. But, since the days of Sadat, we have had the issue and case of Rashad 'Uthman which has been prepared and presented, within a certain framework, by the attorney general. But the people who prepared and presented the case did not have the intention of opening up the dossier and issue of corruption. They forgot that one can dominate and control a given event before it becomes public. But as soon as the matter becomes public and, for example, reaches the courtrooms, it takes on its own independent momentum which is no longer tied to the wishes of those who have prepared the case. This is what happened in the case involving Rashad 'Uthman, and it happened to an even greater degree in the case involving 'Ismat al-Sadat. I believe that when the 'Ismat al-Sadat case was presented, no one thought that it would take on this dimension in Egyptian society or that there was anyone who had planned for it to acquire such broad dimensions. However, it was the nature of the atmosphere which was prevalent that caused the reaction to be so strong and which will cause the reaction to continue in the future. So the process of dealing with corruption has come to the fore, and it in turn has created a new atmosphere and has impelled certain forces to take up a defensive position and other forces to proceed to go on the offensive. This is a new factor of change, rather than being an [actual] change. I insist on this point because it is very useful for us to differentiate between things which are changing by virtue of circumstances which nobody has deliberately planned and changes which we demand to have happen, that is, organized change.

It is possible, under certain circumstances, for factors of change to play a role which accelerates organized change, and sometimes they are stronger than the organized change if the organized change is unable to keep pace with society's momentum. This is exactly what happened in the issue of corruption.

Corruption does not merely consist of a series of instances of aberration here and there. Also, it is not a police problem. It is a social struggle between different forces. Some of these forces--for example, those which were on the margin [of society]--quickly fled. The market was full of people who took out millions [of Egyptian pounds] worth of loans from banks, in accordance with the open-door policy, and as soon as they sensed that there was a new atmosphere--not a change--and they thought that this atmosphere would probably allow society's momentum to develop to its fullest, they hastened to flee to places abroad. Tawfiq 'Abd al-Hayy is only one of dozens of such people. The thing that shelters them is the fact that any intensification of the efforts to deal with corruption will lead to revealing the weakness and corrosion in the very system of the open-door policy.

Those who have a basic interest in this policy, and the politicians and journalists who give expression to it, have gathered together and closed ranks in order to defend their interests. The value of these events is the fact that they have alerted public opinion for the most part in our country, have impelled conflicting social and political forces to define their positions, and have revealed the great gap which exists between the political expression which

we have in our parties, newspapers, and constitutional institutions and the true facts about our social and economic condition. This, in turn, has brought up the issue of change with more urgency than at any time in the past.

Change Is a Necessity

Under these circumstances one can only sympathize with the position taken by President Husni Mubarak. Since we do not have this organized change which we need, our country is beset with gigantic difficulties and horrors.

For example, the economic situation is terrible. The state budget this year suffers from a deficit of 4.5 billion Egyptian pounds and there is a deficit in our balance of payments of \$2.5 billion. The social situation is equally as bad and serious. For example, during the economic conference, the last report made by the World Bank mentioned the fact that 50 percent of Cairo's income goes to only 5 percent of its inhabitants and 95 percent of Cairo's inhabitants live off of only 50 percent of its income. At the People's Assembly one of the assembly members has said that Egypt now has 17,000 millionaires. It is said that Rashad 'Uthman--and I do not know him--accumulated a total of 300 million Egyptian pounds within a period of from 7 to 10 years. All of us also know about 'Isamat al-Sadat and other unusual examples [of people who have accumulated great wealth].

Now let us turn to the international situation. Regardless of our views concerning the matter, the government of Egypt, during the last few years, has taken a certain international position. It has practically cut off relations with the Soviet Union, or at least has frozen them, and has entered the framework of an arrangement which is on an even larger scale--the U.S. strategy. The government then signed a separate peace with Israel which has its provisions and restrictions. Before signing this peace, the Egyptian government had numerous options, but as soon as it signed the peace treaty the treaty became a reality which put restrictions on the Egyptian government.

Husni Mubarak must deal with all of these issues, and when we demand that he institute change, we must realize the nature of the issues which he confronts. We must be aware of the fact that, as soon as a change in the atmosphere was allowed and as soon as this change in the general mood occurred, other factors of change began to crop up, even though they were not planned for. As I have said before, it was foreign forces that have stirred [people] up against President Mubarak. I must say that I am surprised to see that the opposition to Musni Mubarak more or less comes from inside the establishments of the regime, whereas his support comes from forces which are outside these establishments.

So dealing with the issue of change is a matter which is not easy but, at the same time, it is something which it is necessary to do. We must decide how to deal with it.

The Israeli Era

The problem of change leads us to another matter which is related to it. It was brought up within the context of your questions, and I believe that it is

necessary to clarify it. It concerns the nature of the phase which we are going through. I believe that Egypt and the entire Arab world are confronting a new phase which is completely different from the phase prior to it.

A few years ago I said that the phase of revolution had retreated and had opened up the path to a new phase, which was the phase of wealth. I wrote that we were living in the Saudi era--the era of petroleum wealth.

We must admit the fact that the momentum of the revolution came to a halt, in one way or another, after the defeat of 1967. It is true that [Egypt] maintained its position and that it, from time to time, showed signs of deepening its commitment to the revolution. Nasser's decision to institute the second agrarian reform, the completion of the iron and steel complex, and the completion of the High Dam--all this occurred after 1967. Also, wartime price levels were maintained till 1970. But the momentum of the revolution stopped in 1967. Although the momentum of the revolution stopped, this was something which was acceptable as long as it maintained its positions. But later on there was a lot of retreating [from the gains achieved by the revolution]. In light of these retreats from the revolution, what were the existing forces in the Arab world which were capable of exercising influence in absence of the revolution?! The answer is, of course, oil--as fuel, as a resource, as energy, and as capital. I have talked about the capability which these resources have of exercising pressure on the U.S. When the Egyptian government signed the first disengagement agreement in 1973 and began to leave the arena, this meant that the other military fronts no longer had any capability of exercising pressure. The only thing left for us was to utilize the resources which were capable of exercising pressure on the U.S. in order that the U.S., in turn, put pressure on Israel.

I said that it was in this climate that the revolution retreated and wealth advanced and that we entered the Saudi era. This was true. However, I believe that the Saudi era has also ended, and that it ended in Beirut. We believed that the Saudi era was capable of exercising pressure on the U.S., but it was demonstrated to us that the U.S. was the one which was capable of exercising influence over petroleum and over capital. The result was that the utmost achievement of the Saudi era was the removal of the Palestinian resistance forces from Beirut--and we considered this a great victory. At this point it was very clear that, to our great misfortune, the social interest predominated over the national and pan-Arab interest during this phase. All of the dominant classes, in the end, preferred to protect their interests and abandoned everything else. The result was that the Saudi era came to an end in Beirut, and the thing which we had previously foreseen proceeded to emerge--that is, a new era which we, to our great misfortune, are calling the "Israeli era." Israel is a small imperial power capable of imposing its will on surrounding entities which are torn by internal strife, and there is no one who can oppose this power. All of the Arab regimes have discovered that the only thing which lies between them and the power of Israel is the area and arena in which the U.S. can maneuver in order to protect them from it.

So what we have is a brand new phase.

The Arab world has gone through various stages. The Ottoman Empire was the last regime which united the entire area under a single regime. Then after the Ottoman Empire came to an end during World War I and the Caliphate ended, the Middle East began to pass through various phases. The colonial phase was not a successful one. It was followed by the liberal and nationalist era, which also did not achieve any success. Then the era of revolutionary Arab nationalist movements began, it faced severe opposition, and it came to a halt in 1967. Then it totally retreated during the time between 1974 and when the Camp David agreements were signed. After that came the Saudi era which ended in Beirut, and now, to our great misfortune, we are entering the Israeli era.

In view of this situation we need to adopt a completely new and different view of matters.

One-Man Rule Is No Accident

Now I shall take up the matter of the responsibility of the presidential establishment and the responsibility of the other political forces with regard to these circumstances, as you have brought up in your question.

I have always said that the Third World is passing through a stage of transition, and I still say this. I feel that I can rightfully ask: "Is it merely an accident that, in the entire Third World--all the way from Dacca in Bangladesh to Casablanca in Morocco--we find only one-man rule, whether the existing regime is called a monarchy, a republic, a progressive regime, a socialist regime, or a reactionary regime?" It is not possible for this to be merely a coincidence. It is a stage of transition for societies, all of which passed from the stage of tribal feudalism to that of traditional legitimacy and are now attempting to arrive at the stage of legal and constitutional legitimacy. This is legitimacy which exists in a society in which the growth of the various classes has been completed and these classes have been able to find suitable political expression for their interests and conduct their social struggles by means of holding dialogues rather than waging civil war. All of the nations of Western Europe, with their patterns of democracy, passed through the phase of one-man rule and open social conflicts until they arrived at the point where they now have a measure of homogeneity which allows dialogues to be held.

Right now we are in a stage of transition which is characterized by fluidity of class and social structures and confusion as far as the ability of these classes to express themselves and their interests is concerned. This is why educated people play a greater role in expressing the interests of these classes than these classes are able to do for themselves. Except for landowners or people who engage in dealing with the international financial market, all of the classes are in the formative stage, and they engage in no political expression or expression of their interests. The educated people even speak on behalf of the peasants and working classes. These educated people do not represent the workers or peasants, but they are speaking on their behalf because they are intellectually committed to them. However, what these classes of people must do in the future is to produce their own leaders.

In any case, under current circumstances where we have legitimacy--the legitimacy of bureaucracy--we inevitably find a pyramid structure because this is the nature of the structure of bureaucracy. The pyramid structure has one man at the top. Usually he is a popular leader who has become the overall leader, with one exception being perhaps in the case of India because of its diverse nature.

Egypt could have been an exception, and in my view it is a possible exception, and we should not forget that national states in Europe took 400 years before they could complete their formation.

The history of Egypt as a modern nation begins with the era of Muhammad 'Ali, and the history of the Egyptian popular movement begins with the 'Urabi revolution and the groundwork done prior to this revolution. As far as Egypt is concerned, there are two basic issues:

1. Egypt's geographical position which opens it up to the whole world and has made it impossible for Egypt to isolate itself from the world by decree of any authority or ruler.
2. Egypt's historical value or the value which Egypt continually acquires by virtue of the influence which it exercises over those around it. Furthermore, the Egyptian people have been ahead of other people in terms of progress and growth, and the Egyptian people are immune to violence. This recent period of violence went on only 3 months before it ended. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to say that Egypt is not a Third World nation. But it is a fact that Egypt is the Third World nation which is best prepared to successfully pass through this stage of transition.

The set of circumstances which Egypt now finds itself living in makes it possible for Egypt to enter the phase of allowing open political expression.

Democracy Is the Solution

The problems that we are confronted with can only be solved by the people themselves. For example, if the government brought up all of the details of our economic problem and talked about the burdens which [solving it] would impose upon people, people would not accept this. The first question which would be asked would be: "Who is responsible for this situation?" A governmental authority which is isolated from the people will inevitably clash with them. But if people were allowed a real and sufficient measure of freedom in order to critically examine the problems themselves, take it upon themselves to make the necessary sacrifices, determine the objectives themselves, and pay the necessary cost to achieve these objectives, then a great deal could be achieved.

This also applies to the confrontation with Israel. The government is no longer able to deal with the restrictions which have been placed on Egypt's maneuverability because of the Camp David agreements and what followed them without running the risk of having very great problems. But the people of

Egypt could engage in this confrontation. This is why, for example, the government's position appears to be stronger concerning the steps of normalization than concerning any other matter, such as recalling or removing an ambassador, and the reason is that normalization is a matter which directly concerns the people.

It Is Beyond the Powers of the Government

So it is necessary that the main issues not be dealt with by the governmental authority alone. People must participate in dealing with them who are able to say "no" without this "no" constituting barriers which the government alone cannot overcome.

There is also an additional cause of the conflict between the people and the authority of the government. It goes back to the time before the revolution, and to be more precise, it has existed since World War II when the authority of the government started expanding. There was the state of emergency in order to deal with the circumstances of World War II, then after the revolution the government acquired additional powers in order to dethrone the king, proclaim the republic, institute agrarian reform, and nationalize the Suez Canal. Then Sadat assumed broader powers for the government in order to deal with the war of October 1973 and then to deal with the victory. The government acquired all of these powers which enable it to achieve miracles. People are now demanding solutions to their economic and social problems, but they cannot do anything because they do not possess the authority to do so. Therefore the time has come for the government to give back to the people the powers which it took from them in order to deal with emergencies, momentous decisions, enormous changes, or war circumstances, because right now we do not face any of these circumstances.

The people feel that whoever possesses all of this authority is expected to accomplish miracles. But the government cannot accomplish miracles and, objectively speaking, is unable to do this. The only solution to this conflict is to restore this authority to the people so that they can then achieve these miracles.

As I have said, Egypt has undergone a different sort of development, and it is able to experiment and bring about a rapprochement in order to leave the Third World behind and engage in what Dr Mahmud Fawzi calls the "noble adventure." Egypt is able to do this, and also cannot stop at the point where it is right now. The factors which caused the clashes and battles during the phase between the winter of anger and autumn of anger (1977-81) still exist. There are institutions which are defending themselves. Unless this country's purest and most sincere elements are able to come to an agreement concerning a common analysis and a common view and thereby avoid a clash, the matter will become extremely grave.

Nasser's Relatives

[Question] The issue of corruption and the series of scandals of corruption today are monopolizing the attention of public opinion in Egypt, and in the

above you have clearly made reference to some aspects of this issue. Nevertheless, there remain two points which I believe need to be further clarified:

1. The concept of corruption. Is it a phenomenon consisting of individual aberrations or is it an issue linked to political options and the class of parasites who have benefited from the open-door policy and who dominated the government and society during the last 8 years of Sadat's regime?
2. This concerns what some people have said along the lines that the role played by 'Isamat al-Sadat and other brothers and relatives of former President Sadat in corruption is no different from the role played by some of the brothers of Nasser, our deceased leader. As someone who has witnessed these two eras, how do you explain this phenomenon, what is your opinion concerning what is being said about it, and what information do you have concerning 'Isamat al-Sadat during the two eras?

[Answer] Corruption appeared because of policies which permitted it. The doors were opened to allow 40 foreign banks to come in, and licenses were given to anyone to do whatever he wanted to. How can any planning take place in a developing nation if the nation is now allowed to exercise any control over the capital market? This is something which is impossible--anywhere in the world.

Actually I can find no parallel to this period which we have gone through except for the era of Khedive Isma'il. Perhaps you remember the famous incident involving the Austrian consul who wanted to be of service to one of his citizens. He arranged to have the man twist his ankle as he was coming down the stairs of the Shepherd Hotel. Then the consul went to the Khedive and demanded that the Khedive give compensation to the man, and he did this instead of initiating legal action to obtain compensation. The Khedive gave him 20,000 pieces of gold. Something like this also occurred during recent years. The government entered into some projects, but then it was decided to cancel the projects and the government paid compensation to the owners of these project enterprises!

The corruption was a result of social options which conflicted with the spirit of the times and with the interests of Egypt. This is the basis of the matter, and everything else is merely details, whether it involves the case of Rashad 'Uthman or 'Isamat al-Sadat. The importance of these details is the fact that they reveal something else which is both more serious and more important. One cannot view the matter as a police matter. I consider the issue to be a social phenomenon which occurred in an atmosphere which allowed it to grow and spread.

As for the Nasser era, I totally agree that Nasser's relatives should be judged by the same standards as Sadat's relatives. Nasser was responsible for them up till 28 September 1970 [the date of his death], and no one can demand more than this from him.

I happen to know a lot about the situation in Nasser's family. When he died, all of his children were still in the various phases of their education. His

elder daughter Huda was working with me at AL-AHRAM and was earning a salary of 50 Egyptians pound [a month]. Hatim Sadiq, her husband, was also working with me at AL-AHRAM, and was earning a salary of 120 Egyptian pounds. His daughter Muna was working at the publishing house Dar al-Ma'arif, and was earning a salary of 37.5 Egyptian pounds. Ashraf Marwan was an employee at the presidential headquarters, and he earned a salary of 47.5 Egyptian pounds. Concerning Nasser's brothers, it is said that al-Laythi opened up a private school and bought a house, but then Nasser himself closed this school of his.

Let me repeat that every member of Nasser's family should be judged according to the same criteria that every member of Sadat's family is being judged by, and we should consider Nasser directly responsible for any aberrations which can be shown to have occurred before his death on 28 September 1970.

[8 Dec 82 pp 3-4]

[Part two of Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal interview with Husayn 'Abd al-Raziq in Cairo]

[Excerpts] [Question] President Husni Mubarak in the recent period, particularly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, adopted certain stands that have in one way or another affected the Egyptian Government's relations with Israel, the relations that have come about as a result of, and have been consolidated by, the Camp David agreements and the peace treaty between al-Sadat's government and Israel.

This had a clear effect on certain U.S. quarters which speak with remarkable concern about the situation in Egypt. How far can an Egyptian policy committed to Egypt's Arab interests and independent course affect the special relations between the Egyptian Government and the United States?

[Answer] In President Mubarak's attitude toward events in Lebanon, there is a point in his favor. Unlike the other parties, Egypt did not promise what it cannot deliver. Of course my wish and the wish of others was that Egypt should have done more. But I must admit that in the difficult situation faced by the Palestinian resistance Egypt did not promise more than it intended to do and it did not lie to the others or to itself. While sitting here in my office I could say that this or that should have been done, but the situation is different for the one who makes the decisions. Indeed President Mubarak's situation is very difficult. It is for this reason that my attitude toward him is different from my attitude during 'Abd al-Nasir's era or al-Sadat's era. I had a continuous dialogue with 'Abd al-Nasir but I differed with al-Sadat and I left al-Ahram. I expressed my views clearly in the Arab and international press. As for Mubarak I always said that we should give him enough time.

For example I disagree with the Labor Party's call for changing Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din's cabinet. It is not a question of an individual but rather something much bigger than that.

I also disagree with the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party [NPUGP] in its call for the need to lift the emergency law and I declined to write

in AL-AHALI's campaign "Forty Years of Emergency Laws Is Enough." In my view the issue, important though it was, was a matter of detail. The group of exceptional laws by which we are being ruled are even harsher and more restrictive than the emergency laws.

The principal issue in my view is to define the basic options through which this country and, consequently, the whole area can be taken out of the state of "impotence" in which it finds itself now.

What we see in the area is alarming. We are in a transitional state between a bad epoch and a new epoch that is bound to begin. There can be nothing new in the area unless it is launched from Egypt. This is a lesson of history and geography.

Therefore, the issue is more than a matter of details, of the emergency law, of the person of the prime minister and of other particulars provided that we are assured that there is a real and correct trend toward diagnosing what has happened. As far as I can see there are some commendable efforts toward this end, although in my view the matter requires more than mere directives. What is needed now is to tackle problems and issues.

Let us go back to the question of Egypt's attitude toward Israel's aggression in Lebanon and the Camp David issue. I believe that there is something that is far more dangerous than Camp David. Any law student knows that the value of any treaty is dependent upon the balances of power resulting from it and any changes in such balances render a treaty of no value.

The basic and most important danger is the disturbance of the balance of military power in the area that has occurred in the past few years and which gave Israel an unprecedented superiority. After the Camp David agreements al-Sadat announced that the October war was the last, but Israel never said this.

The question of military balance is not only a question of war but also of peace. There is no negotiating position that does not take the balance of power into consideration. The Camp David treaty was the result of the Egyptian negotiator abandoning all the other "options." In any negotiations you set for yourself a maximum and a minimum. In the final analysis your strength stems from your opponent's knowledge--even without your saying so--that unless you obtain the legitimate minimum you will resort to other "options" in order to achieve your legitimate targets. And because they are legitimate the negotiator, and the people whom he represents, are prepared to pay the cost of inflicting losses on the opponent that he will be unable to bear. Unless you are capable of doing this and even if the negotiations go on for 2,000 years you will not be able to achieve anything.

What is more serious than this, as I said, is the disturbance of the military balance of power after 1973. Israel has always been militarily superior but we were able to achieve a strategic balance to counter Israel's superiority. For example in the 1973 war we fought on more than one front so as to force the enemy to distribute his forces. We developed the new

defense means so as to make them an offensive force. In other words, the introduction of missiles as a basic element in our defense paralyzed the Israeli Air Force's effectiveness. The same applies to the anti-tank missile which compensated for Israel's numerical superiority in tanks. Other Arab countries fought on the side of Egypt and Syria and the oil weapon was used.

Therefore, despite the Israeli military superiority there were strategic balances that enabled us to fight the battle. In any case, the Israeli military superiority was 1.2 to 1. I am afraid that the situation now is extremely serious. Israel is superior in firepower to those who are around it and who can fight it by 5 to 1 and 7.2 to 1. [Figures as published] This is a rate that cannot create a negotiating situation or achieve peace. The situation is such that it cannot be remedied simply by buying more arms. What is strange is that now under "peace" we are spending more on arms than we used to spend during war. The Arab regimes last year bought \$30 billion worth of arms while the total cost of all the arms that Egypt bought between 1955 and 1975 was \$3 billion, a major part of which was not paid for.

In the shadow of this menacing Israeli danger, the question of the two superpowers and striking a balance in relations with them is being raised. I have previously spoken about the general economic and social conditions in the area, Egypt's opting out of the confrontation, the halting and the retreat of revolution, and the emergence of the role of wealth and the international options it imposed [sentence as published]. But there is another important element that emerged during this period concerning the Soviet Union.

Frankly, in my view, if the Soviet Union had been more daring and active after 1967 the picture would have changed. I am not blaming the Soviet Union but I place on it a major share of the responsibility for the retreat of the National Liberation Movement; its positions were struck one after the other. The Soviet Union was the international power that was capable of saving these positions before they collapsed, but it hesitated and left them to their fate. In the end it found itself under direct attack and faced the crisis in Poland and Afghanistan.

The National Liberation Movement was in effect a shield for all the progressive views in the world and the battle centered around it, in the Middle East, in Latin America and in Africa. And with the fall of one position after another the Soviet Union stood helpless and unable to help them. We entered the era of the "American triumph" in the whole world, unfortunately, and not only in the Arab area and Egypt. Although the military balances of power between the Soviet Union and the United States are equal so as to prevent the occurrence of war, there is, however, a struggle for minds, hearts, influences and alliances. The United States is leading the offensive and we must admit that we are in the era of a general U.S. emergence.

Also, we are no longer in the era of great changes or of the launching of the National Liberation Movement. Nobody in Egypt dreams or imagines that it is possible to achieve miracles.

Therefore, all that we hope for and seek is that Egypt should be independent and nonaligned because this is the nature of its role, of its geography and its history.

Egypt cannot be placed at the disposal of American madness, which is ruled by an establishment that has emerged from the American West with its stupidity and its aggressive attitude and by the role of the arms manufacturing companies--the aircraft, missiles and space industry companies. Egypt cannot be left at the mercy of the U.S. arms race adventures thereby to become a military target. The whole world opinion, in the United States and Europe, is against arms race and demands nuclear disarmament. Even the Church, which is a rightist establishment in the West, is playing a prominent role against armament and nuclear arms.

Egypt was far from all this and distant from the danger. What interest do we have since our area is now likely to enter this vicious circle? We have no interest in the bright star or blue star maneuvers. All that we want is that Egypt should steer clear of these threatening dangers which are the result of the role being played by the U.S. military establishment. I believe that Egypt can, by its own means, steer clear of these dangers. Is the Israeli danger not enough? All that I ask is friendship with the Americans and that this arbitrary and undignified placing of all the cards of the game in the hands of one party, the United States, should stop.

[15 Dec 82 pp 6-7] Part III]

[Text] Soviet-Egyptian relations:

From the beginning the Soviets set the condition of withdrawing all their advisers before the battle started.

Sadat opposed me in my criticism of the Soviets' slow pace, but then he expelled the Soviet advisers from Egypt.

Some Arab parties convinced Sadat that removing the Soviets from Egypt would guarantee him a solution without war.

I expect initiatives from Andropov concerning China, Afghanistan, and the Middle East.

The Arab-Israeli conflict:

Israel has turned into an imperial power, and we congratulated ourselves on getting the Palestinian resistance forces out of Beirut.

The end of the war option means that the peace option is no longer in our hands.

The "positive features" of Reagan's initiative:

No Palestinian state.

No right of self-determination.

No withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank.

No dealings with the PLO.

Acceptance of the fact that Jerusalem will always be the capital of Israel.

Concerning domestic issues:

It is necessary to hold a dialogue concerning the following matters:

The issue of change.

The basic features of Egyptian strategy.

Freedom and ownership of the press.

The right to form political parties.

Determining the term of the president of the republic.

Independence of the leadership of the armed forces from political parties.

In this third and last installment, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal reveals the secret of Sadat's decision to expel the Soviet advisers from Egypt due to pressure on the part of the Arabs and due to his illusion that this decision would impel the U.S. to put pressure on Israel and would consequently allow Sadat to avoid taking the decision to go to war. He also reveals the Soviet-Egyptian agreement, which had been in effect since 1970, according to which the Soviet advisers would withdraw before battle began.

Haykal also talks about World War III, which is going on between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the new methods which are being utilized to wage the conflict, developments which have taken place inside the Soviet leadership, and his expectations concerning new initiatives by the Soviets under the leadership of Andropov.

Haykal strongly objects to the appeal to have the PLO recognize Israel, asserting that there is a difference between a revolution and a state. He assures us that the Arab world will be a witness to horrors during this new era which began in Beirut and which he calls the "Israeli era." Haykal also shares other important information and opinions with us. Let us now read what Haykal has said:

[Question] Some analysts consider Sadat's intervention in Sudan to back Numayri against the coup by Hashim al-'Atta and Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet advisers from Egypt to have been a turning point in Sadat's regime. This brings up an important question. In AL-AHRAM you published a series of articles concerning relations with the Soviet Union at the time immediately prior to the expulsion of the Soviet advisers from Egypt. It appeared that the articles were something which paved the way for this decision. What are the real facts concerning this matter?

[Answer] The course of history always has a basic flow or context, and there are minor factors which are not important enough to influence history.

I believe that there are those who attribute more importance to Hashim al-'Atta's coup than it really deserves. Whatever our point of view is concerning this coup, or whatever opinions and positions were held by those who carried it out, it was merely a military coup d'etat of the traditional sort--or more appropriately put, it was an incompleated attempt to carry out a military coup.

If There Was a Prior Agreement to Have the Advisers Leave Before Battle Started, Why Were They Expelled?

As for the expulsion of the Soviet advisers, this is a different matter. One could say that this decision was a turning point in Sadat's policy. We should all remember one very important thing. Before 1970 there were only 3,000 or 4,000 Soviet military advisers in Egypt. When the Soviet Union, after the secret Moscow visit, agreed to increase its presence and take over the responsibility for air defense in the Egyptian interior, and when we began to train with new weapons and entered into this important military and international development, the Soviet Union set one very important condition for accepting Nasser's request to increase the Soviet presence in Egypt during the period when Egyptian air defense crews were being trained in the Soviet Union and the Soviets were taking over responsibility for the air defense of Egypt's interior. This condition was that "all" Soviet advisers would withdraw from Egypt before battle began. The Soviet point of view, which Egypt agreed to, was that the presence of the Soviet advisers in Egypt during battle would be undesirable for two reasons:

1. This presence would deprive the Egyptian armed forces of exercising their right to enjoy the fruits of their [victory in this] battle.
2. This would create international complications which no one would be able to overcome, and would give the U.S. a pretext to send U.S. fighting forces to Israel under the cover of being "advisers."

So from the very beginning it was agreed upon that Egypt would not fight a war while it had advisers from the Soviet Union in its army. During 1971 and 1972 the number of these advisers increased. Sadat knew about this agreement, or at least he knew about it after he took over the presidency. He knew about all of the conditions which governed the presence of the Soviet advisers in Egypt.

If we assume that President Sadat decided to enter battle or wanted, in accordance with the prior agreement between the Soviets and Nasser, to have the Soviet Union withdraw its advisers from Egypt, he could have quietly and without any commotion informed the Soviets of what he wanted and requested that they carry out this agreement or condition which they themselves had set before increasing the number of their advisers in Egypt starting in 1970. This was something which was agreed upon. But since Sadat chose to settle the matter by expelling the advisers, with all of the commotion which accompanied this action, then the whole action becomes one which causes people to ask questions.

What happened was that "Arab" parties were assuring President Sadat that the Americans were prepared to play a fundamental role in solving the problem without war and were ready to put pressure on Israel. But they said that the U.S. would not approach the problem as long as there were Soviet advisers and Soviet weapons in Egypt. President Sadat did not want a military battle and he tried as hard as he could to avoid it. I do not believe that anyone can blame him for this. War is a very difficult and dangerous option. May God stand by any ruler or leader who finds himself confronted with possibly taking a decision involving war, and he has every right to try as hard as possible to avoid war.

All during 1971 and 1972 certain Arab parties were urging the president to kick the Soviets out so that the U.S. could act and put pressure on Israel. I have always said that there is a role for the U.S. to play in the Middle East, but I have said that this role should involve the neutralization of the U.S., should involve a position which is imposed upon the U.S., should involve our international and Arab alliances, and should involve a united Arab front, military action, and the utilization of other Arab weapons such as oil. It is possible to impose upon the U.S. a position of being rendered neutralized rather than a position of neutrality, because the U.S. cannot be neutral when it comes to choosing between us and Israel.

The important thing is that Sadat was won over by the urging of these Arab parties, decided to have the Soviet advisers removed, and decided to have them removed by expelling them--and decided to do so by means of a decision which he personally took.

The Arab parties which were advising him to have the Soviets removed were surprised by the timing of the event. Henry Kissinger, the U.S. secretary of state, said that he also was surprised. He also said that if Sadat had demanded a reciprocal gesture on the part of the U.S. for his taking this decision, the U.S. would have been ready to make such a gesture.

But Sadat wanted to take this decision in this dramatic fashion and wanted to do it himself, since he believed that if he did it in this fashion he could cause the Americans to be obligated to him for this gesture of his, and then they would put pressure on Israel and he would no longer have to make the decision to go to war.

But this is not at all what happened.

Now let us proceed to the matter of my articles about the Soviet Union and the alleged connection between them and this decision by Sadat. I both opposed this decision and the manner in which it was carried out.

These articles had nothing whatsoever to do with the decision to expel the Soviet advisers.

I have always criticized, and I still criticize, some of the positions taken by the Soviet Union, especially the slow pace of the Soviets. The Soviets view

developments in the world from a historical point of view. This might perhaps be a correct way to view things, but there are always tactical considerations which occasionally compel you to stop waiting for historical developments to take place and to proceed to take bold steps which are necessitated by events. I believe that the policy of caution which the Soviet Union has adhered to more than is necessary was what led to the Soviet Union's losing its role in the Middle East and caused the Soviet Union to be a party which, so far, has had no voice concerning the crisis in the Middle East.

During this period of time which preceded Sadat's decision to expel the Soviet advisers, I began to criticize some aspects of Soviet policy. There was the slow pace in replacing some of the weapons and supplying other weapons, and this was particularly unjustified in view of the fact that many of these weapons were covered by the agreement which was made with Nasser during his 1970 visit. This included, for example, completion of the missile batteries in Upper Egypt. I was against resuming military operations after Nasser's death because these batteries in Upper Egypt had not yet been completed. For this reason I criticized the slow pace of the Soviet Union, and I said that there were those who were benefiting from this "no peace, no war" situation.

The curious thing is that President Sadat strongly objected to these articles of mine and demanded a meeting with me when I was writing them. When I went to see him, Mamduh Salim had already been meeting with him before I arrived. Sadat said to me: "Your articles are putting me in an embarrassing position with the Soviets, and the Soviet Union is my only friend." I replied: "I will not go into details with you, but when any person says that he has only one friend, this is a catastrophe and it means that he is in trouble. If you are angry about this series of articles, then I am prepared to stop writing them, but I will not write anything other than these articles and, if it comes to this, I will leave my job."

I recall that at that time there was a Soviet official in Egypt who told President Sadat that Haykal was poisoning Soviet-Egyptian relations.

On Friday 7 July I was in Alexandria and was startled when someone came up to me and told me that President Sadat was calling me on the phone. I thought that he was angry about the article of mine which had appeared in that day's Friday issue since this article was the most critical one in the whole series of articles about the Soviet Union. I then talked to him on the phone and he asked me when I was coming back to Cairo. I had arrived in Alexandria on Thursday, and intended to return on Sunday. I asked him if it was something important. He said that there was something and that he wanted to have dinner with me on Monday. I tried to find out what it was all about. But he merely told me to finish my vacation and that we would see each other on Monday.

Sadat had already stopped by to see Dr Mahmud Fawzi in al-Badrshayn on 6 July and had told him that he was going to inform the Soviet ambassador of several matters on Saturday, the most important thing being his decision to expel the Soviet advisers and that it was necessary for them to leave Egypt within 10 days. Dr Fawzi debated this matter with him and suggested that he consider

the priorities and allow the matter to be discussed. He said that there was no need to expel the advisers, and that the issue should be made an issue for negotiation. Dr Fawzi also displayed some apprehensions concerning Egypt receiving supplies of weapons.

On Friday, the same day that he contacted me, Sadat called Lt Gen Muhammad Sadiq and asked him to perform Friday prayers together with him. On that occasion Sadat said to Sadiq, knowing what Sadiq's position was with regard to the Soviets: "I am going to tell you something which will make you break out laughing." He then told him of his decision to expel the Soviet advisers. Lt Gen Sadiq was taken aback, and then asked him: "But what are we going to do about being supplied with weapons?"

The next day Sadat summoned the Soviet ambassador and, in the presence of Hafiz Isma'il, informed him of his decision. I met President Sadat on Monday and I had no inkling of all of this that had happened. When I first saw him, I told him that, if he objected to my articles, I was prepared to stop writing them. I said that, of course, I would write nothing other than these articles and that I would stop writing altogether. Sadat said: "What do you mean? This is a scandal. You are the greatest journalist in the Middle East and the great reporter who knows everything. But you do not even know what is going on in your own country. You do not even know the most important decision which has been made." When I asked him what important decision he was talking about, he said: "I have expelled the Soviet advisers. I summoned the Soviet ambassador and told him to get them out."

We talked about the matter and I told him that there was nothing wrong with removing the Soviet advisers if he felt that the time had come to do so, especially since there already was an agreement with them to do so. But the method used to accomplish this was incomprehensible. First of all, he gave them only 10 days to leave. Furthermore, they were being expelled and this was causing tension in [Soviet-Egyptian] relations, and was a response to outside pressures, and our weapons were Soviet weapons.

So there was no connection between my articles which criticized the slow pace of the Soviets and Sadat's decision. I attacked this decision and in AL-AHRAM I said that it was not a well-considered decision. And even if it were a well-considered decision, it was implemented in a dramatic fashion and involved an issue which does not allow actions of a theatrical type.

What Do You Anticipate From the New Soviet Leadership?

[Question] In view of your knowledge of Soviet policy and your knowledge about the new Soviet leadership, do you expect there to be any change in Soviet-U.S. relations?

More importantly than this, what are your expectations concerning the role played by the Soviet Union under the leadership of Yuri Andropov--and I believe you are personally acquainted with him--in the Middle East and with regard to Soviet-Egyptian relations?

[Answer] One must admit that, in times past, Soviet policy has been characterized by a certain degree of inflexibility. In my view this is attributable to various diverse reasons.

The Soviet Union, as I have said before, is the country in the world which has suffered the most. Since its very beginning it has been surrounded and has had to fight many wars. During the Stalin era the decision was made to put socialism into practice in a single country [rather than pursuing the application of socialism throughout the world]. The Soviet people paid a fearful price in order to achieve this, and they did succeed in establishing heavy industry. During World War II the Soviet Union's heavy industries were destroyed, 20 or 22 million Soviet citizens were killed, and whole villages and cities were destroyed. It was a real war of genocide. After the war the Soviet Union began its reconstruction while the cold war was going on and under circumstances of international tension and a fearful arms race.

To all of this one must add the growth in the national liberation movement and the fact that this movement asked for help from the Soviet Union--and the Soviet Union did give help to this movement. We should not forget that the Soviet Union was not involved in the process of colonialist expansion and plundering which was engaged in by the West. Some scholars talk about the expansion of Russia to the Pacific Ocean, but all of that took place under circumstances which naturally allowed this to happen, just as the U.S. expanded from east to west. This is completely different from what happened during the nineteenth century, which was a process of colonialism and exploitation in the traditional sense of the word "colonialism." The Soviet Union did not participate in this old-style colonialism, nor has it been involved in neo-colonialism.

After World War II the Soviet Union had to build itself up, maintain its full capacity to defend itself and the ring of defense surrounding the Soviet Union, whether it was China or the Eastern European nations, and the Soviet Union had to aid the national liberation movement.

After Stalin died and Khrushchev came to power, the Soviet Union attempted to do all of this and more. The nuclear balance of power brought about fixed borders of a sort between the Soviet Union and the U.S. in some areas such as, for example, Europe. The security of Europe was an important issue for both sides, and the situation was stabilized at the Geneva conference in 1955, but there remained other locations where the conflict was still going on.

After the nuclear balance of power was achieved, war became impossible because of the development of missiles. More important than this was the mobility acquired by these missiles when they were placed on submarines. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, by means of modern detection, were capable of pinpointing the missile bases of the other side and destroying them. But the location of missiles borne by submarines which cruise around the seas cannot always be easily determined. In addition to this element of mobility, one must also mention the element of concealment in the case of submarines. For example, any modern submarine is able to carry missiles which are capable of destroying

about 35 or 36 vital locations in either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. The most recent studies and scenarios created for a war which would take place have shown that the side which deals the first blow will cause the other side to lose 132 million people, and the side which replies to the first blow will also cause its opponent to lose the same number of people. The cost of war has become fearfully high, and the result has been that other methods of waging the conflict have emerged.

In this conflict the U.S. pattern represents a tremendous temptation for all of the other societies. The Americans have not created a civilization, but they have created a way of life. This way of life, to our great misfortune, has become a pattern for many nations. When the issue brought up is the issue of development, the Soviet Union is able to play an important role and to help nations achieve development. But when the issue is something else, such as a way of life, then it is the American pattern which tempts and attracts many nations.

Since a hot war has become something which is impossible, the Americans have started maneuvering more. They have dragged the Soviet Union into a frightening arms race. Last year the Soviets spent \$300 billion on weapons. The Americans are able to spend this much and more. They are also capable of destroying the entire world economy, and unfortunately they will end up destroying themselves also. They have started circulating Eurodollars throughout the world. What this means, in simplified terms, is that the U.S. is borrowing \$2 trillion (that is, \$2,000 billion) from the world. These Eurodollars are banknotes which are issued by the U.S. and backed by the U.S. itself, that is, they amount to a loan with no collateral. The U.S. is actually destroying the world's monetary system. The Soviets do not have the capability of influencing the world's economic system. The U.S. is also taking the capital surpluses earned from Arab oil. The Soviet Union, to our great misfortune, is unable to compete with the U.S. in the conflict which is going on right now. During the time of national liberation and independent development, it was possible to ask the Soviet Union to build the High Dam and help with industrialization, and the Soviet Union was capable of responding to this request and carrying it out. But now the issues are different, especially in the Middle East. Oil capital has destroyed all of the old dreams for development (in spite of the correctness of such development). The entire area is sinking in a sea of oil capital, with all of the social conflicts which accompany this situation. It is true that this is a temporary phenomenon, but right now it is the prevailing phenomenon.

At the time this new phenomenon was occurring, the Soviet Union was going through a phase of transition in its leadership as a result of numerous circumstances. Party bureaucracy came to dominate even the highest levels in the Soviet Union. I believe that it is worth noting that Brezhnev kept on ruling the Soviet Union for 18 continuous years, and during all of that time there were about five presidents in the U.S. Gromyko has been the Soviet foreign minister for the last 30 years, and during that time he has dealt with ten U.S. secretaries of state. Each of these secretaries of state had his own new team, and each president had his own national security adviser. What this

means is that there was always new thinking in the U.S., whereas in the Soviet Union it appeared that nothing ever changed. Certainly new things were going on inside the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, but nobody knew anything about it. At the same time, whatever was going on in the U.S. was brought up, attracted everyone's attention, and affected the world.

This process of having a cultural effect on the whole world, especially the Third World, is something which is dangerous when done by the U.S. For example, if any person here is interested in issues of national security and strategy, where does he get his information? I, as a reader, know of no Soviet center which publishes any studies concerning these issues, whereas there are dozens of American centers which publish reports dealing with nearly everything. We must admit that all of us depend on studies and reports produced by the U.S. when we want to know something about strategy or economics. At the same time, we find no papers published by the Soviet Union which we can use. There is rigidity and hesitation in Soviet policy. If we take into account which age group, on the average, influences U.S. policy and which age group, on the average, influences Soviet policy, we find that the average age of such persons is 51 in the U.S. and 69 in the Soviet Union. How is it possible for the largest revolutionary nation in the world to be conservative to this degree?!

The upshot of all of this is that the war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is still going on. World War III is in full swing. The U.S. is dragging the Soviet Union into a fearful arms race, is offering a type of consumer way of life which the Soviet Union cannot match, and is attempting to isolate the Soviet Union by taking advantage of the rigidity of Soviet policy.

Now that Brezhnev is dead and Andropov has taken over the leadership of the party, will anything new happen? I believe that it will. Five years ago I wrote a book which reached readers throughout the world and concerned Soviet-Arab relations. In the book I said that there were two rising stars in the Kremlin, Mazurov and Andropov, and that only one of these two would succeed Brezhnev. Mazurov's health declined and he came to be out of the picture, and the only bright star on the horizon of the Soviet Union which was left was Andropov.

The strangest thing that is being said about Andropov in our press is that he is a KGB man who came to be the leader of the Soviet Union. I have never heard such nonsense in all my life.

Andropov is not a police officer or KGB man who was promoted within this apparatus and then became head of the government. He is a political man, and as such he was appointed by the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party to be head of his country's state security apparatus which deals with matters both at home and abroad. It was exactly the same in the U.S. when Henry Kissinger was chosen to be national security adviser and chaired the Committee of Forty in the White House to which all reports are submitted and which organizes methods of collecting information, analyzes the information, provides appraisals, and overseas the CIA in addition to engaging in [other] secret operations. It was

Nixon who gave clear instructions, via Kissinger, to have Salvador Allende, the president of Chile, assassinated. And Kissinger, as we all know, was no police officer or intelligence officer. He is a political man!

Three Meetings With Andropov

I met Andropov three times a long time ago. The last time was in July of 1970. During one of those meetings he sat there and did not utter a single word. He was following a discussion between me and Suslov about the press after Nasser had said that AL-AHRAM was earning a profit. Suslov then asked: "How can one of the objectives of the revolution be to have its press earn a profit?" The discussion was going on between me and Suslov via an interpreter. I was speaking in English, and I noticed that Andropov was following our discussion with interest and was not waiting for my words to be translated into Russian.

The last time we met, Andropov and I talked about the media coverage of the Soviet presence in Egypt to provide air defense for Egypt's interior after the Moscow visit in 1970, when this important matter became known.

My belief is that the Soviet Union has passed through the transition stage. This stage began 5 years ago when Brezhnev became ill, then all the internal balances were worked out, and the issue of succession was settled and decided upon before Brezhnev's death. The military played an important role in the choice of Brezhnev's successor. By "military" I do not mean the marshals of the Soviet Union, but rather the new generation of Soviet generals who are acquainted with modern warfare, who know the meaning of nuclear war, and who are acquainted with the facts of the modern age.

So with regard to Andropov and Soviet policy as far as the top Soviet leaders are concerned, I believe that there is an important series of facts which one must bear in mind, and which could be summed up as follows:

1. The problem of the period of transition has been settled.
2. The new leader is younger than Brezhnev was, and he has a very profound understanding about what is going on in the world. The reason for this is that he was head of the KGB for a long time and was able to become acquainted in great detail with what was going on in the world.
3. It is not only a matter of knowing information. It is also a matter of judging the information, and being able to do this depends on knowing the facts of the modern age.
4. There is a new elite in the Soviet Union, and it is represented above all by Ustinov or the new bureaucracy in the party and the Soviet generals. I believe that this generation has new ideas, is conscious of the scope of the challenge which the Soviet Union confronts, and also has new vitality.

For this reason I expect some sort of Soviet initiatives in the future. The beginnings of these initiatives have appeared as far as relations with China

are concerned. We will also possibly witness some initiative in Afghanistan to enable the Soviet Union to get out of the critical situation which the Soviet Union is confronted with there.

I also expect new things in the Middle East. The Soviet Union clearly sees that it has lost a great deal in the Middle East and that it has abandoned the Middle East not only to the U.S., but also to Israel. We should not forget that the Middle East is an area which borders the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union has many interests in the Middle East. This is why I expect a new initiative in the Middle East and expect Soviet policy there to be reactivated. How will this take place? This is something that only events will tell us.

As far as Soviet-Egyptian relations are concerned, my point of view is that it is unreasonable that there still is no Soviet ambassador in Egypt. First of all, this is something which is completely illogical. Secondly, the Soviet ambassador left Egypt during the "cyclone" which took place in September of 1981. Those who were arrested during this "cyclone" have already been released, and I think that it is also necessary to "release" the Soviet ambassador and allow Soviet-Egyptian relations to return to their normal level.

Egypt's Military and Political Will Has Not Been Vanquished

[Question] Many politicians and commentators are talking about the fourth Arab defeat and the Arab collusion which took place both during and after the Israeli invasion. What is your assessment of the position taken by the Arab regimes, the position taken by the Egyptian regime, Reagan's initiative, the decisions made by the Fes conference, and the insistence that the PLO recognize Israel after the Palestinians were removed from Beirut and the Palestinian resistance fighters were scattered?

How can we put a stop to this infernal string of Arab defeats?

[Answer] This was not just one question. Your question was formulated in such a way as to include dozens of questions.

First of all I would like to ask you about this number of Arab defeats which you mentioned. You say that there have been four of them. I do not know on what basis you base this opinion.

We have entered into six armed confrontations with Israel during the last 30 years.

In 1948 we entered into a confrontation, and our objective was to prevent the establishment of Israel. We were defeated, Israel was established, and it was established in an area larger than the area allotted to it by the UN partition of Palestine.

After that we entered into a confrontation with Israel in 1956. This was not only a confrontation with Israel, but also with Britain and France that sided

with Israel. I believe--and so does the whole world, with the unfortunate exception of some people in Egypt--that we were not defeated in this confrontation. Quite the contrary, we achieved a victory which I consider to have been the most complete strategic victory ever achieved in modern Arab history.

Sometimes we do not differentiate between battles and wars.

A battle is one thing, and war is something else.

War constitutes an overall political effort. The field of battle is merely one of the arenas where a struggle between opposing wills takes place. It is basically a struggle between wills, each of which is attempting to obtain the spoils of war for itself.

The battles which took place in 1956 were limited ones because there were only six battalions of Egyptian forces in Sinai. Our principal groups of armed forces were not in Sinai. They were west of the Suez Canal, and were awaiting the attack of the British and the French. They had received orders to withdraw so that their lines would not be cut off from their fundamental base in Egypt. After the Israeli attack on 29 October, these forces were told to resist for 48 hours, they did put up brave resistance, and then they withdrew. The British and French forces which had landed at Port Sa'id were not able to advance.

Eden and Mollet were banking on the fact that, as far as the Suez Canal was concerned, it would be enough to merely issue a warning to Egypt in order to get Egypt to surrender. But this did not happen. Egypt kept on fighting alone for 11 days, and the world was totally shaken up by this. The invading forces were forced to withdraw. All of the spoils of war--the Suez Canal, Sinai, and even the Gaza Strip--remained in the hands of Egypt. So what this means is that Egypt was victorious in this war.

After that we engaged in a confrontation with Israel for a third time, in 1967. We were defeated on the field of battle. However, the war did not end with this defeat. It kept going on. We lost on the field of battle, but we did not lose the war. The will of Egypt, embodied by Egypt's political leadership and armed forces, remained steadfast and prevented Israel from attaining the objective of the war.

Nevertheless, I am prepared to say that in 1967 we were defeated. It was a military defeat which was not able to put an end to the war, nor was it able to constitute the end of a period of history which would stop at that point because Egypt's political and military will continued the war.

This resulted in the fourth war between us and Israel, which was the war of attrition. This war lasted about 2 years. I do not believe that this war resulted in a defeat for us. In fact, this war constituted the normal prelude and necessary preparation for the war of 1973 in which Arab arms were able to achieve a long-range strategic victory, even though Egyptian policy was unable to take advantage of what had been achieved by force of arms. This was the

fifth war between us and Israel. We definitely were not defeated in this war--at least not on the field of battle.

Now we come to the sixth war. The sixth Arab-Israeli war was the war at Beirut. I do not believe that the Palestinian revolutionary forces lost this war. As far as the Palestinian revolutionary forces themselves are concerned, the whole world saw that they fought, fought with honor, and fought bravely, and they fought so hard that their fighting produced strong reactions throughout the world and even in Israel itself.

It Was the Arab Regimes That Were Defeated in Lebanon

Nevertheless, I am prepared to say that the Arabs lost the war in Lebanon. But who was it that lost? Certainly it was not the Palestinian revolutionary forces. It was the whole Arab world that lost, or to be more precise, it was all of the Arab regimes that were defeated in Lebanon. The truth is that they had already been defeated before Lebanon, but it was in Lebanon that their total impotence showed up in such notorious fashion.

What happened before our eyes in Lebanon was tragic.

The forces of Israel occupied an Arab capital for the first time. Israel also, for the first time, chose the president of the republic of an Arab country.

Israel, which has now been transformed into an imperial power in the Middle East, acts in whatever fashion it wants to throughout the entire area, and for the first time it is able to do so without any opposition or deterrent.

The only thing that we were able to do was to call in the U.S. ambassadors in the Arab capital cities and have them send messages to the U.S. president asking him to demand that Israel be satisfied with what it had achieved and quiet down.

Is This Not Horrible?

There are many reasons why this Arab defeat occurred.

One reason was that Egypt had left the Arab arena.

Another reason was that the interests of the rulers of the Arab world predominated over concern for the security of the Arab world.

Still another reason was total dependence on others, that is, surrendering one's destiny to others.

We have not even been able to find a solution for the Iraqi-Iranian war. Unfortunately there have been among us people who are happy to see that Iraq has gotten involved in this war so that Iraq can be prevented from playing any active role in the Gulf area. I remember how surprised I was once when I heard one of the Arab leaders talking about this war between Iraq and Iran,

and his comment concerning the war was summed up in half a verse of poetry which said: "Maybe the vipers will die from the poison of the scorpions."!

In the end the only thing that we were able to do in Lebanon was to get the Palestinian resistance forces out of Beirut. We considered that to be a great achievement, and we started congratulating ourselves that this had happened.

The Palestinian revolutionary forces then entered a diaspora that I am apprehensive about.

Lebanon then remained alone to confront the dreams of Israeli hegemony, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, also has to deal with minor civil wars.

And what has the rest of the Arab world done?

The Ax Which Has Fallen on Our Heads!

We were invited to a summit meeting in Fes, and it ended up being the ax which has fallen on our heads, as the Egyptian proverb says. Before the summit conference in Fes we had received Reagan's proposals and had said that they contained positive elements. The fact is that I have not been able to see what these positive elements are.

Reagan clearly said to us--no Palestinian state, no right of self-determination for the Palestinians, no withdrawal from the West Bank or Gaza, and, of course, we must accept the fact that Jerusalem will always be the capital of Israel.

Then Reagan also said to us that he will never deal with the PLO under any circumstances.

The eloquent expressions which appeared to be positive in Reagan's plan were most likely an attempt to tone down the resentment of the Arab world which considered the U.S. to be responsible for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The effect of these words ended as soon as the ringing of the echoes of these words disappeared.

It was in this atmosphere that the Fes conference took place. It was clear that the victory achieved there was that of the bloc of kings in the Arab world. Of course, we should extend all due respect to the Arab kings, but we do have the right to debate with them. King Hasan, the king of Morocco, who was the chairman of the conference, said to the others during one of the sessions of the conference: "Let us do something. We have allowed you to run things for a long time, and that is why we arrived at the situation that we are now in."

If King Hasan will pardon me for saying so, the fact is that the kings have been doing something.

The kings of Saudi Arabia, for example, were mainly interested in getting the Soviets out of the Middle East, and getting the Soviets out of the Middle East

began with removing Soviet weapons from the Middle East. But this meant that we would no longer have war as an option. We simply are not able to confront Israel with the weapons which we get from the U.S. alone. Whatever we do, the U.S. will not give us enough weapons to defend ourselves against Israel. But when we no longer have the option of war, this means that we also no longer have the option of peace. There can be no peace and can be no negotiations in isolation from the balance of military power.

Furthermore, the king of Morocco himself was the mediator between President Sadat and Israel. It was in his palace that the first meeting between Moshe Dayan, the foreign minister of Israel, and Hasan al-Tihami, Sadat's adviser, took place, and this happened months before the Jerusalem initiative.

These contacts between President Sadat and Israel led to the initiative and to Camp David. This, in turn, led to removing Egypt from the Arab confrontation with Israel and led to removing Egypt from the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel, and this was a factor which was decisively in favor of Israel.

The Fes conference ended with a plan of action, but any plan of action which is not based on a real balance of power becomes something which is merely aspirations or illusions.

An Unfortunate Meeting

We have seen that the U.S. objected even to the presence of a PLO representative in the Arab summit delegation which travelled to the U.S. in order to present the Arab plan which resulted from the Fes conference. We agreed not to include the PLO representative, we met with Reagan, and it was an unfortunate meeting. The only thing the Arab delegation heard from him was that it was necessary for all of the Arabs to first recognize Israel and then sit down with Israel at the negotiating table!

Recently we have heard opinions which call upon the PLO to recognize Israel even if Israel does not recognize the PLO, because this would induce the U.S. to agree to talk to the PLO. It has also been said that the PLO later on, if it wanted to, could withdraw its recognition of Israel.

With all due respect to these opinions, I differ with them. I differ with them first of all because there is a great difference between a state and a revolution. A revolution has only spiritual or moral things which it can give away. If it gives these things away, then it no longer has anything. A state, though, is something else.

If we demand that the PLO recognize Israel even though Israel does not recognize the PLO, this means that we are asking the PLO to surrender before the negotiations begin.

Secondly, there is another matter, and it was brought up by King Husayn himself when he was asked about Israel. He said: "What Israel are we being

asked to start recognizing, and within which borders should we recognize Israel as being?"

Israel occupies all of Palestinian territory. If the PLO gives recognition to this circumstance, then this would mean that the PLO would be recognizing the fact that Israel has the right to all of Palestinian territory. This would mean that the PLO, in such a case, would be giving Israel everything and would not be gaining anything in return. The only thing which it would gain would be that the U.S. would agree to talk to the PLO--assuming that the U.S. has actually agreed to do this.

Thirdly, I would like to ask: How can the PLO withdraw its recognition of Israel after it has recognized it? In the case of a state, withdrawal of recognition means cutting off relations, recalling an ambassador, or other such measures. But what could the PLO do to withdraw its recognition of Israel?!

Fourthly, my view is that any party which gives advice to another party is supposed to have some sort of justification entitling him to give the advice. We already know what Israel is saying, and there is no need to listen to me or anyone else. Israel is saying that it will not recognize the PLO even if the PLO recognizes Israel. With all due respect to those in favor of a prior Palestinian recognition of Israel, without making it a condition that Israel simultaneously recognize the PLO, I beg to differ with them!

Is it not strange that we are demanding that the PLO, whose elements are scattered throughout the entire Arab world, unilaterally recognize a state that has become a nuclear power, because we want to have this state rest assured that this revolutionary organization which is so scattered is not striving to destroy it?

Egyptian Delegation to Beirut

Let me also marginally add a quick comment about what I heard concerning the arrival of two Egyptian envoys, Dr Usamah al-Baz and Dr Butrus Ghali, in Beirut.

Perhaps I am mistaken in my view, but I must admit right away that, at first, I saw no reason for this visit. Perhaps I could risk saying that, in my opinion, the visit was premature, and I am afraid that some critics of Egyptian policy might find reasons to criticize this visit.

It might be said, for example, that representatives from the only Arab capital where there is an Israeli ambassador are now rushing over to the only Arab capital where there are Israeli army forces. It might be said, for example: Why did Egypt not send these envoys to Beirut when both the Palestinian and Lebanese people were fighting a war under difficult circumstances, and why is Egypt now sending these envoys during the period of bargaining and negotiations?!

Of course, it is necessary for Egypt to be concerned about the affairs of every Arab country and to use all means to attempt to restore natural ties with the Arab world. But let me say that the Lebanese door which has been smashed open by Israel is not, at the present time, precisely the most appropriate door for Egypt to enter in order to become directly involved with issues involving action by the Arabs. But it could nevertheless be that this judgment of mine is a hasty one. Perhaps I and others will soon hear that these Egyptian efforts have succeeded in providing bases for the various Lebanese factions to come to an understanding in order to have the Lebanese formula for a national accord be successful. Such a national accord would mean that no faction would dominate any other faction, no party would disarm any other one, the weapons would remain in the hands of a single overall party, and everyone would be committed to Lebanon's special role, which is linked to both Lebanon's security and its very existence. Maybe we will hear that Egypt has succeeded in convincing the authorities in Lebanon to call the leaders of the militias to account for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila and has succeeded in convincing the official authorities in Lebanon to release the more than 2,000 Palestinians arrested by the forces of the regular Lebanese army. This happened after Israeli forces surrounded Beirut, and then the Lebanese militias overran the Palestinian refugee camps and committed a horrible bloodbath, and then elements from the Lebanese army were left behind to undertake third step, which was the arrest of all of those [Palestinians] that had remained behind in Beirut.

As I say this I am aware of the degree of suffering that the Lebanese people, for years, have had to endure due to irresponsible possession and use of weapons, due to violations of the authority of the Lebanese government, and due to violations of even the most elemental human rights of Lebanon's citizens. However, if we want to turn over a new leaf in Lebanon, then we must really do so, even in the midst of all of these high-strung circumstances, and we cannot simply allow old scores to be settled. Otherwise Lebanon's future will be in danger.

In any case, I am prepared to be open-minded toward any Lebanese delegation which comes to Cairo to explain whatever it wants to explain, as Bashir al-Jumayyil did when he went to Riyadh and Rabat. But I cannot help feeling wary about an Egyptian delegation which, under these circumstances, goes to Lebanon in order to either explain or listen to matters there.

As a further aside I would like to say that I have reason to believe that some parties are thinking about inviting Egypt to participate in the multinational force in Lebanon. Although I do not know whether or not this proposal has officially been made to the Egyptian authorities, nor do I know whether or not the Egyptian authorities have either agreed to or rejected it, I nevertheless would like to hasten to raise my hand and fundamentally object to the idea. If Egypt did this, it would be sticking its nose where it does not belong and where it has no interest. Everything that is going on in Lebanon right now amounts to a U.S.-Israeli effort, and I do not know what direction it is leading to, nor do I know what the consequences of this effort will be. In any case, Egypt, from the beginning, was far removed from the conflict in Lebanon,

and it is too late for Egypt to get close to the issue since it is already the end of the day. Furthermore, this would lead Egypt toward complications, the details of which I do not care to go into.

Israel's Demands

Also, we have to view the situation as it really is.

Israel has nearly completed the process of annexing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Among us there are people who say that Egypt recognized Israel and regained Sinai, but they forget that Sinai is not the same as Palestine.

Israel had no historical claims to Sinai at all, but was only interested in Sinai because of its security requirements. Israel got more of Sinai than it ever dreamed it would.

We forget that President Sadat once said: "Israel offered to give back Sinai in exchange for having Egypt leave the Arab camp, but I refused."

This could be true.

Israel's objective has always been to get Egypt to leave the Arab camp rather than to annex Sinai. Annexation of Sinai would mean that Egypt would continually remain in the arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt is the Arab nation which is most capable of confronting Israel. For this reason Israel has always been anxious to cease its clashes with Egypt if this could guarantee that Egypt would leave the Arab camp. And, unfortunately, this is what happened. So withdrawing from Sinai was part of Israel's strategy as long as Egypt left the Arab camp.

Israel's real demands have always been centered in geographical Palestine, which the Israelis call the "land of Israel." I can understand Begin's position in this regard. I can understand what his position is from his point of view. The "land of Israel" concept is one which is based on a semi-religious myth, and myths are something which cannot be broken down into parts. A myth is a complete metaphysical concept. If you take away part of it, then you fundamentally destroy it. But history is something which is different from a myth. History involves people. And whatever involves people is something which is relative.

If Begin accepted the logic of withdrawing from Nablus, then, for example, what would be the difference between withdrawing from Nablus and withdrawing from al-Nasirah [Nazareth]? Whatever applies to the West Bank also applies to Galilee.

If there is any man involved in this problem who is not a Palestinian and for whom I feel sympathy, it is--I swear to God--King Husayn of Jordan. I think that he is in a most difficult situation. He is a smart man, he is experienced, he knows all of the facts, and he is being subjected to pressure from all sides.

Reagan is pressuring him to adopt the Jordanian option [for the Palestinians], and the king knows what Israel is doing and realizes that it is too late for the Jordanian option.

The Arabs are putting pressure on King Husayn because the Arab regimes wish to have it appear that something is being done.

While standing between these two pressures, King Husayn is attempting to gain time in a battle from which he, more than anyone else, does not expect any results worth mentioning. But he is nevertheless trying. Perhaps he will succeed in providing a cover for everyone, and perhaps a miracle will happen.

Before you came to interview me now I had an American visitor whom you perhaps saw as he was leaving my office and you were coming in to see me. He had just been in the occupied lands. He told me that now no more than 5 percent of the West Bank could be regained by the Arabs even if Ronald Reagan used all of the influence which he has with the Israelis. When he was talking to me his advice was that this 5 percent of the West Bank should be quickly accepted or else even it too would be lost. I said to him: "If we are going to regain 5 percent of our territory in return for recognizing the other 95 percent as part of Israel, then I am one person who will not accept this."

I told him that my opinion was that Israel, historically speaking, is an entity which is doomed, especially in view of the way in which Israel lives its life and plays its role.

Historically speaking, the weight of history is entirely against Israel even though current circumstances in the Arab world are favorable for Israel.

Israel is a small patch of land surrounded by a vast Arab sea. Also, the Arab world is going to change and new forces are going to emerge in the Arab world which will be firmer and more capable.

Israel and Lebanon

Let me remind you of the fact that, although the Arabs were defeated in Lebanon, the Israelis nevertheless were not victorious. One could even say that when Israel went into Lebanon it entered a minefield. It turned out that the action of invading Lebanon cost more than the Israelis had bargained for. The political, social, sectarian, and international circumstances in Lebanon are difficult to control, and there are interactions there which are difficult to assess. This has caused Israel to have to widely deploy its forces and they are thus more vulnerable than Israeli forces have been used to being in previous operations. They are also exposed to a psychological and human climate which is difficult to cope with. We have seen the reactions to this in the political arena of Israel itself. I do not know when Israel will be able to leave Lebanon, but certainly it will be facing a bitterly cold winter there.

When this winter is over, what will Israel be gaining from Lebanon? More than likely Israel will not emerge with a peace treaty because the Lebanese formula [for a national accord] means that such a treaty cannot be accepted, even if a given Lebanese faction might want to have such a treaty.

With the balance of forces currently being what it is in Lebanon, it will not be possible to transform the Lebanese nation into a petty state under Israeli domination.

If it becomes necessary to rebuild Lebanon, there is only one Arab source which is able to provide the necessary capital to do this. If the Lebanese president wants to be the president of all of the Lebanese rather than of one faction of the Lebanese, then he has to stand up and resist the dictates given to him by Israeli hegemony. If this president wishes to maintain the integrity of Lebanese territory, then he must take into consideration the presence of the Syrians. This presence is far larger than merely being the Syrian military presence in the Biga' Valley.

Lebanon has had a great influence on the Israeli army.

Ordinary Israeli soldiers have suffered a great loss of morale in Israel. In fact, I know that they have even lost a great deal in terms of their standards and criteria of military service which they have been so proud of. I know of many incidents which prove to me the fact that soldiers in the Israeli army--and even officers--have accepted bribes on a large scale in order to let commercial shipments and merchandise pass through their lines. In fact, Israeli officers have even accepted bribes in order to allow arms to pass through their lines.

Lebanon has a dreadful influence on all of those who enter it. The Palestinians have suffered from this influence, the Syrians have suffered from this influence, and now the Israelis are suffering from it. Tomorrow the Americans will be suffering from it!

Israel's structure is being jolted from within. More people are emigrating from Israel than are immigrating to Israel. Israeli life as a society is that of a military garrison which one can hardly endure. The Israeli economy is an economy without a real basis. There are more than a million Arabs inside the borders which Israel claims. The composition of the population in Israel is experiencing an upheaval and the Sephardic element, or Oriental Jews, now outnumber the Ashkenazi element, or Western Jews.

Furthermore, the folly of force and violence is tearing away at the thoughts of all of the original pioneers who had the dream that Zionism would create a new society for them. What we have is a racist military society which is destroying itself.

I personally prefer to await the course of history and wait for the scales of history to do their job. These scales of history will not merely do their job automatically and all by themselves. The Arab world is going to change, it will acquire knowledge and education, and it will become more resolute and have increasing awareness. New generations are going to emerge which will have new values. With these generations class-related interests will not predominate over the interests of the Arab world or over the security of the nations of the Arab world.

What I said to this visitor who was here before you came was no exaggeration, I was not dreaming, and I was not being excessively pessimistic concerning the status quo or excessively optimistic concerning the forces of history.

A New Phase

It appears to me that the Arab world is now going through a phase of labor pains. It has just completely gone through one phase, another phase is bound to begin, and it will begin.

We are going to be entering a phase in which there will be violent interaction, and right now I already see the beginnings of it. We are going to be entering a phase of tremendous, perhaps fearful, conflicts. They will be conflicts of a social, intellectual, and class-related nature. I do not believe that any country in the Arab world will be able to avoid these conflicts. We are all going to be right in the middle of them. One phase has totally ended. It ended once and for all in Beirut, and now a new phase is going to begin. Where is it that this new phase could begin? I believe that it will begin in Egypt. Egypt has always been the beginning of everything new in the Arab world.

Egypt's current leaders are the ones who will have to answer the following basic and vital question: Is Egypt a postscript to what has already taken place in the Arab world, or is Egypt a prelude to what should take place in the Arab world?

I am also asked what these leaders should be doing. My reply is as follows:

The phase of revolution has retreated for numerous reasons, and there are many reasons why the phase of wealth is already over. The only thing left for ordinary Arabs to do is to accept and endure their destiny. But they cannot accept and endure their destiny unless they obtain the freedom to dream, to think, and to act. I neither wish nor have in mind to demand that our current Egyptian leaders do more than circumstances permit them to do. But we must find a way to reconcile our hopes with reality.

Let me tell you exactly what I have in mind.

The current People's Assembly term ends in June of 1984. Let this be a turning point in our country. Let us begin preparing for these elections by having the freedom to form political parties, the freedom to publish newspapers, freedom of assembly, and freedom of speech. Let us allow the Egyptian Arab people to shoulder their responsibilities as they today are shouldering their concerns, and let us allow them to proceed to set up a new structure.

We are right now nearing the end of 1982 and we still have 2 years till 1984. Let us have this intervening period be a period of preparation to give people the opportunity to exercise their role. We now have only the Egyptian Arab people involved in all of this. During this 2-year period the problem of internal security will already have been dealt with and the economic and social problem will at least already have been diagnosed.

As you see, I am not demanding sudden upheavals. I am simply saying that matters cannot continue as they are right now. There must be changes which are necessitated by the nature of circumstances, and we must get ready and be prepared for these changes which will inevitably take place.

Actually our situation is a strange one. We have political parties and yet we do not have political parties, and we have democracy and yet do not have democracy. What we have is a strange mixture of the various phases of development in our national experience.

Let me give you some examples of this:

We had a single political organization. This was something which was only natural because we were talking about a society in which class differences were melting away.

Then we abandoned the stage of the society in which class differences were supposed to disappear and we entered the era of the open-door policy. The open-door policy was supposed to be a return to a free economy, although what happened in accordance with the open-door policy was definitely not the act of choosing the free economy system, but rather something else. In any case, a free economy and even an open-door policy means allowing various interest groups to have the opportunity to achieve their demands. If this is true, then these various interest groups should have means of political expression which are independent of the interest groups themselves. In other words, there should be political parties. A political party is the politicized vanguard of a given social class, and this is the only reason for having a party.

If this is true, then the diversity of classes should be accompanied by a diversity in political life, and this diversity in political life should have its means of expression.

Right now we are talking about a multiparty system, but we still have firmly-anchored remnants of the era and logic of a single party system.

For example, consider the following:

The establishment of new political parties is subject to being authorized by the Parties Committee, which is subordinate to the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union. Where is the Arab Socialist Union, and where is its Central Committee?

Here is another example:

In the era and logic of the one-party system all of the newspapers belonged to this single organization. And all of our newspapers, with very few exceptions, still belong to a single body, which is the Advisory Council. The Advisory Council is in fact a body which represents a single political organization--assuming that it really is a single political organization.

Here is an even more important example:

In the era and logic of the single party system it was possible for the minister of defense and commander in chief of the armed forces to be a member of this organization. The strange thing is that this situation, which was at least theoretically understandable when the doctrine was the formula "an alliance of the popular forces--peasants, workers, Egyptian capitalists, intellectuals, and soldiers," has survived even after this alliance formula was fundamentally eliminated. Only one part of this formula has survived, and it concerns participation by the military. It is precisely the relationship of the minister of defense and commander in chief of the armed forces to this political organization which, in reality, is a political party. This matter, among many other matters, needs to be looked into.

Actually many things need to be looked into and revised in order for us to eliminate the effects of stages whose remnants have accumulated and become mixed up, thereby forming a type of political tossed salad which is both strange in shape and strange tasting!

If we want to make a real and serious start, then we must begin right now. A correct beginning would be to have a national dialogue which would start at the first appropriate opportunity and would involve discussing vital and fundamental issues. Such issues are, for example, that of determining the basic features of an Egyptian strategy which would have definite guidelines and clear directions for the future. The dialogue should also involve other great unsettled issues such as the issue of freedom of the press and press ownership. It makes no sense when the utmost in the exercise of freedom is to stage what resembles zar ceremonies which are dedicated to this freedom, or when the utmost in freedom is to exercise this freedom only vis-a-vis the deceased. Freedom of the press in the real and basic sense of the word means discussing political policy, the factors concerning how this policy is made, the climate in which this policy is made, the considerations which this policy has in mind, and the objectives which this policy intends to achieve.

Unfortunately, President Sadat considered this sort of thing to be interference in politics by journalists. He felt that the only realm in which the press should exercise its freedom was that of discussing issues concerning sewage, water supply, transportation and communications, and nothing more than this. It is time that this situation changed. Furthermore, when circumstances allow the formation of new political parties, they should provide the opportunity to the heads of these parties to get in touch with the masses and utilize their programs and platforms to have the people participate in the national dialogue. There are many issues which must be included in the open public dialogue which we must prepare to have in 1984. I believe that it is necessary right now to suggest an agenda for the tasks of reorganization and restructuring. The reason I believe this is that the whole Middle East is about to witness momentous events. This should be an agenda with definite time-frames which set dates for the beginning of the dialogue, dates for opening the door to the formation of political parties, and dates for working papers which must be prepared for the Assembly in 1984 so that it will have a

clear picture of everything and so that its possibilities for taking action will be clear--including its right to amend the constitution.

I am saying all of this, and at the same time I consider myself to be outside the Egyptian political game and outside the game being played by the Egyptian press. I have said this, and this is still my position. However, I still consider myself to be a citizen who is concerned about public affairs, who follows public developments, and has the right to, from time to time, express his opinion which he wishes to put forward without being insistent about it.

Furthermore, the term of president of the republic needs to be clearly determined. The same thing is true of the vice-president's term. Otherwise the institution of the presidency will be transformed into a monarchy, with one man being king for life, and the vice-presidency will be tantamount to being the position of succession to the throne for whomever the president chooses. Maybe it would be appropriate if we used the U.S. system, that is, one man could be president for no more than two terms and for no longer than 8 years. It also means that the vice-president would be chosen together with the president by the people and would complete the president's term if anything should interrupt it.

[Question] Mr Haykal, what are your most recent writings that will be appearing in the market, and what are you working on right now?

[Answer] My latest work is the book "The Autumn of Anger." I have already seen the cover to the book, and it will appear in the market next month in English and in 21 other languages.

Farewell to Mahmud al-Qadi

This week I have been very sad because one of our partners and comrades in part of the "autumn of anger" experience passed away. I am talking about Dr Mahmud al-Qadi.

When I last saw him in the hospital a week ago, I told him about this book and I was hoping to be able to present a copy of it to him. We have lost a number of people who shared this great experience with us--the experience of being in prison in September of 1981. This prison experience is one of the scenes in "The autumn of Anger."

We have lost 'Abd al-'Azim Abu al-'Atta, we have lost 'Abd al-'Aziz al-(Shurbaji), and this week we have lost Mahmud al-Qadi. Tears were in my eyes as I walked along in his funeral procession. There were people at the funeral who shouted: "[H lived] for the sake of Egypt!" as a way of saying farewell to him. I have not felt so sad for a long time. I did not know Mahmud al-Qadi well before the prison experience. But both in prison and after the prison experience, I came to know him. I was very sad for him and very sad for Egypt for losing him. This was a man whom circumstances did not allow to use his full capacities to work for Egypt. As a man, a person with a principle, and a staunch fighter, he had a great deal to give, but they fought

him, they could not tolerate him, and they did not allow what he had to give to be completely given to a country which is in desperate need of what its able citizens can give to it. What a great loss this has been to those who knew him as he should have been known. What a loss it was to Egypt which did not have the opportunity to come to know him as it should have. Here we were following his coffin to his grave, and what we should have been doing was to follow the progress he was making to achieve something great which he was going to be able to present to Egypt. [We should have been] in a procession dedicated to life rather than in a funeral procession.

Now you are asking me about my work. You want to know what I am doing and what I am working on.

Right now I have begun preparing a book about the Suez War in 1956. Publishers have asked me to write this book. I was surprised by this request and I thought that this was a subject which had already been exhausted. However, the publishers feel that the point of view of an Egyptian who was close to the events has not yet been fully written.

When I finish this book, I will devote my time to a book about contemporary Egyptian history from the time of World War II till the October War of 1973, concentrating on the Nasser era. I do not want it to be a history book in the academic sense of the word. I want it to be a continuous narrative of the events and occurrences which took place during that period as well as of the ideas which were most influential at that time. It will be based on a series of Nasser's handwritten documents which will be published for the first time. Many people have made whatever allegations they felt like concerning this period, and I think that people now are no longer prepared to listen to more such tales which are created by the whims and moods of these storytellers. In this book I will commit myself to not mentioning any facts which I am unable to document.

[Question] One last question. You were a participant, in one form or another, in Nasser's regime and, for a time, in Sadat's regime. What role do you play as far as President Husni Mubarak's regime is concerned?

[Answer] I was not a participant either in Nasser's regime or Sadat's regime. All during Nasser's regime I was a dialogue partner of Nasser's, and I tried to perform the same function for Sadat--and I actually did so for a while. As far as President Husni Mubarak is concerned, all I can do is pray for him. In fact, I really do pray for him from the bottom of my heart because he is confronting the most difficult circumstances that have ever been faced by an Egyptian ruler in modern times. However, I am confident that he will live up to his job. There are those who think that matters are proceeding more slowly than they expected, but I, for my part, believe that the president, by virtue of his previous experience as a pilot, will concentrate on the element of safety and security before starting to move and before flying. I can understand his position, although I realize at the same time that circumstances now have made it necessary for him to start up the engines and to begin to get ready to take off.

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VARIOUS JOURNALISTS CONDEMN PRESS LAW FIRINGS, HARRASSMENT

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 3 Feb 83 p 3

[Article by Hasan Badawi: "Journalists Favor Suspension of the Execution"]

[Text] In March 1981 the last elections to the Journalists' Union were held. On instructions from our late "colleague" Anwar al-Sadat - who always boasted that he had "made a profession" of journalism, as he had made a profession of many vocations - the nationwide press organizations spent money on the electoral campaign and deployed their cars and restaurants to mobilize the greatest number of journalists to support the candidates of the late colleague, who had insisted that the Journalists' Union be sovereign in body and soul, lest it be turned into a "club." Then he did away with it, as he tried to do away with the Lawyers' Union, the Judges' Club and all legitimate "institutions."

At that time, the National Party candidates to the elections vied with one another for all the candidates. They declared that no journalist would be infringed upon or prevented from writing and they said, "The union agenda must not be cancelled or relinquished." The National Party candidate to the post of the union, Salah Jalal, said, "I will cut off my arm to keeping journalist from being fired!"

In September 1981, 67 journalists were fired by decree of the late colleague, and yet the union head's arm was still in good shape!

In a few weeks, next March, the elections of the Journalists' Union will be held to elect six members to the union council and elect a new union chief!

In the agenda of the journalists' problems now, there are journalists who are not working and whose salaries are being appropriated, and the chairmen of the board and the editors in chief are refusing to publish even one word they write!

In the agenda there are journalists who were transferred last September to the Departments of Electricity, Housing, Insurance and Agrarian Reform, and, when the judges had them returned, could not find an office to sit in, a desk to write on, or a paper to publish in.

In the agenda there are journalists who worked abroad, and who, if they returned, the late colleague declared, would not be tried for the opinions they published, but would go back to work with their same benefits as before. He stressed that

those who entered the Journalists' Union building would be safe. (He did not say that those who entered the building of Abu Sufyan would also be safe.) They returned on the basis of this promise, but did not get work, and, if they did, the little caesars of the nationwide press did not publish what they wrote.

In the agenda there are hundreds of suits the journalists filed against their organizations because they had been passed over for raises and promotions.

The list of acts of deceit on the part of the managing heads and editors in chief who had been appointed by the government party, on account of their repression of journalists and arbitrary acts in dealing with them - professional solidarity notwithstanding - is a long one, and it has numerous designations and methods. Some of them lie under the heading of "absolute prohibitions" or incomplete prohibition on writing, while others are carried out behind the documents of illusory pages or acts. Dozens of journalists lack specific responsibilities, indeed even desks. However, these are all considered "acts of deceit" and indeed, through them, the managing directors and editors in chief violate the rulings of the judiciary and the decrees of the president calling for the journalists to return and receive work.

These are just examples.

Absolute Prohibitions on Writing

In March 1977 the magazine AL-TALI'AH, which was issued by the al-Ahram Organization, was expropriated. At that time, AL-TALI'AH was the only legitimate media platform expressing leftist thought. The straw that broke its back was its position on the people's January outburst, when it offered an objective view of the outburst, rejecting what the former president had called it and which his agencies subsequently reiterated in designating it a "thieves' uprising." Since that time, the magazine's writers have been absolutely prohibited from writing.

Lutfi al-Khuli, the editor of the expropriated editor of AL-TALI'AH, member of the board of the Journalists' Union, member of the secretariat general of the Grouping Party and a journalist for AL-AHRAM, has been prohibited from writing since that time. When the September decrees were issued, he was abroad for a medical examination of the heart and was one of the persons who were being sought for detention; a decree was issued transferring him to the Insurance Organization. He filed a judiciary suit against the decree, with regard to its two sections on the detention and job transfer. On 11 February 1982, a verdict was issued by the Council of State against the former president, his minister of the interior, his minister of information and the chairman of the Higher Press Council, suspending the execution of the decree on the job transfer, and he went back to work, but without work, and his desk was removed.

Lutfi al-Khuli says "It was not a legal or administrative matter. In essence it was political. When the former president adopted his decision, whether to detain people, fire them or chase them from their jobs, that was part of his campaign against the people who had opposed his policies. He was thereby using his powers, which he had given himself, to punish the opposition harshly. It is evident that President Mubarak has taken a decree to correct this situation, but,

in practical execution, the people in charge of managing the institutions refuse to carry it out truthfully and totally, and act as if al-Sadat's decrees were still in effect and those of Mubarak had not been issued."

Wadi' Amin, a journalist with AL-AHRAM, was one of the writers for the expropriated AL-TALI'AH. He says, "Since AL-TALI'AH was shut down, no articles of mine have been published, and material and moral damage has resulted from this situation. The case is basically a political one; it is a form of political isolation, which began with the shutdown of AL-TALI'AH, then the prohibition to keep writers from writing, with the goal of prohibiting the opposition viewpoint from being published."

The Incomplete Prohibition

This means that a person is sometimes prohibited from publishing, or, more correctly, sometimes permitted to publish.

Ibrahim Yunis, a journalist with AL-AKHBAR and a member of the Labor Party, says:

"Sometimes the publication of my articles is prohibited. The forms of the prohibition are numerous and there are no criteria on what is to be published or not to be published. The only criterion is the desire of the people in charge of editing in the press organizations. For example, I wrote an article on the withdrawal of the Egyptian ambassador from Israel at the time it occurred, but the article was delayed. In general, it is not appreciated when people with opinions and positions write in the nationwide papers, even if they work on them."

Muhammad 'Uthman, a journalist with ROSE AL-YUSUF, says, "After I had worked for 7 years on the magazine, and the number of articles of mine that were published had come to hundreds, I was terminated on 12 February 1980 on the charge of incompetence. I filed a suit in the time of Kamil Zuhayri, the former union head, and the union considered that an arbitrary dismissal and joined forces with me. Under the pressure of the court and the union, a reconciliation took place between me and the organization, and the termination decree was rescinded. I made an attack on the crisis of religious thought, in which we predicted that the religious groups would turn toward violence. We called for a policy of dialogue among all political and religious forces, and after that I was suspended from writing and submitted articles that were rejected without any justification.

"When a decree was issued transferring me to the Agricultural Museum in September 1981, I filed a suit against the former president along with Dr Sami Mansur and 'Adil Sulayman. A decree was issued sending me back, after al-Sadat's assassination. From the first day I tried to publish an article calling on the nationalistic forces and President Mubarak to stand together for the sake of ridding Egypt of the things it was suffering from, it was refused publication. I sent a telegram to the president containing a summary of the matter, the article was published in AL-AHRAR, this situation was repeated five times, I submitted a complaint to the office of the public prosecutor, the union council gave me permission to pursue litigation to raise the matter before the judiciary, and I filed suit.

"On August 1982 I was finally prevented from getting a production stipend. I sent a warning, in the form of an official summons, and then filed suit. At that point the organization paid the stipend. In September 1982 I was surprised to receive a warning that I would not be allowed to work and that my case would be submitted to a tripartite committee for a ruling, although I was continuing to work. The case is still before the judiciary, and in it I am asking for compensation of 50,000 pounds. I submitted my articles in a file of documents to the office of the prosecutor and officially informed the organization that there was no system for checking in and out, so consequently I would be compelled to establish my comings and goings at the Qasr al-Nil police station."

Faridah al-Naqqash, journalist with AL-AKHBAR and member of the Central Committee of the Grouping Party and the Secretariat of the Committee for the Defense of National Culture, says,

"As soon as I returned to work with the second group of journalists who were sent back to their organizations, after I left prison I submitted two articles to Mr Ahmad Zayn, the managing editor. Nothing was published. I then submitted a number of articles after that, but they were not published. This situation continued until I met with Mr Musa Sabri, the chairman of the board and editor in chief, in the middle of April 1982, and agreed with him to write a weekly column on the stage. I actually did write it, and it was published regularly for a number of weeks. Then the internal censorship on what I was writing started, and the people who were in charge of the page started to procrastinate at length on the column, so that it would lose its timeliness and would be restricted in a manner that twisted its meaning.

"I know that my situation could be used to state that there is a spirit of democracy in the newspaper organizations, but the real situation is different. What am I writing, and what of that is being published? This is the issue. Perhaps the reasonably lenient treatment I have been given can be attributed to the fact that I am writing about the stage. Proof of that is that nothing I write on the crisis of culture has received attention. I submitted that to Ahmad Zayn. What would you say the case is with political writers?"

Illusory Pages

Another technique in the National Democratic Party's management of press organizations involves not just the rights of writers to express their opinions but also the field through which they express themselves, basically. That has resulted in the paralysis of a number of writers, such as Riyadh Sayf al-Nasr, Nasif Salim, Muhammad al-Hayawan, Muhsin al-Khayyat and others from the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH, when its organization changed in 1975.

Muhsin al-Khayyat, journalist with AL-JUMHURIYAH, states "After I returned to work, I was put on the force of an illusory page titled the Literature Page, which did not exist, and was supervised by our colleague Prof Jalal al-Sayyid. After constant complaints by the supervisor that there was no page by this name, we were asked to prepare a literary page, and we did prepare one three times, but it did not see the light of day. I was then asked for a brief statement about the poet Salah 'Abd-al-Sabbur on the anniversary of his death, and that was not published. When I was asked to write a weekly statement on the literary movement, it was not published, even though I had prepared the statement and submitted it to the manager of the weekly issue.

"When I was preparing the literary pages that I referred to, I was in contact with some literary figures, and that compelled me to keep from maintaining a daily attendance, by permission from the supervisor of the page. The paper had only to make an investigation into me, after stripping me of my annual vacation and asking that a day be deducted from my salary. The opposite of what they had been expecting occurred as a result of the investigation and the testimony of the person supervising the page. The person conducting the investigation ordered that I be given my right to a vacation and that the day that was deducted be restored."

No Work

Hamid Zaydan, journalist with AL-AKHBAR and editor in chief of the newspaper AL-SHA'B, says,

"After the decree returning the journalists was issued by President Mubarak, I went back to AL-AKHBAR, and asked Musa Sabri, the chairman of the board and editor in chief, to give me a job I could do or a field of specialization for which I could be responsible, but he told me, 'The newspaper AL-SHA'B will resume appearing, and it is difficult for me to give you your job in AL-AKHBAR and for you to be responsible for a party paper at the same time.'"

We wonder, does the case of Mr Hamid Zaydan apply to journalists and writers of the ruling party as well?

Returning to Exile

After appeals had been made by the late president, the Higher Press Council, the union and the union chief to Egyptian journalists abroad, urging them to come back and work in Egypt, those who did return were either arrested as soon as they arrived, such as Fahmi Husayn, the former managing editor of ROSE AL-YUSUF, and were refused work once they got out, or faced unusual problems and were also refused work, such as Sa'd al-Ta'i'ah.

Riyad Sayf al-Nasr, journalist in AL-JUMHURIYAH, states, "In November 1977 I obtained a leave without pay to work abroad, after my daily job became just a matter of signing and receiving letters and warnings from the newspaper management. I had not yet specified the body in which I was going to work, and in January 1978 I obtained a certificate from the newspaper to work in the University of Algiers, where one of our friends was working. However, I did not agree to work there, but went to work in the Center of Research and Studies in Libya starting 24 April 1978. After I completed my leave in November 1978, the management wrote a letter informing me of the refusal to renew my leave and demanding that I return. Here ill will was apparent in a number of things. First of all, my contract with the Research Center had started on 24 April, so it was difficult to get a ticket and come back. Second of all, I really had been present earlier, and there had been no need for work as the management claimed. The purpose was obvious; that was to terminate me, and that is what actually happened. Two weeks after the first letter, they wrote me that I had been terminated.

"I sent a complaint to the union, informing it of my desire to return, and a letter reached me from the union containing a promise of work in the place I

wanted and the retention of my material and administrative rights. The union head got in contact with the chairman of the board and his reply was firm: 'I am the only one who can determine who I deal with, and I refuse to have him return.' He gave no reason. The head of the union presented the problem of the people coming back from all Arab countries to President Mubarak. He ordered that they be returned, but the editor in chief held to his position, and when the union head informed him that the union would file suit, he said, 'Do as you like.' The office of the public prosecutor assigned Prof 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad to file a suit against the management of AL-JUMHURIYAH.

"I met Sufi Abu Talib, in the presence of Sayyid Zaki, the vice chairman of the People's Assembly, and told him that I was talking not about a personal problem but about a general one. His comment was, 'Most unfortunately, some chairmen of press organizations consider that a loss that is theirs only? I asked him about the solution, and he said, 'Write to the Higher Press Council.' That was actually done, but the council has not answered yet. Sayyid Zaki's comment was that a letter would not solve the problem and that the board chairmen's position was not in opposition to journalists returning from abroad only but also to many journalists working in Egypt, and that the problem had to be solved from the roots."

Professional Demotion and Deprivation of Work

Siham Hashim, a journalist with MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, says, "When the decree was issued transferring me in September 1981 from my job in the agency to the Information Department, I had spent 20 years in my job. The transfer was a sham, because I was not assigned any work and nothing linked me to the authority except the dispensation of my monthly salary. We were looked upon as aliens on the one hand and as the object of the authorities' wrath on the other. When the decree on my return was issued on 2 January 1982, I went back to the agency, but I faced many problems. Here one must pause, because the problems of MIDDLE EAST NEWS are extremely special in nature, although they are part of the problems of people working in the so-called nationwide press. The people working in it bear the burdens of press activity in terms of irregular working hours, the race after news and investigations, and political responsibility and exposure to arbitrary transfers. However, they are deprived of the nice returns from press work, which are the relationship that is established between the writer and the reader.

"However, the peak of the tragedy here is in the practices of the chairman of the board, who assumed this position a full 17 years ago. It appears that because of the long period, he imagined that he had inherited the agency and the people who were in it. It is sufficient for us to point out that the number of suits that have now been filed against the board by the employees totals more than 80, and these are being reviewed by the courts now. They all revolve around professional demotions, deprivation of work, or the failure to carry out judiciary decrees until they are reaffirmed in the appeal process.

"The peak of what the people working in MIDDLE EAST NEWS suffer from, in the form of injustice and hardship, is what happened in the wake of the latest union elections (March 1981) when the chairman of the board committed an act that was called a 'palliative massacre,' so that the agency's journalistic and professional

structure, as well as the wage structure, would be totally overturned, although that was in violation of the law issued by the People's Assembly in this regard and was in violation of the Press Law in general, on the basis of personal allegiance to the chairman in the election campaign. Whoever took a position or had a view that was opposed to the chairman of the board would be punished by losing his material and professional rights, and indeed his right to work.

"The amazing thing is that the chairman of the board, in the context of the previous atmosphere, managed to become a member of the board of the Journalists' Union, and in this capacity he was supposed to protect the rights not just of the journalists in the agency but also the rights of the journalists as a whole, and here he was destroying them. This intensified the disapproval of him and ultimately only a reform would have been appropriate.

"One of the strange aspects of the press is that an official in a press organization terminated one of the major writers and journalists in the magazine he was supervising on the same day in which the president gave him the state prize of appreciation and a medal because he had translated a great work, titled 'The Description of Egypt.' That was the late martyr Zuhayr al-Shayib."

Who Owns the Nationwide Press?

Rushdi Abu-al-Hasan, a journalist with the magazine SABAH AL-KHAYR, says:

"The matter of preventing some journalists from writing is one in which there is a confusion which has been caused by the perversity of the current state of the nationwide press under the command of the Higher Press Council. After the dissolution of the Socialist Union and the grant of freedom to form parties (with restrictions!), this important change was not accompanied by a corresponding one in the state of the press; the government preferred to have the nationwide papers win by inventing the Consultative Assembly. This is the issue, basically: who owns the nationwide press? When the proprietor is determined, he will have the right to determine the issues and the subjects that he discusses on his pages. The nationwide press today belongs to the government, in fact, and that obscure, tense situation requires a solution.

Layla al-Jabali, a journalist in AL-JUMHURIYAH, has been working in the press since 1956. She has become specialized in foreign affairs, and she had a regular weekly diplomatic column over a space of three columns in the form of a journal, before the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH changed its system in the mid-seventies.

Layla al-Jabli did not want to talk from a personal perspective; rather, she spoke in general, in response to the questions that had been raised.

She said, "If you want to know my opinion on the freedom of the press, you have only to follow today the cases of corruption and usurpation that arose during the economic liberalization and the absence of human and aesthetic values in our lives to know that this is all the natural result of the absence of a diversity of opinions and freedom of the press as a consequence of the coercion, blackouts and fraud of past years.

"The culture of cattle and the GR model has been occupying the stage of national culture and legacy during the invasion of Zionist thought and the international monopolies' tools in the country. Would that the people who had benefited from the murder of the freedom of the press in a bygone era, and the people who today are tenaciously defending their interests, which flourished in the context of the absence of freedom of the press would try to go back to Article 47 of the constitution, which stipulates 'Freedom of opinion is guaranteed and everyone has the right to express his opinion and disseminate it in speech, writing, portraiture or other means of expression within the limits of the law, and self-criticism and constructive criticism are a guarantee of the soundness of the construction of the nation.'

"This stipulation applies to every Egyptian, so what would one say about the journalists!"

The Role of the Journalists' Union

After all the above facts, we wonder what the role of the union and the union head in coping with these problems is.

Lutfi al-Khuli, member of the union board, says:

"In recording the actual situation, there is no role; it seems that all parties have an interest in failing to remedy the situation and bring it back to its natural state. The union has been stripped of powers and vigor to the point that, for example, though this is a particular situation as far as I am concerned, I am an elected board member who is responsible for the Committee for the Defense of Freedoms and Professional Rights and have immunity through union activity, but nonetheless transgressions have been committed against my most trivial rights as a writer, as a journalist, and the execution of a judiciary verdict on my behalf has even been rejected. Naturally I find personal embarrassment in raising this issue myself in the union board, which is aware of it. Nonetheless, the head of the Journalists' Union, and the unions, have not moved, even though they knew of all these facts, to defend this position and restore rights. One should bear in mind that our colleague the union head is also a colleague in the same organization, and, since I was away in exile because of the September events, I have not been invited to union board meetings up to now. In general, I believe that public opinion inside the union, and among many members of the board, supports the need to act to preserve the rights and freedoms of journalists. I personally, as I was informed by officials in AL-AHRAM and colleagues in the union, would have preferred to have been given a period of time before proceeding, at which point I would not have found any embarrassment in shifting the case from its particular status to its general political status.

"It seems that there is a plan to provoke us to raise this political issue and proceed to have the ruling carried out, since the situation seems to be one of opposition to the institution of the president and President Mubarak. The ruling directed a letter to him in his capacity as the president, who has succeeded to and inherited the heavy legacy of the former president. It seems that there is a deliberate effort to stir up a political storm against President Mubarak."

The Higher Press Council

Lutfi al-Khuli says,

"In spite of the basic unconstitutionality of the Higher Press Council, it did not act when al-Sadat issued his decrees. It did not act afterward to have these decrees removed. Consequently, it is a totally formal council as regards the freedom of the press and the rights of journalists, but becomes a force for restrictions and pressure against the press and journalists when it is desired violently to shake their rights. It is in reality an extension of the agencies of the ruling party and a blatant example of the interconnection between the agencies of the ruling party and the authorities in the government. That is the grave matter which threatens the sovereignty of the government which the former president, al-Sadat, pursued."

In conclusion, the subjects of this investigation do not just concern the press, the journalists who have been harmed by this situation, or the policies about which the agencies of the media revolve; indeed, they are of concern to all journalists and all readers, on grounds that it is an issue of principle. Either we capitulate to aggression against the freedom of the press and freedom of expression or we change it. Whoever sees himself safe from harm today will be afflicted by it sooner or later, as long as the principle of freedom of thought and freedom of opinion are restricted by these practices.

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CSO: 4504/196

BRIEFS

GREEN BOOK SYMPOSIUM--The preparatory committee for the International Meeting on the Green Book which will take place at Qar Yunis University between 7-15 April continued its work yesterday in order to prepare for this important intellectual meeting. It should be remembered that more than 1000 researchers and thinkers from several countries and international universities will participate in this meeting. The secretary of the World Center for Research and Studies on the Green Book, as well as the secretary of the People's Congress of the municipality of Banghazi and the secretary of the People's Committee of the same municipality, attended the committee meeting. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRIYA-PRESSE in French 28 Feb 83 p 6]

CSO: 4519/154

MAURITANIA

INTERVIEW WITH KHOUNA OULD HAYDALA

AU020941 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Feb 83 p 6

[Report on TANJUG interview with Lt Col Khouna Ould Haydala, president of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, in connection with the upcoming nonaligned summit meeting in New Delhi--date, place not given]

[Text] Nouakchott, 24 Feb (TANJUG)--In an interview with TANJUG, Lt Col Khouna Ould Haydala, head of state of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, said that the conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front in Western Sahara is the dominant characteristic of the situation in Africa's north-western region.

"Mauritania's position in this conflict," he said, "is based on the principles of the nonaligned policy, particularly on the principle of the right of peoples to their self-determination and on strict respect for the borders as inherited from the period of colonialism. The solution of this conflict is possible solely through a direct dialogue between the warring sides--Morocco and the Polisario Front, which is the sole and legitimate representative of the Saharan people. Mauritania has always made efforts to begin this dialogue which should enable the organization of a referendum at which the Saharan people would express their will."

Lt Col Haydala added that "the situation in Western Sahara was being made more difficult by the presence of new U.S. bases in Morocco and by the danger of an internationalization of the conflict."

Stressing that the seventh conference of the heads of states or governments of the nonaligned countries is to be held in a really difficult international situation characterized by the fact that the "existing hotbeds of tension are flaring up, while new ones are appearing in the most diverse forms," the head of state of Mauritania said that "in such a situation the actions of the nonaligned countries were more necessary than ever before." He particularly pointed to the increasingly more ruthless aggressive policy of Israel in the Middle East, to the disturbing continuation of the Iraqi-Iranian war, to the events in Chad which "show that this country has not yet achieved its unity and stability," to the maneuvers of the South African racists who are trying to prevent the proclamation of Namibia's independence and to developments in Latin America.

"If the nonaligned countries would consistently and in a coordinated manner apply the basic nonaligned principles, there is no doubt that they would, together, represent a moral force sufficient to overcome the present critical situation," Lt Col Haydala said, and remarked that he "has great hopes for the seventh summit meeting."

He believes that the "roots of disagreements and armed conflicts between certain nonaligned countries lie in the hegemonistic policy of the super-powers, which try to impose their ideology and their economic system on other countries." These attempts by the superpowers lead to "tension, armed conflicts and to undermining the stability of certain nonaligned countries."

The head of state of Mauritania expects that the forthcoming summit meeting in New Delhi will strengthen the mutual confidence among the nonaligned countries, reaffirm the principle of solving conflicts and tensions through dialogue and negotiations and point to the need to push aside national egoisms in the interest of a dynamic and effective cooperation which will enable more rapid economic, social and cultural development in accordance with the aspirations of peoples. "Only in this way, united and firmly linked, will the Nonaligned Movement be capable of imposing itself, with its specific interests, on the international arena," he added.

In reply to the question of what the chances are for achieving a consensus on beginning global negotiations on main international economic problems, Lt Col Haydala expressed the view that this consensus "could result solely from a dynamic compromise which would take care of all interests of the international community."

After stressing that "Mauritania has always appreciated Yugoslavia's exceptionally positive role in the Nonaligned Movement," he said that the bilateral cooperation between Mauritania and Yugoslavia was good and that it could even be further improved "through more regular talks and an exchange of experiences and products."

CSO: 4500/113

INDUSTRIAL GOALS OF SIXTH PLAN ASSESSED

Tunis DEMOCRATIE in French Feb 83 pp 8-9

[Article by Hichem Gribaa: "The Industrial Sector"]

[Excerpts] The Sixth Economic and Social Development Plan proposed by the government after the "national consultation" was debated and approved by the Chamber of Deputies.

That plan is presented as one phase in the overall strategy that is "to lead Tunisia to the level of the developed nations by the year 2000."

The "accomplishments" of the past two decades, the "lessons" derived by plan promoters, the geoeconomic context and the means used to attain the objectives set by the plan unavoidably lead to this question: Can the plan and the development strategy proposed raise the country to the level of the developed nations?

Today, we shall try to reveal our point of view on the industrial policy proposed by the promoters of the Sixth Plan.

In the general preface to the Sixth Plan and the third decade of development, the second decade is presented as "that of a liberal socialism whose imbalances caused the confrontation."

This observation might lead one to believe that the promoters of the Sixth Plan realized that the impasse and confrontation are definitely the consequence of a certain policy and consequently decided to make adjustments and to follow a different economic policy.

A study of the Sixth Plan shows that such is not the case and that the industrial development strategy proposed by the plan is definitely the same as that followed since the beginning of the 1970's.

I. Objectives, Means and Results of the Industrial Policy Practiced From 1970 to 1980

The objectives set essentially included the following: 1) rapid growth of some sectors such as textiles; the creation of a maximum number of jobs in

order to maintain social peace; and 3) the obtention of a foreign exchange surplus thanks to export industries.

For this purpose, the government based their efforts on the establishment of institutions and mechanisms providing incentives and on exorbitant legal and financial privileges benefiting a new class of entrepreneurs.

In addition, the government reduces its role on behalf of private investors. Until 1970, public enterprises made 75 percent of all investments. Starting in 1970, the situation changed. A distribution of industrial production tasks was achieved between private manufacturers and public enterprises. Private capital was oriented toward the least capitalistic sub-branches, those that were the least costly in technology and the most profitable: tourism and small assembly plants.

The government therefore mobilized its resources to support private investment and itself got behind in the completion of industrial infrastructure projects. During the 1970-1976 period, only projects involving exports were completed on time, such as the ICM 2 and 3.

This strategy of selective growth certainly attained some of its goals, to wit, the creation of jobs and the obtention of surplus foreign exchange, but it had negative repercussions on the development of the Tunisian industrial fabric, including: increased dependency of the national economy; an increase in the extraversion of that economy; and a drop in the rate of integration into Tunisian industry.

II. Objectives and Means of Sixth Plan in the Field of Industry

A. Objectives

We find the same objectives as those set by the industrial development strategy set forth during the past decade, to wit:

1. Rapid growth of some sectors (chemistry, the machine industry and textiles for the Sixth Plan)

<u>Sectors</u>	<u>Fifth Plan</u>	<u>Sixth Plan</u>	<u>Number of Jobs</u>
Agrofood industries	160.0	240.0	16,000
Building materials	269.4	300	12,500
Machine industries	107.6	385	24,350
Chemical industries	155.9	360	5,150
Textiles and shoes	73.0	165.0	33,000
Miscellaneous	50.2	150.0	18,000
Total (millions of dinars)	816.1	1,600.00	109,000

2. Creation of 109,000 jobs, or 33 percent of all jobs to be created. Investments creating jobs represent 60 percent of all investments, compared with 40 percent for capitalistic investments.

3. Obtention of surplus foreign exchange thanks to investments in the export industries.

In 1986, exports of industrial products will represent 57 percent of all exports, for a value of 1.12 billion dinars, compared with 40 percent in 1981 for 479 million dinars.

B. Means

1. Fiscal Incentives and Legal Benefits

The institutions and mechanisms for providing incentives and the legal and financial benefits set up for private investments during the previous decade are quite simply strengthened or expanded.

The legal framework for industrial investments was modified by the law of June 1981 regarding criteria for granting tax and financial advantages that were expanded for decentralized projects without any modification in the basic mechanisms.

The establishment of the National Fund to Promote Handicrafts and the tax incentives relating to it will have limited effects on the job situation, but will not improve the industrial fabric because of the necessarily high costs of goods produced in small quantities.

2. Financing

In order to expand capacities of financing projects identified or to be identified, the government proceeded with the participation of brother and friendly countries in the establishment of development banks with high capital to finance projects, either through loans or participation in the capital.

III. Similarities

A comparative study of the objectives and means of industrial development strategies applied by the Fifth Plan and projected by the Sixth Plan shows that the differences between these two strategies are minimal except with respect to financing.

The consequences of this type of development will be the same, to wit:

1. Increased dependency of the national economy above and below.

Actually, a large share of national industry will be under the control of foreign capital, whether in brother or friendly countries, and their common concern is to derive the maximum profit possible. Coordinated and coherent economic development of the country can only concern them incidentally. In some cases, they only want to integrate Tunisia into the international division of labor once and for all. The role of that division is to maintain and deepen the gap between developed and underdeveloped countries.

In addition, this strategy, based on incentives and benefits granted to private entrepreneurs, can only engender a proliferation of small units operating in the sub-branches of industry, which get their raw materials or semi-finished products exclusively abroad.

2. Increased extraversion of the national economy

Within the framework of the law of April 1972, export industries and most assembly plants set up within the framework of the August 1974 law or to be set up as part of the Sixth Plan obtain nearly all of their supplies abroad, both with respect to equipment as well as products to be processed.

Increased dependency and extraversion necessarily engender a drop in the degree of integration of industry.

The different systems of the industrial fabric operate in an anarchistic autonomous way and without any relation between them.

This may bring about the selective growth of some sectors, but it prevents the transformation of growth into true development.

These factors, combined with the turbulence of the international monetary system, the structural crisis shaking the world economy and the closing of foreign markets can only lead to blockage and disruption of social peace.

In order to develop the industrial fabric of the country and protect it from blockages and jolts, we must outline a different development strategy consisting of the establishment of a national economic space integrated into the Maghrebian economic space and the establishment of a solid industrial infrastructure that in the long run will lead to the establishment of a well-adjusted economy.

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CSO: 4519/149

BACCOUCHE ON UNION SITUATION, OTHER ISSUES

Tunis DEMOCRATIE in French Feb 83 pp 6-7

[Interview with Taieb Baccouche, secretary general of the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor], 24 January 1983, by Ali Ben Mabrouk]

[Text] [Question] The 26 January crisis came five years ago. How have things changed since that time?

[Answer] Despite its aftereffects, the evolution of the trade union situation has generally been positive. In fact, trade union autonomy, which was the main issue in the 26 January crisis, has gradually been acquired. Preservation of that autonomy and its defense require a continuous struggle and increased vigilance. Furthermore, thanks to that autonomy, the democratization of trade union life has made great strides. We must consolidate it and root it in our union practice and tradition in order to make it irreversible, especially since the progress made along that path serve as an example for the entire country.

The existence of many factions or political affiliations within the UGTT means that they can only co-exist through a democratic debate and a minimum of tolerance. All this is learned in practice much more than through dogmatic attitudes.

Furthermore, the economic and social policy that was one of the important factors in the 26 January crisis was brought into question in the official speech in terms reminiscent of those of the UGTT National Council in January 1978. Unfortunately, in practice, nothing has basically changed in three years. The UGTT is therefore more and more aware of the need to draft the main lines of a union vision of economic and social policy, which is not necessarily a government program.

[Question] In your closing speech to the National Council, you said in substance that the UGTT does not have to present an alternative. You even dare to label those who preach that idea as dogmatic. And yet, the UGTT has always played a role going beyond its purely trade union function. Is that one way of recognizing the UGTT's inability to draft a program, a substitute strategy, or a tendency to reduce the UGTT to its corporatist mission?

[Answer] It is neither one nor the other because the UGTT, by virtue of its history and the national trade union tradition it has inherited, cannot be confined to the very superficial role of a corporatist organization, one that merely makes demands. Furthermore, the UGTT must not conduct itself as a political party which by definition is after power, for unions and political power are normally antinomic, without necessarily being opposites. The national trade union nature of the UGTT, with its historic burden, means that the UGTT can and must participate in the country's politics in the broader sense of the word, without actually getting involved in political power strictly speaking.

[Question] Let us move on from the UGTT to you yourself. Your statements and positions have always been clear and consistent in the sense of progress of trade union work. And yet, you have been the object of a campaign of denigration from circles considering themselves to be on the left. How do you explain this?

[Answer] Personally, I do not have too much belief in the traditional left-right classification, especially regarding unions. It is a fact that the groups claiming to be on the left have rarely made a correct or realistic analysis of the phases of the trade union struggle. That is what explains the series of self-criticisms and readjustments of positions, without mentioning the often abnormal intergroup alliances. All this means that this "left" has to date vacillated between the most puerile dogmatism and the most frantic opportunism. Confronted with such inconsistencies, I would not be surprised to find myself attacked personally, not by the left, but by individuals calling themselves leftists because I believe that I have always been consistent, before and after 26 January, in my positions of principle as well as in my speeches and practice. My positions of principle do not stem from a personal view, but are based on the logic of the facts, their limitations and dynamics.

[Question] The facts constitute the best possible transition in order to ask you how the wage negotiations are going.

These negotiations have dragged on for over a year. In most cases, one feels that there is deliberate blocage. The private sector blocked everything, while awaiting the result of negotiations in the public sector, and the latter also blocked everything while awaiting the agreement between the government and the UGTT on the ceiling on the rate of growth of the wage mass. That agreement has not yet been achieved because the UGTT is not willing to negotiate -- for the first time and without being prepared ahead of time -- an overall mass including, in addition to the traditional wage increases, such problematical areas as hiring, promotions and various adjustments on which it is very difficult to come to an agreement before drawing up a common method of computation and real statistics. The latest proposals of the government, which are coming long after the demands formulated by the UGTT, have the advantage of measuring more accurately the points of divergence and contrast with the vagueness and generalities that have long characterized such negotiations. In future meetings between social partners, we hope to achieve a solution that we deem to be fair.

[Question] What lessons would you derive from the National Council and what prospects do you see?

[Answer] I believe that the lessons one can derive from the holding of the last National Council can be summed up in three main points: 1) the results of negotiations underway; 2) the desire to modify UGTT structures so that they may be better adapted to the diversity of the professional strata within it; and 3) the essential need to preserve trade union unity and to eliminate anything that would weaken it.

The decisions of the congress confirmed the position long defended by UGTT officials, to the effect that there can be no question of making only the working class bear the burden of our economic difficulties.

As for prospects, one must think about ways of reviewing the role of the rank-and-file union so that it will fully assume its responsibilities, reorganize the UGTT in the light of proposals from the rank and file, and finally, the UGTT must draft its own price index.

In addition, the National Council reiterated its traditional positions regarding the improvement in the political climate, particularly through the abrogation of all unconstitutional legislation, actual separation between the three branches of government, confirmation of political pluralism and general amnesty, elimination of the State Criminal Court and respect for trade union freedoms.

I hope that these resolutions will be applied in order better to serve the real interests of the workers.

11,464

CSO: 4519/149

AHMED CHTOUROU DISCUSSES LEGAL ISSUES, PSD, YOUTH

Tunis DEMOCRATIE in French Feb 83 pp 14-15

[Interview with Deputy Ahmed Chtourou by Zeineb Samandi; date and place not given]

[Text] Ahmed Chtourou is a different kind of deputy. Although a militant Destourian from the very beginning, a former minister and elected deputy from the National Front list, far be it for him to be a "yes man" or to fail to speak out within the Assembly, to say out loud what others keep to themselves, to be a spokesman for the concerns of the average man. That is what makes Ahmed Chtourou a different kind of deputy.

[Question] Deputy Ahmed Chtourou, how do you view your role as a deputy?

[Answer] I cannot conceive of my role as a deputy without thinking of all those who, on 9 April 1938, went out into the streets of the capital to demand a Tunisian parliament which, in the eyes of our people, represented their very resurrection and the guarantee of their survival. Many of those who demonstrated that day gave their lives for the symbol of national sovereignty.

As a result, being a deputy means listening to the country and the concerns of the citizens in order to make those concerns prevail in all decisions affecting their present and their future.

[Question] What action do you expect to take, especially after the fate suffered by your bill to eliminate the State Criminal Court?

[Answer] Unfortunately, a great deal remains to be done. Our bill has been filed with the office of the Chamber of Deputies for over six months.

Four of us signed it: Abderraouf Bouker, Mohamed Lasoued, Helifa Abid and myself. Article 28 of the constitution provides that it is up to the president of the republic and the deputies to initiate legislation. As for Article 9 of the bylaws of the Chamber, it provides for an identical procedure for the examination of bills from the president or the deputies. That article states, in fact, that the president of the Chamber of Deputies receives such bills, registers them and forwards them to the specialized committee, in keeping with

Article 27 of the bylaws. However, to date, our bill has not been distributed to the deputies and has not been passed on to the specialized committees, despite the written and oral responses from the president of the Chamber.

[Question] This is a serious matter: We have here an article of the constitution and another of the bylaws of the Chamber that are not being respected.

[Answer] Indeed.

[Question] Do you expect to propose a bill relating to a revision of the press code?

[Answer] I brought up the problem at the time of the discussions on the 1982 budget and the discussions this year. I proposed the establishment of a special parliamentary committee in order to propose amendments to the existing press code. If that procedure is not adopted, a number of colleagues and I intend to present certain amendments to the code to give consideration to observations and opinions expressed on the matter by people in the profession and by others with views on the problem. The High Information Council may help solve the situation.

[Question] Despite the circumstances of its election, what conditions are needed so that the current Assembly might fulfill its role?

[Answer] That depends first of all on the Chamber office. It is that office that must provide a new thrust and create suitable conditions enabling the deputies to fulfill their role. It also depends on the deputies themselves, who can give their action greater effectiveness and be credible partners for the Executive Branch, especially regarding public opinion.

The Chamber must organize in such a way that it works full time, if I may use that expression. This means that the plenary sessions of the Assembly can meet more often in order to discuss general problems facing the country and thus be able to debate current issues. We must not always be in a hurry, especially on budgetary debates. These debates must not be the opportunity for discussing the general policies of each ministry. That becomes an exhausting marathon without great effectiveness. It is also impossible for every deputy to speak of all the problems that exist. In every committee, there may be groups or persons interesting in certain specific problems and who study them throughout the year, either within working committees or some other body. This presumes an adequate infrastructure that can help the deputy achieve the objective: a secretariat, contacts, a library, and so on.

It is a big problem. At the present time, they can only work through the channel of certain organizations and on the occasion of certain rituals. Our action must be able to be integrated into a broader and more effective context that will give the deputy full range within his district and the country in general. All this presumes that the government will agree to play the game of democracy and that it will allow the Legislative Branch to play its full role. It is a long-range task.

[Question] Ahmed Chtourou, attorney. The name of Ahmed Chtourou remains linked to the defense of trade unionists and Habib Achour. In a few days, it will be the fifth anniversary of 26 January. What does that date mean to you?

[Answer] I think that every Tunisian sees it as a rent in his soul and flesh. Now that passions have died down somewhat, it should be possible to assess responsibilities, not in a spirit of revenge, but in order to derive lessons helping us to prevent similar wounds. The most important lesson is that the use of force with the whole cortege of trials, special courts, arrests, arbitrariness and other abuses, does not solve problems. Only the establishment of a climate of natural trust can bring Tunisians to engage in a dialogue and find the paths of reason. The establishment of such a climate requires great political courage manifested at the time of the speech delivered by the president during the special congress of the PSD. Unfortunately, we appear to be about to stumble again and we must be careful. Every Tunisian must find the means of expressing himself freely in a legal manner and without hindrance, thus helping to enrich reflection on the future of his country. All other alternatives are useless.

[Question] Ahmed Chtourou, a Neo-Destourian militant from the very beginning, how do you judge the PSD today?

[Answer] The PSD is definitely not at the peak of its strength. It has definite signs of wear that it would take too long to analyze on this occasion. Members of that party have given a great deal to their country. Many made the supreme sacrifice or suffered either mentally or physically. Many of us are heart-broken over the self-destructive acts we have witnessed in recent years. The Eighth Congress of 1971 could have been the congress of regeneration, but it failed. That is a shame. But the party can still hold on if it plays the game of democracy within itself and in the country as the party in power.

[Question] You were a leader in the youth movements, and then minister of youth. Is there a youth policy now? What is your opinion of it?

[Answer] A youth policy cannot be dissociated from the overall government policy. A youth minister cannot have or apply a special policy to his department. I would say that a youth policy can have meaning only insofar as all government actions and orientations would tend to promote the blossoming of the creative forces of youth and integrate them into the country's general effort for a better future. This can only take place insofar as our young people are moved by an unshakable faith in a future of which they would be the privileged artisans. But we cannot continue to proclaim these principles and act in the opposite direction. Our country has been able to move forward thanks to its young leaders who have taken over for French personnel after independence. It is moving to recall how young people such as Taieb Mehiri, Ahmed Mestiri, Abdelmajid Chaker, Bechir Ben Yahmed, Mansour Moalla, Mohamed Masmoudi, Ahmed Ben Salah and others were able, led by President Bourguiba at the dawn of independence, to snatch the country away from the former colonial

administration. Today, we need a second wind so that our country might continue to move forward and blossom through its young people, who have already distinguished themselves in the administration, business, the factories, the university and everywhere else.

11,464

CSO: 4519/149

WESTERN SAHARA

SDAR REACTION TO RABAT-ALGERIA CONTACTS

PM031537 Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Mar 83 p 6

[Dispatch by Jean De la Gueriviere: "Polisario Seems Divided on Algerian-Moroccan Rapprochement"]

[Text] Algiers--"It is positive, very positive," a top Algerian official told us in private when speaking of the recent meeting between President Bendjedid and King Hassan II. "It is still too soon to make any comment," according to the ambassador of Mauritania--a country to which Mr Larbi Beilkheir, one of the Algerian head of state's close aides and secretary general of the presidency, has gone to inform the Nouakchott leaders of the summit's results.

The reception given on Tuesday, 1 March, by Polisario External Relations Chief Ould Salek to mark the seventh anniversary of the proclamation of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR] was a success.... The tall figure of Cardinal Duval rose above the compact ranks of diplomats who had come in search of news. Several Algerian ministers and presidential advisers and FLN leadership members were embraced by the Saharans.

Mr Ould Salek handed out a new statement which he had drafted that very day and which was slightly different from the one published the same day by the daily EL MOUDJAHID. It reads: "We are open to and in favor of any initiative which would lead to the start of direct negotiations between the SDAR and Morocco to find a peaceful solution to the conflict between them.... Algeria's open attitude cannot be misinterpreted, as some people are trying to do, by portraying the meeting between President Chadli Bendjedid and the Moroccan king as Algerian-Moroccan negotiations on the West Sahara.... Since the conflict is a Moroccan-Saharan conflict to portray it differently is to attempt to sow confusion, to make a mistake about Algeria and also to make a leap in the dark which proves the absence of real political will in the enemy. In a word it proves that peace is a very long way off and that the war between the SDAR and Morocco is continuing."

This document contrasts somewhat with the speech delivered in the "liberated territories" on Sunday by Mr Mohamed Abdelaziz, "Saharan head of state." The latter first attacked "some sections of the Western media which are talking of a summit meeting yesterday between King Hassan and Brother Bendjedid, basing their statements, of course, on enemy sources." He

attributed this "hubbub" to "circles specialized in psychological warfare." He called for the creation of a "revolutionary front" between the SDAR, Algeria and Libya "to resist the all-out systematic offensive by the United States, France and Saudi Arabia," siding with Rabat's "reviled regime."

Mr Mohamed Abdelaziz continued, without beating about the bush: "Mitterrand's policy, like that of Giscard d'Estaing, has only one objective: To build the Maghreb of Hassan II and Bourguiba--the Maghreb of multinationals and Western military bases and hence the Maghreb of neocolonialism." The pro-Libyan faction within the Polisario has apparently not given up. Algiers probably feared as much. On Sunday APS warned "those who are incapable of drawing a distinction between watchwords and principles" that Algeria is not "prepared to be taught lessons in the sphere of struggle and militant activity."

The text of Mr Abdelaziz's speech did not reach Algiers until Tuesday. It is significant that APS had only given an incomplete version of it in the evening and the most strongly worded statements were omitted.

CSO: 4500/113

WESTERN SAHARA

BRIEFS

SDAR AMBASSADOR'S STATEMENT--Bulahe Mohammed Fadel, member of the Polisario Front's Politburo and ambassador of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR] to Cuba, has stated here: Today our people are more determined to continue fighting for full sovereignty over our territory. In a ceremony to commemorate the seventh anniversary of the SDAR proclamation headed by Severo Aguirre, member of the Central Committee and president of the Cuban Movement for Peace and Sovereignty of Peoples [MPSP], the African diplomat noted that Morocco spends \$3 million per day in its war of aggression. He also accused imperialism of encouraging the expansionist plans of the Moroccan regime. Nora Gopar spoke on behalf of the MPSP and recalled the history of the Saharan people's struggle noting that nothing can stop their victorious advance to final freedom. Gopar expressed support for the positions of the Polisario Front, the only true representative of the Saharan people, and added that to count with this political organization means to advance toward peace in the region. [Text] [FL011458 Havana Domestic Television Service in Spanish 1354 GMT 1 Mar 83]

CSO: 4500/113

ISRAEL

INDUSTRY MINISTER ON U.S. TIES, JORDAN ROLE

TA031825 Tel Aviv YOMAN HASHAVU'A in Hebrew 3 & 4 Feb 83 p 23

[Interview with Industry and Commerce Minister Gid'on Pat by Adar Qeysari; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Question: Is there fear, Mr Minister, that the United States might use the aid it grants Israel as a means to pressure us toward making concessions?

Answer: There is no such fear. In 2 or 3 months the United States will be well into the presidential race and the campaign for congressional elections. I do not think many politicians there could then be found to lend their hand to such an extreme move that conflicts with the moods and attitudes shared by the vast U.S. public.

Let us not forget that the United States has invested tens of billions of dollars in countries larger than us in order to exert its influence there: for example, the Southeast Asian countries and Korea. Yet, it got nothing for its help. If the United States had wanted--that is, if Israel did not exist--to increase its influence in the Middle East and defend its vital interests here, it should have maintained half a million soldiers in this region and invested sums of money six times higher than what it presently does in helping all its Middle Eastern friends.

The great mistake the United States made was in failing to understand that with the peace treaty with Egypt, the illusion is gradually fading away that there is "an Arab world," and it still continues to handle the Middle East as though it constituted one national entity.

At the same time, we must understand that our partnership with the United States is not just desirable, but is also necessary. We introduced the Americans as an influential element here, as one of the three elements--in addition to ourselves and the Arabs--which determine the future of the Middle East. We cannot start riding the seesaw again: once with them, once not.

Question: Do you think Israel can afford to say "no" to the White House?

Answer: I am not anxious to have differences of opinion with the United States, but on matters that are important to Israel there is no other choice but to turn down the White House's position. In such cases I cannot overcome the feeling of pride at feeling that Israel is prepared and able to withstand this giant,

the United States, and for the sake of its own vital interests can even say things the White House may find unpleasant. Golda Me'ir said once: 'There is no need to seek a negative reply to everything the United States is asking of Israel. But I am sure that there is growing appreciation and admiration in the United States toward the government of a small country that can sometimes say: no.'"

Question: According to well-founded information published in YOMAN HASHAVU'A and later on on the Israeli television screen, President Reagan gave a written pledge to King Husayn, promising him all of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.

Answer: We should not get too excited over this. So what if he promised this? Is Reagan the owner of Judaea and Samaria? Reagan can promise Jordan Judaea, Samaria and Gaza just as much as we can promise him Iraq.... Our very existence as an independent state has nothing to do with one U.S. President, who serves either 4 or 8 years in the White House, or another. Jordan could only join the negotiations on the basis of the Camp David accords, not on the basis of any other scheme, including the Reagan plan. No agreement will be signed without us. They need us. We paid the heaviest national pride after Camp David, and we will not pay it again. Israel could continue thus for many years, even if Jordan does not join the negotiations with us. Our security and existence will not be harmed by this.

If Husayn should come to the negotiations on the basis of Camp David, we will welcome him. If he comes on the basis of someone else's promise, while basing himself on the Reagan plan let him not waste his time in vain, let him stay home.

CSO: 4400/241

SHIM'ON PERES OUTLINES POLITICAL VIEWS

TA151531 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 15 Feb 83 pp 10, 33

[Interview with Labor Party Chairman MK Shim'on Peres by Yitzhaq Ben-Ner and Alex Ansky on 10 February, "A Few Minutes After Television Reported the Bitter Piece of News on the Murder of the 'Peace Now' Demonstrator and That Additional Demonstrators Opposite the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem Were Hurt"-- at the Labor Party headquarters in Tel Aviv]

[Excerpt] Ben-Ner: Mr Peres, if there were a decision today to advance the elections, either according to your wish or in contrast to it, how long would it take the Alignment to prepare for such a campaign?

Peres: I do not know, I only know that we would be pleased to have as short a campaign as possible. An election campaign costs a fortune, and the shorter it is the better for the people.

Ben-Ner: This seems like a novelty to me, because it implies that you have no objection to going to elections, as some coalition elements have all along been saying of you?

Peres: We said the elections business should not be linked with the most topical issue today. If we had said today that we favored elections, the incumbent government would have turned into a caretaker government, Arik Sharon would have remained defense minister and would furthermore have enjoyed free range to do whatever he felt like. This is certainly not what we had in mind. As for the election date, we will discuss it.

Ben-Ner: Many have argued that the Alignment's chances of succeeding in the next election, with you at its head, are much slimmer than its chances could be if Yitzhaq Navon or Yitzhaq Rabin headed it. What would convince you that this estimate is correct, or to put it differently, what are your reasons for not accepting this view?

Peres: How do you know that whoever would take my place would get more votes than myself? The question is whether all the attacks are directed at me as a human being, as a person, or as the chairman of the Labor Party.

Ben-Ner: And how do you feel about it?

Peres: My true and sincere feeling is that 90 percent of the attacks on me are because of the duty I am fulfilling. The Likud has been attacking only me. I have no complaints about it, as I myself attack it, and it attacks me back. It is very easy to improve your lot in public opinion polls: be kinder, nicer, more pleasant, avoid attacking Begin, avoid attacking the Likud and turn the polls into a model for ideology. I am the spearhead. I am not complaining or moaning about it--after all, this is the job I have taken upon myself.

Ansky: If you do not attack the Likud, would that improve your lot in the polls?

Peres: I have no doubt about it. Such things have already been known to happen. There was a time when the polls showed that I was the most popular man in Israel.

Ben-Ner: That was in 1976! What has changed since?

Peres: I have not changed, my job has. Sometime I collect the stories being spread about me. It has already been said about me that I stutter, am lazy, do not like to work, run after luxuries, etc. But I do not know how the rumors that my mother was an Arab, or that I belong to the Tadiran concern ever came to be. When I attended 'Aliza Begin's funeral, may her soul rest in peace, a Jew approaches me suddenly and said: "I will not vote for you until you give up ownership of 'Tadiron.'" I was shocked. I came to Moshav Avivim in the north, and sat together with the Moshav secretariat members. I went out when three young men shouted: "Begin, Begin." They were very nice boys. I approached them and one of them said to me: "Mr Peres, under your rule, for 30 years I was not allowed to go into the Jewish national fund forest nearby. Now that you have gone, I can go in." Everything is a factory of rumors, and I am sure it can be directed toward any man, and it will be directed against anyone who fulfills my job.

Ben-Ner: Supposing you are the prime minister, and the PLO offers you simultaneous recognition and expresses readiness to launch negotiations. Would you buy that?

Peres: No. I oppose the PLO's plan. The PLO wants to set up a Palestinian state. There cannot be a Palestinian state without a Palestinian army, and such an army could not but be stationed around the walls of Jerusalem. Since I am not prepared for this, I would not like to delude anyone. I believe Israel has a political alternative: to conduct negotiations with Jordan that would include a Palestinian delegation. Anyone who says yes to negotiations with Jordan must say no to negotiations with the PLO, and vice versa.

Ansky: If the results of the negotiations with Jordan would call for a territorial compromise, would you uproot settlements? Would you send the central command soldiers to evacuate Ari'el just as Yamit was evacuated?

Peres: Uprooting settlements is a first-rate mistake. I never thought the Sinai settlements had to be evacuated, nor do I think those in Judaea and Samaria need to be removed. To me it seems absurd that Jews would be allowed to live anywhere in the world except in Judaea and Samaria. There are settlements there and they will remain where they are.

Ansky: Will the settlements that currently exist in Judaea and Samaria remain there in any event, even if there is a territorial compromise according to your plan?

Ben-Ner: Including settlements situated in the midst of densely-populated Arab areas?

Peres: Everywhere.

Ben-Ner: People have been saying that if a compromise is necessary then it would be better if the Begin government remains in power. It was the one that evacuated Yamit, and if necessary it will also evacuate the other settlements.

Peres: The Begin government conducted the negotiations with Egypt unwisely, and as a result we had to evacuate the settlements. In my opinion it would be preferable to change the government before negotiations are conducted, not after.

Ben-Ner: Supposing you are prime minister, and you are being advised to remove the IDF from Lebanon at once. What would your position be?

Peres: It would be better to have all the non-Lebanese forces removed from Lebanon, including ours.

Ben-Ner: What kind of concessions would you be prepared to make in order to bolster peace with Egypt and extract the peace wagon from the quicksand?

Peres: The condition for resuming the fabric of relations with Egypt would be implementation of the second stage of the Camp David accords, namely the establishment of autonomy.

Ansky: Iraq is completely building another nuclear power station. Would you, as prime minister, order it bombed?

Peres: I was not in favor of bombing the first one. I said that in public on the eve of the elections, in dire straits, and there is no reason for me to change my opinion today. It was not fear that prompted me to oppose bombing the reactor. Firstly, I was not convinced that the main problem in Iraq was the nuclear reactor. In my opinion the main problem in Iraq was the enriched uranium which can be used for military purposes. The bombing of the reactor did not touch that uranium. Secondly, we too have nuclear power stations.

Ben-Ner: Let us again suppose you are the prime minister, and a state commission of inquiry--the eighth in number appointed either willingly or by force--investigates irregular activities and misdeeds, submits its conclusions and rules that partial responsibility should be placed on you. What would you do?

Peres: Draw conclusions. If the commission said that I was responsible, and that I must draw conclusions, then in simple Hebrew, I would just go home.

Ben-Ner: This is only a newspaper interview. Such things are easy to say when you are the head of the opposition.

Peres: I have already resigned before in my life. I believe that anyone who is prepared to assume authority must likewise shoulder responsibility. When the aircraft took off toward Entebbe, it was clear to me that, God forbid if the operation went afoul, I would immediately submit my resignation. I had no doubt at all that this would be what I would do. This is the only way to work.

CSO: 4400/242

IDF CASUALTY FIGURES FOR LEBANON WAR REPORTED

TA031121 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 3 Feb 83 pp 1, 2

[Report by Hirsh Goodman]

[Text] The Israeli death toll in operation peace for Galilee is 466 killed and 2,567 wounded. These figures include all casualties in Lebanon, regardless of cause, current to yesterday morning.

Of the wounded, 138 remain under care, 49 of these recuperating at home; 85 are defined as having light injuries, 3 medium injuries and 1 still seriously wounded.

Of the 2,567 wounded, 1,985 men have returned to their original units; 235 were placed in new units due to a lower medical rating, while 186 were released from active service.

The overall casualty figures pertain to all members of the armed forces, and include the Tyre tragedy, where 275 [as published] men were killed, plus all accidents and soldiers killed in terror incidents.

A senior military officer said that contrary to rumours, there has not been a spate of suicides in Lebanon, but only two since the beginning of the war. Compared with the total number of suicides in the IDF in relation to the number of men deployed in any one area, this is way below average.

In general, the officer said that last year the suicide rate of men in uniform was half of that in previous years.

The officer disclosed that the IDF recently completed an in-depth study on the impact of the war on the morale of troops. The study showed, according to the officer, that 78 per cent of soldiers who were questioned felt they had been well prepared for war; over 80 per cent said they had "complete confidence" in the weapons they were using; 76 per cent said that there was teamwork in their units; over 80 per cent said they were impressed by the leadership shown by their officers; and not a single soldier responded that he thought his unit had not attained the task set for it.

The number of volunteers for specialized units has not dropped since the war in Lebanon, but increased considerably, the senior officer said. Two call-ups since the war, in August and November, showed an increase in the number of volunteers, including from among kibbutz youth and others of left-oriented backgrounds.

There have been fewer than a dozen cases of men jailed for refusing to do military service in Lebanon, he reported, and there has been no increase in the five or six soldiers each year who have refused to do service in Judaea, Samaria or Gaza over the past 10 years.

The average amount of reserve duty anticipated for the coming year depends on whether Israel remains in Lebanon. This fiscal year, fighting units served between 60 and 70 days, while specialists, drivers, communications personnel and military policemen completed 90 days. If the IDF withdraws, fighting units and most of the reserve pool will do 40 days, with around 60 days for specialists needed to refurbish war-damaged materiel during 1983/84. If the IDF does not withdraw, the minimum projection is an average of at least 60 days for all units.

CSO: 4400/241

ARENS', SHARON'S STYLE CONTRASTED

TA041357 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 4 Mar 83 p 10

[Article by Natan Brun: "Style and Content"]

[Excerpt] The following is the report made in all the communications media about events in the Beirut suburbs this past week:

"Toward the end of his visit to the IDF units in the Beirut area the Israeli defense minister noticed a unit of U.S. marines from the multinational force patrolling the main road located within Israel's area of jurisdiction. At his instruction the IDF forces' commanders appealed to the U.S. commander asking him to return to the area under the control of the multinational force."

Now, you can just imagine if the defense minister in question were still Ari'el Sharon and not Moshe Arens who assumed office this past week. One can only guess what a "celebration" would have broken out in the communications media. "The shooting Ari'el," the papers would have written caricaturists would have painted Ari'el Sharon at the turret of a tank, his right arm uplifted in a threatening motion toward a few frightened marines. Leading articles would have been written throughout the world, talking of the famous "toughness" and claiming that Israel was sabotaging the peace chances in the region with its own hands.

However, when the new defense minister, Moshe Arens, is involved, one does not hear a cry or commotion. Nobody reacts, and even the U.S. President does not rush to award medals in this case.

The style and the content are different. All signs indicate that there is not any difference between Moshe Arens' views and those of Sharon. Some even say that Arens is firmer and more extreme on certain issues than his predecessor in the Defense Ministry. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that his various moves in the Israeli defense spheres, however extreme they may be, may be received much more quietly and peacefully. When Arens said to the IDF soldiers in Lebanon that "we will not withdraw without an agreement," no new song has (as yet) been composed on this and it can be assumed that this situation will last at least for the coming period.

This is what we have said: Content and style are different. Occasionally we see with our own eyes how style overshadows content. The quiet, well-considered and polite style of Arens versus the stormy, aggressive style of Ari'el. The difference is completely clear. The question is whether the actions too will be different and here of course a problem of content arises.

BRITISH PRIME MINISTER SAID INVOLVED IN ENVOY CASE

TA021530 Jerusalem KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 2 Mar 83 p 13

[Report by Yisra'el Segal]

[Text] British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher last week sent a special emissary to Jerusalem in order to prevent the appointment of Eliyahu Lankin as Israel's ambassador to England. The emissary, David Wolfson, a Jew who is among the Queen's confidants, secretly met with Prime Minister Menahem Begin and Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir and expressed to them Thatcher's firm opposition to the appointment of Lankin who was one of the Irgun leaders in the past. Wolfson transmitted a personal message to Begin and Shamir the main gist of which: The appointment will harm the relations between the two countries. Thatcher also mentioned in the message the fact that it prevented the inclusion of a PLO representative on the inter-Arab delegation which will visit Britain next week. The hint was clear: if the Israeli Government insists on appointing the past "terrorist" as the ambassador to Britain Thatcher will reconsider its decision not to meet with a PLO representative.

Begin and Shamir understood the hint and shelved the idea of appointing Lankin as the London ambassador. The meeting between Begin and Shamir on the one hand and Wolfson on the other was kept so secret that Shamir even convinced Lankin to write a public letter in which he ceded his new letter of accreditation. Political circles in Jerusalem also added that Begin and Shamir left the decision in Lankin's hands and had he insisted on the appointment the cabinet would have appointed it. In fact Begin and Shamir "commissioned" the public letter to blur the fact that the cancellation of the appointment was made under British pressure originating from 10 Downing Street. An official of the British Embassy in Israel, Gervase Chavasse, said in answer to a question whether a special emissary on Thatcher's behalf indeed visited Jerusalem: "No comment."

The cancellation of Lankin's appointment silenced the "musical chairs" movement in the Foreign Ministry. The plan originally was as follows: Lankin would be appointed ambassador to Britain; Dov Milman, Israel's ambassador to Portugal, was supposed to replace Lankin in South Africa and Efrayim Dubek, an Israeli Embassy official in Cairo was going to replace Milman in Portugal. The cancellation of the appointment disrupted all moves.

A new problem was added this week. Who will be appointed our man in Washington following Moshe Arens' return to Israel. There was a lot of activity in Shamir's office in Jerusalem this week: former Minister Shmu'el Tamir met with Shamir

and offered his candidacy to this important position but it is greatly to be doubted whether Begin will approve of the appointment. Professor Re'uven Yaron who is going to end his term as the chairman of the broadcasting authority's executive in a few months also visited Shamir. As things stand now: Israel's ambassador to France Me'ir Rosenne is the candidate for the high position in Washington, and this leaves Shamir with a new problem: Who will be appointed as the ambassador to France?

This report is suggesting a solution to the diplomatic complications developing in the wake of the recent developments: Rosenne be appointed as the Israeli U.S. ambassador, Lankin be sent to France, Milman be stationed in South Africa, Dubek be appointed as ambassador to Portugal and Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir be appointed to the London ambassadorial post. According to the Thatcher government's definition, Shamir is a terrorist in his own right, but with a difference: he is an honorable one. The iron lady will be unable to oppose the appointment, and this will leave the Foreign Ministry without Shamir, and this too is a blessing.

CSO: 4400/238

MAPAM MEETING ENDS; RESOLUTIONS REPORTED

TA032049 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1945 GMT 3 Feb 83

["The MAPAM Council Ends"--ITIM headline]

[Text] Tel Aviv, 3 Feb--The 29th MAPAM Council ended this afternoon in Tel Aviv with the adoption of political resolutions on the Palestinian issue. The council also called for an immediate withdrawal from Lebanon.

The political resolutions state that MAPAM will struggle for a solution based on two independent and sovereign countries--Israel on the one hand and a Jordanian-Palestinian state on the other. Most Jordanian citizens are Palestinians who, along with their brothers in the West Bank, share a common language and tradition. The dimensions of a Jordan-Palestinian state would enable the Palestinian people to realize their right to self-determination, maintain their unity, take in the refugees and solve their problem, and respect Israel's right to secure and recognized borders, security arrangements and demilitarization. This would not hold true regarding a third state between Israel and Jordan. On the basis of stable peace and good neighborly relations Israel will also have to contemplate the possibility of a communal [qehilati] solution, either federative or confederative.

The paragraph entitled "The Road to Peace" states, among other things: "Israel must be ready to negotiate with any Palestinian element that would recognize Israel, would oppose terror and would recognize Israel's right to secure and recognized borders according to security council resolution 242. These conditions denote opposition to the clauses of the PLO's Palestinian charter which seek to destroy Israel. On the basis of mutual simultaneous recognition between the two peoples direct negotiations, without any preconditions, would open about peace."

In its political resolutions, MAPAM also calls for an immediate withdrawal from Lebanon. In its resolutions it is pointed out that Israel does not question the borders existing between itself and Lebanon and that it demands security arrangements which would assure the well-being of the settlements on the northern border.

The council notes the role the party played in consolidating public opposition to the government's moves during the war.

The political resolution ends with a call to give peace a chance. MAPAM calls on all the progressive forces in Israel to exert a united effort to topple the Likud government and once again bring the labor movement to lead the country.

The resolutions were adopted almost unanimously. Only 3 out of 54 additions and reservations were passed, mainly dealing with the issue of self-determination of the Palestinian people, the question of a third country and on the conditions under which negotiations must be held with Palestinian elements.

In his political lecture, MAPAM's political secretary, Dr Gadi Yatziv, said that the government has no political solution and is not ready to compromise. Its option to an Israeli-Arab solution is force. This war was decided upon by an elected government. Still, it must be ensured that the democratic apparatus works properly and the opposition discharges its duties, he concluded.

CSO: 4400/241

SCHIFF DISCUSSES 'CONTRADICTIONS' IN LEBANON STRATEGY

TA271635 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 Jan 83 p 9

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "Five Contradictions in Lebanon"]

[Text] The confrontation with the United States regarding the security arrangements in southern Lebanon proves that the Israeli strategy in Lebanon has, as expected, reached a most ironic situation: Not only is it hard for us to obtain the objectives of Sharon's "grand scheme," but the achievements and the "assets" we possessed in the past, before the war, are in jeopardy. Below are the five serious contradictions we have found ourselves embroiled in:

--We must fight for the continued existence of the Haddad enclave and for the militia under his command, which served as an important tool toward achieving Israeli security interests. A similar danger also exists in regard to the reconnaissance flights into Lebanon and along the Lebanese-Syrian border. What was taken for granted and self-evident up until the war is not that certain for the future. The argument over the presence of the Israeli early-warning stations in Lebanon is one of the expressions of the situation we are in. Either way, these stations will only be temporary.

--Any military advantage Israel could extract from Lebanon inside its territory would result in Syrian pressure to obtain similar things from the Lebanese. One does not need to be an intelligence or electronics specialist to understand that the Israeli early-warning station in Jabal al-Baruk peeps into the Syrian "bedroom" and that our surveillance sorties are, as earlier, aimed not only against the terrorists--whose commands have deserted Lebanon--but first and foremost against the Syrians. If Lebanon accepts more flights over its territory, Damascus will also demand its own patrols over Lebanon. The same will also hold true in regard to Syrian "early-warning" stations.

--The Lebanese Government's refusal to permit Israel to remain in southern Lebanon and sustain Major Haddad and his forces for a long period of time has led us to a situation where we are indirectly endangering that country's territorial integrity. (To recall, in the past we have declared that strengthening independent Lebanon and maintaining its territorial integrity is one of our

objectives). At first, Begin gave Haddad the Beaufort fortress as though it was ours, and later we imposed his rule all the way up to the al-'Awwali River. Sharon tells Amin al-Jumayyil that if he does not agree with us, he will remain the president only of the B'Abda Presidential Palace, and recently we have gotten the good word that Sham'unist elements are in contact with Haddad in a bid to establish a militia comprising thousands of people in southern Lebanon. One can hardly assume that such activity could have been carried out without our knowledge and without prior coordination.

--We are experiencing difficulties in getting out of the Lebanese quagmire after we had issued an ultimatum saying that we would not budge even 1 meter before the Syrians and terrorists pulled out. Thus we have become dependent on their will and have created a situation where the United States must pay Syria and the PLO for their agreement to leave Lebanon. We have deluded ourselves that this withdrawal would be done for nothing. The price we will have to pay will be in hard currency--on the issues of Judaea and Samaria, settlements and the like. Without such a payment, Washington will be unable to persuade even Saudi Arabia to serve as a go-between toward obtaining Syria's and the terrorists' withdrawal. This in addition to the debt to the United States in "Lebanese" coin, namely that Israel will not win too many achievements in Lebanon, whereas the Syrians will not withdraw from there without something in return.

--In day-to-day life there, we have found ourselves all of a sudden in friction with the marines. The U.S. Secretary of Defense, who hardly said a thing about the danger emanating from the stationing of SAM-5's in Syria, has defined even the small "clashes" between the IDF and the marines as most disconcerting. We have found ourselves in a predicament similar to the one we were in with units belonging to friendly countries such as the Netherlands and Norway, who dispatched their soldiers to Unifil and within a relatively short period of time we found ourselves in conflict with them. This will also likely be the situation with the U.S. force and its soldiers as long as we insist on remaining on the current lines.

These are the gross contradictions, and yet we have not mentioned other problems, such as the need to carry out police duties in the al-Shuf Hills, keeping the two sects engaged in a civil war at bay. This jeopardizes our relations with the Druze in Israel, whose sons are serving in the IDF, and many view with increasing concern the continued support and supply of arms to the Phalangists. These are too many contradictions to argue that they are incidental. They constitute proof that willingness is no strategy, and that a successful strategic maneuver is no show of a correct political approach.

Since we are in the midst of such a labyrinth, the natural inclination is to blame others and claim that if only...things would have turned out differently. If only Bashir al-Jumayyil were alive, and if only the Americans had agreed to let us realize all our war objectives, then...as for Bashir al-Jumayyil, a myth has spread as though he would have signed a peace agreement with us. But there is ample proof--including his own remarks to Israeli officers--that

he would not have done so. He wanted practical, behind-the-scenes relations without official documentation. He would have given Israel a more substantial normalization, but not a written agreement. He regarded himself as bound to the Arab world. It would be appropriate to recall that on 6 September, a week before he was murdered, Sharon came to Qiryat Shemona and strongly warned Bashir saying among other things: "If Lebanon refuses to sign a peace agreement with Israel, then Israel will be forced to stay on the 40 to 50 km strip from its border, and leave southern Lebanon under a status other than that of the other parts of Lebanon."

In order to extricate ourselves from the entanglement of the contradictions, there is no other alternative but to get down from the tall tree planted on the quicksands of Sharon's grand scheme. The choice Israel has is to talk to the Syrians and not depend only on Amin al-Jumayyil and his government. The chances for such a dialogue are pretty slim, and the price for it will no doubt appear to be great to the Begin Government, but if it is achieved it could be considered a real breakthrough.

The other alternatives would seem, at first glance, to be its opposite. It calls for giving up the insistence that we would not withdraw even 1 meter from Lebanon unless the Syrians and the terrorists do likewise. This alternative says that we must first of all focus on our own security interests in southern Lebanon: in real peace for the Galilee. That is to say, we should leave the al-Shuf Hills and their problems to others; let the Lebanese army, the U.S. marines and the multinational force deal with these problems and with possible terrorist infiltrations into that area; not to insist too much on the Syrian pullout from the northern part of the al-Biqa' Valley, and even accept a disengagement between the IDF and the Syrian army. Militarily, we would conceivably gain a lot from such a move. The great Syrian army would then continue to be split between the Golan and the al-Biqa' area; the danger of a local surprise from it would decrease, and we would be able to continue conducting patrol flights and the like, until the parties reconcile themselves to reasonable Israeli security demands. And, of course, we would be avoiding a lot of troubles stemming from the Lebanese civil war.

What is currently happening is an effort to save the objectives of the war in order to justify its high price. The more this becomes difficult and complex, the greater our charges and claims against Washington, blaming it for the whole guffaw. If we concentrate on realistic security objectives, no doubt the United States will also support them, because it is hard to believe that Washington would want to leave a dangerous vacuum in southern Lebanon and at the same time endanger Israel. One could, then, safely assume that we would ultimately gain those security achievements, with or without the early-warning stations (incidentally, involved is more in the nature of a military presence in two of the bases; without the patrols they only have a symbolic significance, with the aim of preventing the return of terrorists). This is certainly a feasible achievement, but we should likewise not forget that it could have been attained in a far smaller-scale war, and at a lower price. This important fact should be pointed out again to those who undoubtedly wish to make political and personal profit when an agreement on security arrangements for southern Lebanon is finally signed.

SETTLEMENT MORATORIUM FOR JORDAN OPPOSED

TA091140 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 9 Feb 83 p 6

[Commentary by Me'ir Bar'eli: "The Pressure and the Freeze"]

[Text] Although all the information we have comes from press sources, and there is no official confirmation, still it stands to reason that the argument between Husayn and the Americans is really over the conditions for his joining the political negotiations Menahem Begin has invited him to join; it also stands to reason that Husayn is demanding that Washington show proof of its ability to apply pressure on Israel that would lead to substantive results. That is not only withdrawal from Lebanon "to the last centimeter," but also "the first centimeters" in reference to Judaea and Samaria. This is not to say that Husayn would only join the talks if Israel a priori gives up some territory. He will likely make do with a moratorium on the settlements and regard this as "the first centimeters"--and rightfully so.

From the Israeli standpoint, the problem is twofold: the problem of the U.S. pressure, and that of the settlements and freezing them. Even the most extremist opponent of any settlement activity beyond the green line would have to understand that any Israeli concession made as a result of U.S. pressure would not bring Israeli-Arab peace any closer, because it would produce no favorable attitude toward Israel on the part of the Arabs. This would not serve to mitigate the Arab hostility toward Israel. On the contrary, it would encourage them to get further pressure on Israel. An Israeli concession as a result of U.S. pressure could help the Americans set foot in the Middle East at the Soviets' expense. But even someone who sincerely wishes to help the United States (and Menahem Begin could well compete with any person in harboring anti-Soviet and pro-American extremism) will have to think twice or even more before he welcomes capitulation to U.S. pressure, because of the venomous ramifications this could have on Israeli-Arab relations. It should be known, after all, that submission to U.S. pressure can never be presented as a willing concession. I only wish Israel's concessions, made in good will (such as the one when it gave up holding talks with Lebanon in Jerusalem), would not be interpreted by the Arabs as submission to U.S. pressure.

Once people often talked about "forced peace" without understanding withdrawal. There is nothing like forced peace, because it is not peace at all.

Now in question is a freeze on the settlements, and there are people who would have wanted Israel to initiate a moratorium without U.S. pressure in order to obtain in return at least the achievement of a more congenial Arab attitude toward us. One could ask, why everact? After all, such a moratorium has already been declared once, and was followed by a settlement drive that was unheard before that freeze. But the difference between one moratorium and another is that what is now being suggested is too great to allow for a comparison and make the argument "it is not so bad" hold water, and this is true for two obvious reasons.

First, the freeze then was a gesture for the negotiations in which Israel handed over entirely different areas. And, to recall, they were handed over completely, "up to the last centimeter," and it is over that "centimeter" which is partly in the Sinai and partly in Israel that there is such a vociferous argument nowadays. What was at stake then was not the future of Judaea and Samaria, whereas now people have been suggesting freezing the settlements there for the sake of negotiations over that very part of the land. Such a freeze would spell an Israeli admission, even before the negotiations have begun, that Jewish settlement activity there is not altogether compatible with peaceful arrangements. A moratorium on the settlements would constitute a huge and substantive Israeli concession even before the talks have begun.

Secondly, when the settlements were frozen for the sake of talks with Egypt, the settlements were merely ideas. The people who lived in Samaria were only people who were far more zealous for Samaria than Menahem Begin and his ministers. But today many live in Samaria because they went there with their families to reap advantages--comfortable housing conditions (and cheap), quality of life and such things. If the Israeli government freezes their drive, the settlement activity will be harmed for a long time to come, and possibly irretrievably so. We are not talking about people who are convinced that "the evil scheme will be disrupted" and that the Almighty will make sure they succeed. We are talking about your run-of-the-mill Jew who hopes the Israeli Government will defend the house he is building for himself in Judaea and Samaria, just along the green line. Freezing these settlements will shatter all the confidence, even if the moratorium will not apply to houses on which construction has already begun. A freeze now will leave in the area those who originally went to Judaea and Samaria in order to get compensation when they are evacuated, and when the evacuation day comes, compensation payment will not be a desirable thing for the country. The damage that will be done by stopping settlement activity will affect the Jews who want to establish their home away from the density and the pollution of the high-populated centers, who go to places where the population is sparse--Jewish and Arab populations alike.

Incidentally, harming these settlements will not only deal a blow to "greater Israel," but it will harm the "territorial compromise" because it will damage the residential settlements near the green line.

CSO: 4400/239

INTERVIEW WITH PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS

JN312035 Jerusalem Radio in Arabic to the Arab World 1530 GMT 31 Jan 83

[Interview with Tulkarm Mayor Hilmi Hannun and Mustafa Dudin, head of the village leagues union in the West Bank, by Rif'at Qaddur, radio correspondent for West Bank affairs, carried in the "With the Events" program--place and date not given; recorded]

[Text] [Interviewer] Mr Hilmi Hannun, mayor of Tulkarm, first of all, I would like to ask your opinion on the Palestinian-Jordanian rapprochement?

[Hilmi Hannun] We support any Palestinian-Arab rapprochement, particularly a Jordanian-Palestinian rapprochement as the Palestinians have an interest in establishing good relations with the Arab world.

[Interviewer] As recently mentioned by the media, a Palestinian-Jordanian team will be formed in the near future for starting direct negotiations with Israel to settle the Middle East issue. What is your opinion about the formation of such a Palestinian-Jordanian team?

[Hilmi Hannun] As I mentioned previously, we support a Palestinian-Jordanian rapprochement. We also support any joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation that will be acceptable to the PLO.

[Interviewer] Do you think that the circumstances of the new stage in the Middle East can lead to the settlement of the Middle East issue?

[Hilmi Hannun] I believe that U.S. President Reagan's initiative will be valid for approximately 6 months. During that very short period, some signs of optimism may emerge. After this 6-month period ends, it will be difficult to find any solution to the Palestinian issue before new presidential elections take place in the United States.

[Interviewer] In your opinion, is there a unity of opinion between the Arab countries and the [Palestinian] organizations on the solution of the Middle East issue?

[Hilmi Hannun] I believe that differences exist between radical Arab countries and moderate Arab countries. Moderate Arab countries seek a quick settlement of the Palestinian issue through negotiations. While radical Arab countries prefer the military solution.

[Rif'at Qaddur] Do you believe that after so many years the military solution continues to exist, particularly after the many wars that have taken place?

[Hilmi Hannun] The military solution will continue to exist in the future if no peaceful solution takes place.

[Interviewer] News agencies have reported that six West Bank personalities have been chosen to be on the Jordanian-Palestinian team to conduct the negotiations and the talks. In your opinion, do the six personalities from the West Bank represent all sectors in the West Bank?

[Hilmi Hannun] With due respect to these personalities whose names have been mentioned, I have been told by these personalities that no party has come forward to empower them or ask them about their response if asked to become members of the Palestinian-Jordanian team. I would like to stress here that any representative of the Palestinian people must be a member of the PLO.

[Interviewer] Do you believe that there are leaders here in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip who will start negotiations in the future within the framework of the Jordanian-Palestinian team or in an independent manner?

[Hilmi Hannun] I believe that there is no Palestinian personality who would dare to be a member of any delegation for negotiations if the PLO does not agree to this.

[Interviewer] Mr Dudin, what are your comments on this subject?

[Mustafa Dudin] With due respect to all, I believe that the experience of the past 40 years, during which leaders and representatives were imposed on us, has made us lose the country. That is why I believe that the people here in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, who are directly concerned with peace, should be given the opportunity to elect their representatives in a democratic manner.

As for the method of appointing representatives and imposing guardians on us, our experience in this matter makes us lose any hope of reaching any solution through the adoption of such methods. These methods have been imposed on our people here through terrorism and by force and without giving these people the right to voice their opinion on such methods.

[Interviewer] Do you expect Jordan to conduct direct negotiations with Israel in the coming weeks?

[Mustafa Dudin] We have appealed to His Majesty King Husayn more than once to lead the process of negotiations with the participation of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. We have also expressed our support for such a move to be carried out by his majesty. We hope that this will take place because we, who are here, are the ones who are directly concerned with peace. We realize more than anyone else and more than our brothers abroad that maintaining the status quo will not be in the interest of the Palestinian people. We also are aware that the time factor will never be on our side.

That is why we are ready to work with his majesty and to fully support him in the negotiations for seeking solutions. At the same time, we categorically reject any attempt to impose persons on us as our representatives without giving us the chance to give our opinion on these persons.

FORMER NABULUS MAYOR DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN PEACE MOVES

TA041418 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Feb 83 pp 16, 17 Ha'ir Supplement

[Interview with former Nabulus Mayor Bassam al-Shak'ah by Orli Lubin; date and place not given]

[Text] About 3 months ago, the mayor of Bethlehem since 1972, Ilyas Frayj, returned from Jordan carrying a document which, according to him, had been written with the approval of Husayn and 'Arafat (Frayj may have met Abu Jihad, 'Arafat's right hand). The document, which was to have been circulated and signed by leaders in the West Bank, contained three central points: mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, readiness to accept UN Resolution 242, and sympathy toward the rapprochement process between Jordan and the PLO. Once signed, this document is designed to strengthen 'Arafat's men against the rejectionist front within the PLO.

When he returned from Jordan, Frayj summoned several people to East Jerusalem, including Anwar al-Khatib, the governor of the Jerusalem area on behalf of Jordan and its strong man in the West Bank (al-Khatib is also one of the six men 'Arafat mentioned he would like to see on his side as representatives of the West Bank); former Gaza Mayor al-Shawwa (the only mayor appointed by the Israeli administration who was not elected to his post) who is opposed to Bassam al-Shak'ah; and Hikmat al-Masri, a member of one of the largest and richest families in Nabulus, a member of the local Nabulus opposition to al-Shak'ah, a member of the Jordanian establishment and the founder of al-Najah University in Nabulus (which reopened this week, after a 2-week recess in the wake of pro-PLO demonstrations in the campus). All these men met in the office of Mahmud Abu Zalaf, the editor of AL-QUDS. Frayj showed them the document, each of them took copies of it and set out to collect signatures of others in the West Bank. Their main goal was to get the signatures of members of the national guidance committee which was established in October 1978 and outlawed in 1982. The living spirit of the committee and the man considered its leader is Bassam al-Shak'ah, the deposed mayor of Nabulus.

The people collecting the signatures had hoped that the so-called agreement in principle of the PLO would preclude problems. To their surprise, the radicals hesitated while al-Shak'ah refused to sign. The biggest blow to Frayj's move came when Hilmi Hanun, the mayor of Tulkarm since 1962--the most veteran mayor

and one of the most acceptable ones in the area--proposed that amendments should be introduced in the document. From that moment, a series of changes in various initiatives began which was coupled with a scandal in the Arab press. The scandal reached its peak with the publication of venomous caricatures against the "initiative of the five" printed by the newspaper SHARIH ("THE INTERPRETER") which represents George Habash's popular front.

Frayj was compelled to forgo his initiative for a massive collection of signatures, and only made his associates--Bethlehem men--sign it. For his part, Hikmat al-Masri also made those people close to him sign another version of the document. Reservations about this initiative were perhaps expressed best by AL-FAJR--which represents 'Arafat--and whose editor, Ziyad Abu Ziyad, is one of the pillars of the moderate line in the West Bank (along with Frayj, al-Shawwa and Raymond al-Tawil). Although AL-FAJR did not mention any reluctance about Frayj, it reported about his initiative subtly and not enthusiastically.

The document--which according to Frayj was signed by 200 personalities--was taken along by Ilyas Frayj during his visit to Egypt, and he delivered it to Mubarak for his perusal.

Frayj, who began as a proclaimed pro-Jordanian, met in 1979 with 'Arafat in Amman and has since then made his way into the PLO. He is currently one of the leading PLO supporters in the West Bank. Al-Shak'ah, who began as a member of the popular front, is not considered a rejectionist front man today but more of a radical in the extremist flank of FATAH.

Although he does not hold any formal post today, al-Shak'ah's status in the West Bank is strong and central. Public figures and activists call on him and consult with him. The talk with him, which focused on his reaction to Frayj's initiative and the prominent positions in the West Bank, exposed confusion and doubts along with a process of moderation within the radicals in the West Bank; and the recognition that after the second and successful Fes conference the political path will gain the upper hand. Above all else, al-Shak'ah said, Palestinian unity prevails: "We are united today, we will always be united, and only with unity will we attain peace and the Palestinian state."

Question: Did you sign the document?

Answer: No, nobody showed me that document.

Question: Why did they not show it to you?

Answer: You should ask them. I think that in it they express their own position, otherwise they would have shown it to us, to me and to others.

Question: Who are the others?

Answer: Many others, most of the other mayors did not sign that document; most of them did not even see it.

Question: If they had come to you with the document, would you have signed it?

Answer: No.

Question: Why?

Answer: Because there is nothing new about the call for recognizing Israel. It is important to pay attention to the fact that they do not mention anywhere the unity of all Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. They said that all those undersigned bear full responsibility for the Palestinian problem. However, each one of them objectively knows that whoever wants a true peace should talk about Palestinian unity. Peace will only come through Palestinian unity rather than through split groups, even if they want to become a central force in the deliberations about the problem. A first step toward peace would be the unity of the people. Whoever says anything without obtaining the approval of others is creating an internal struggle without bringing peace any closer.

Question: Their action does not contain anything that may bring peace closer?

Answer: Any peace action will prevail--or begin--through the unity of the Palestinians and through our representative? They did not say that clearly enough.

Question: So who does represent them?

Answer: They speak about the Reagan plan which does not recognize the PLO and does not mention a Palestinian state; they encourage King Husayn and Jordan to assume the main role in the deliberations about the Palestinian problem. That is their position, although it is not coupled with the facts in the field--and that is their problem.

Question: And what are the facts?

Answer: The real fact is that we are united, that the PLO is our representative, that we want our independent state.

Question: Alongside the state of Israel?

Answer: We know that Israel has rights, and you know that the PLO talks about a state to be established on any territory that would be liberated from the occupation, and that it accepts the Fes initiative and the UN resolutions. That means the PLO recognizes the right of Israel. We did not refuse to give you a country; we were not the ones who occupied you. Israel is the one that occupied all Palestine, the Golan Heights and Lebanon. Israel has already annexed the Golan Heights and it is now trying to annex Lebanon. Israel is now fighting for more than just southern Lebanon. We want our rights and our independent state. Later it will be possible to establish contacts and say "hello." Nowhere in our history or struggle did we reject the Israelis' rights, at no stage of our problem.

Question: You rejected the Israelis' right to their own state.

Answer: We lived together in 1948. Since then your country has taken away more and more of our rights. If a group in America or in any other European or African country were to say that it wants to found a state for a certain religion or nationality--do you think others would accept it? However, we have a problem now, a humanitarian problem, and we will get the same rights as others to live. The problem now is that the others do not accept our rights. Even when we talk about peace on our part, we know that Israel does not want such peace--and peace cannot be made alone.

For our part, we accept the rights of the Israelis. The Israelis want a state, so let us discuss, negotiate and talk about the rights of both sides--then I will accept it. The question is not my wish but the position that will be adopted by the leaders, the position that will be adopted by the government of the Palestinians and, on the other hand, Israel's official position. However, today in Israel, nobody speaks officially about the rights of the Palestinians. I am not referring to the democratic forces in Israel which we and our leaders respect, with whom we have good relations and with whom we hope to have even a better future together. However, that is not Israel's official policy. The decision about two states must be made through negotiations with our government.

Question: You talk about unity but there is currently no unity within the PLO.

Answer: I do not agree with you on this point.

Question: Do you think that there is unity?

Answer: There is unity, and our people will maintain the Palestinian unity.

Question: From what we have heard recently, there have been differences--both regarding deeds and statements--between, for example, 'Arafat, Hawatimah and Habash.

Answer: I do not know what you mean. We hear a lot of things, there are many rumors. Our region is plagued with nonsensical information. Believe me, I do not think there are many known and clear facts today amid all this information. Many elements create propaganda about things that are not facts.

Question: Do you believe that 'Arafat has met with Husayn?

Answer: Yes, he has met him. As for the results of the meeting, however, I do not believe what the propaganda says.

Question: After having met him, the Americans expect Husayn to join the negotiations this month.

Answer: From the Americans' point of view this is realistic. They have not recognized the PLO, they are opposed to a Palestinian state and they talk about negotiations between Israel and Jordan--and part of the Palestinians.

Question: Perhaps the part that Ilyas Frayj represented?

Answer: Whoever is expected to represent that part; Ilyas Frayj is an example. He says that he will accept the Reagan plan.

Question: What about Rashad al-Shawwa?

Answer: He also spoke about the Reagan plan, but differently from Ilyas Frayj. He looks optimistically at the Reagan plan and he has said as much, but he does not talk like Frayj. Fahd al-Qawasimi and Muhammad Hasan Milhim say that the PLO represents them. Frayj--he may be anything, he may be everything, even a Jordanian. He is not like the rest. Ilyas Frayj is not Bassam al-Shak'ah.

As for Husayn: Husayn has not yet accepted the Rabat conference resolutions stating that the PLO is the representative of the Palestinians, but he has announced that he would not go to any negotiations without the PLO.

Question: Why do you want to talk about things that have no resemblance to the facts whatsoever? To date, there has been nothing for which it would be possible to go to negotiations. The Palestinians have not received anything from the Israeli side and they can receive nothing from the Americans, because the latter's starting point is "no" to a Palestinian state and "no" to the PLO. Everybody knows that, objectively speaking, peace cannot be attained without these two elements. If new facts emerge and a new agreement is reached democratically--that is something else altogether. However, the situation has not changed, neither on the American nor the Israeli side. Today, if I want to do something for peace, I do it with my own imagination rather than with the facts. [as printed]

Negotiations are now underway with the Palestinians and Jordan, and one begins to hear many positions from many sides about all sorts of things but not about reality. "Jordan will discuss peace"--where is the peace it will discuss: And why should I agree to something whose results and possibilities I do not know?

Question: Frayj went to Mubarak and submitted a list of dignitaries. Does he not represent anybody?

Answer: If you want to talk about Frayj's meetings with Mubarak, you must first speak about Tabah; whether Mubarak will manage to get the Tabah area or not. However, beyond all that, Frayj may call on Mubarak just as I may visit Egypt.

Question: Can you?

Answer: Why not?

Question: Can you leave the West Bank?

Answer: I have not tried. I tried several times in the last 2 years but I did not get a permit. Earlier, I was even held under direct control, with a military vehicle. There was no military order that banned me from traveling but I could not move because the military vehicle kept an eye on me. Now, after I underwent surgery to remove kidney stones, less than 2 months ago, they have called off this control.

Question: Will you try and get permission to travel to the PLO convention in Algiers?

Answer: I have not tried to get a permit. Still, nobody is talking of going there. I am not a member of the Palestine National Council.

Question: In your opinion, what is Husayn striving for?

Answer: Husayn is trying to reach peace, also for the Palestinian side.

Question: Does Husayn want the West Bank to be part of Jordan?

Answer: You know, many years ago Husayn spoke about a united kingdom of the West Bank and Jordan, and Jordan has also recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. One cannot observe Husayn's activities and attempts without bearing this in mind.

Question: Do you think that Frayj and his relations with Husayn serve the Palestinian goal?

Answer: For my part, believe me that I look upon Frayj's activities without pinning great hopes on them, because he is dealing with things that have nothing to do with reality. He is discussing something which he cannot achieve. He says that we should recognize Israel to have this or another thing happen--and that is talking about something unattainable.

Question: Still, he is at least trying to achieve it.

Answer: He is trying. We will see, let us wait and see.

Question: But you will not help him.

Answer: I do not see how he can be helped. There is nothing now, nothing.

Question: What do you think should be the first move now?

Answer: The Israelis and the Americans should recognize the right of the Palestinians and their representative, the PLO. That is the first move because everything now depends on the power of Israel, which occupied the entire region. What should happen is that the Americans recognize the PLO and that the PLO should move from that point, from the recognition, onward to peace.

Question: Who are the other 200 signatories on Frayj's document?

Answer: I do not know. I know some but not all of them.

Question: Who will represent the West Bank in the negotiations, if these come into being?

Answer: How can I, Bassam al-Shak'ah, tell you? Only our leaders, the PLO, can decide who will represent the West Bank.

Question: And most people in the West Bank believe that the PLO represents them?

Answer: Not most, I think all of them. I myself heard Frayj say about 2 weeks ago that the PLO is our representative.

Question: What is the difference between Frayj and those who signed the petition and you?

Answer: There are many differences. We are now outside the city council while he is inside. He is in contact with the civilian administration and we are not. He has always had relations and contacts with the administration while we only had civilian relations; namely, we kept in contact only in order to serve our city, in order to discharge our duties. Frayj behaved differently; he is different in many respects.

Question: So, there are at least two groups in the West Bank--his and yours.

Answer: There are several, different positions.

Question: More than positions are involved; Frayj is active, he travels all over and meets people.

Answer: I think that if Ilyas Frayj can achieve peace and a state for the Palestinians, that can only start through unity; he must start off from the unity of the Palestinians.

CSO: 4400/240

INVESTMENT IN TERRITORIES SETTLEMENT

TA0711110 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 7 Feb 83 p 6

[Report by economic affairs correspondent in Jerusalem Yisra'el Tomer]

[Text] Some 8,867 housing units have been built so far--or are now in various stages of construction--in Judaea, Samaria, the Gaza District and the Golan Heights. According to next year's budget, construction on another 2,803 housing units will begin in these areas. Consequently, there will soon be 11,670 housing units beyond the "green line," according to data of the Construction and Housing Ministry.

According to estimates, some 21 billion Israeli shekels (about \$600 million) have been invested to date in residential housing beyond the green line.

Our correspondent points out that in addition to the construction ministry's investment in residential housing, the Agriculture Ministry and the Jewish Agency Settlement Department have invested an additional sum of 23.7 shekels at today's rates (approximately \$677 million) beyond the green line in the last 10 years to prepare land and infrastructure, create production means for agricultural settlements, build temporary housing and various public buildings. (This sum also includes some 3 billion shekels in the new budget).

Thus, it seems that since the 6-Day War Israel has invested a total of 45 billion shekels at today's rates (about \$1.3 billion) in military presettlements and civilian settlements beyond the green line (excluding military pre-settlements in the Sinai). This sum also includes the allocation in this year's budget.

According to data gathered by the Construction and Agriculture Ministry it emerges that there are currently 39 Jewish settlements and 4 presettlements and Nahal footholds in Judaea and Samaria and that the construction of another 12 new settlements and 2 Nahal footholds will begin this year.

There are now 21 Jewish settlements in the Jordan Rift Valley and the construction of 2 new settlements and one new Nahal foothold will begin this year.

There are currently 29 Jewish settlements and 3 presettlements and Nahal footholds on the Golan Heights and the establishment of 2 new settlements will begin this year.

In the Gaza District and the Hebron mountain slopes, 11 settlements, 2 Nahal footholds and two temporary camps have been established so far, and the establishment of 4 new settlements and 4 new Nahal footholds will begin this year.

In view of the recent argument on this issue, it should be pointed out that since 1977, 8.7 billion shekels (\$250 million) have been invested in the project of rehabilitating the slums. The new budget for next year allocates another 4.1 billion shekels to this project. Hence, this project has been allocated 12.8 billion shekels (\$366 million). As may be recalled, Deputy Construction and Housing Minister Moshe Qatzav had claimed that the government had allocated twice as many funds to the reconstruction to the slums than to settlements beyond the green line.

CSO: 4400/240

ARENS WANTS ATTENTION ON WAR'S ORIGINAL GOALS

TA060742 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 6 Mar 83 pp 1, 2

[Report by the diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] New Defense Minister Moshe Arens is hoping to return attention to the original aims of the war in Lebanon and favours a partial withdrawal of the IDF, political sources in Jerusalem said last night.

The sources said that Arens does not intend to abandon the effort to achieve an arrangement with Lebanon incorporating elements of "normalization" of relations between the two states.

However, the concept which guides his thinking, as reflected in talks he has held with various political and military figures, is that Israel has to focus on the original, central aim of the war--to ensure the security of Israel's northern border.

It was further learned that the defense minister is carefully examining all the documents referring to past talks and other political contacts geared to finding a solution to the crisis. He has also re-examined all the Israeli positions adopted in the talks and simultaneously the various options available to further the negotiations with the Lebanese.

Sources close to the talks with Lebanon said yesterday that Arens would likely participate intensively and stress his views at meetings of the ministerial committee guiding the talks.

The sources estimated that the minister enjoys the full support of Prime Minister Menahem Begin--a support which will be particularly important when and if Minister Without Portfolio Ari'el Sharon objects to Arens' positions.

According to the sources, Arens also enjoys the support of most cabinet members, who maintain that Israel should act to further the negotiations in cooperation with the U.S.

The sources added that Arens enjoys widespread public support and much creditability in the IDF, and the fact that he has taken office "from outside" following his success in Washington is seen as a major point in his favour, enabling him to introduce new ideas in the talks.

Arens supports a partial IDF withdrawal, simultaneous with a Syrian pullback, as an interim phase towards a general withdrawal. This support is being interpreted by the political sources as part of Arens' desire for speedy action to bring about a full withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanese territory.

The sources said that the trip made by Arens last week to Lebanon strengthened his view that there is a need to act quickly to minimize the chances of friction between the IDF and various forces in Lebanon.

In the meantime, Jerusalem expects the return of special U.S. envoy Philip Habib from the U.S. Habib conveyed last week a Lebanese proposal for an interim arrangement which would go into force immediately after the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon. According to several reports, before leaving for the U.S., Habib said that Lebanon would be prepared to negotiate on all issues once the IDF is out of Lebanon, and it is assumed that Habib's proposal and Arens' ideas will complement each other.

CSO: 4400/238

KHALAF DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH PLO, ISRAEL

TA031422 Tel Aviv YOMAN HASHAVU'A in Hebrew 4 Mar 83 pp 14, 15

[Report by Roni Shaqed on interview with deposed Ramallah Mayor Karim Khalaf in Jericho; date not given]

[Text] In his exile, Jericho, ousted Ramallah Mayor Karim Khalaf feels like one of the Judaea and Samaria leaders who have not lost their power. He continues to derive encouragement and energy to continue his activity from the support given him by his townspeople as well as from many circles in Judaea and Samaria, who continued to regard him as one of the pillars of the Palestinian national leadership in the territories.

Karim Khalaf emphasizes with a degree of self-confidence: "My status now is higher than before, and despite my dismissal by the Israeli authorities, I am the legal mayor of Ramallah and only my struggle against the conquest and my principles against cooperating with the civilian administration are preventing my return to Ramallah."

Despite this feeling, Khalaf expresses with sorrow his frustration from being away from the heart of the political action in Judaea and Samaria, and especially that he could not participate in the public argument that preceded the Palestine National Council meeting in Algiers. "It hurts that I have to be away from the focus of events," Karim Khalaf emphasizes bitterly. Still he finds relief to the blow to his political status in the activity he conducts in his Jericho home, which is being frequented by various activists who update him on events and hold deliberations and consultations with him as of yore.

In his villa, surrounded by groves of fruit trees, he tries to keep up his activity. His home serves as a mecca for political activists from Judaea and Samaria, delegates on behalf of world politicians and members of Israeli leftist circles. "I do not have a lot of free time. I often meet with Ramallah residents who seek solutions to their problems. I meet with senators and congressmen from the United States, with journalists from Israel and the whole world, and I even confer with members of the peace now movement of the Israeli faction of the alignment."

The deposed mayor is a shrewd politician with a lot of experience in the wiles of politics, who emphasizes assuredly that he can still affect the political events in Judaea and Samaria and serve as one of the Palestinian spokesmen

of the talks with representatives from the world and Israelis with whom, he says, one can talk and hold a dialogue. "It is necessary to maintain a dialogue between ourselves and the Israelis, and every Israeli who recognizes the justness of the Palestinian problem and our right to an independent country is a welcome guest in my home. Uri Avneri and Mati Peled are my good friends, and their meeting with Yasir 'Arafat was a wise step. They recognize the Palestinians' right to a country, and in the course of their meeting with 'Arafat they understood that the PLO is seeking peace. They must transmit this message to Israelis. I hope my friend Uri Avneri, who has recently broadened his circles of support, will be elected to the Knesset."

According to Karim Khalaf, peace now is currently gaining strength in Israel and its members are thought to be the friends of the Palestinians: "I usually meet with members of the peace now movement once a month and we hold talks. In our meetings, they bring American Jews with them so that I can explain to them the essence of the Palestinian problem and convince them of the need to establish a Palestinian state that would exist alongside Israel. About a month ago, peace now members visited me and brought a group of Canadian Jews whom they presented to me as good Zionists who are not prepared to accept the Palestinian demands from their own country. I talked to those Jews from Canada and managed to convince them of the need to set up a Palestinian state."

As for his relations with Israelis from the alignment, Karim Khalaf said that he holds meetings with them, but in order not to harm their political status, he would prefer not to mention their names: "I have held talks with Amnon Lynn, but my best friend from the alignment, or rather from MAPAM, is Latif Droi. Recently I got a picture from him that appeared in the papers in which he is seen carrying in a demonstration a placard against the government."

Khalaf testifies that he is a PLO supporter, but emphasizes that he is not a member of any PLO organization, although he supports 'Arafat's leadership. Like many other Judea and Samaria activists who do not accept the moderate line in the PLO but at the same time wish to observe the organization's unity, Khalaf points out that he is proud that at present matters in the PLO are being conducted in a democratic fashion: "Yasir 'Arafat was democratically elected to serve as the PLO leader. I support him, he will decide how to talk on behalf of the Palestinians and even if he decides to meet with Begin, I will support his actions."

Khalaf regards the resolutions of the Palestine National Council in Algiers as marking a victory in the political struggle. "The resolutions are a hand extended to Israel. Now the ball is in the Israeli court. If it is prepared to recognize an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 boundaries, whose capital is East Jerusalem, the Palestinians will agree to recognize Israel. Obviously, prior to the negotiations it will be necessary for Israel to evacuate all the settlements from the West Bank, including all the Jewish quarters built in East Jerusalem. There is no place for Jews in the future Palestinian state, not even as Palestinian residents."

Khalaf ignores the resolution on the continued armed struggle along with the political struggle, and he claims that no such resolution was passed. Peace talks with Israel will only be achieved on the basis of the Fes summit resolutions.

The Camp David accords, or President Reagan's plan are unacceptable to Khalaf because he believes they aim at eliminating the Palestinian problem.

Karim Khalaf, who is well versed in Israeli politics, sees no way to hold a dialogue with Israel as long as either a Likud or Alignment government is in power. He believes the Palestinians must give all possible support to the Israeli circles who are prepared to recognize an independent Palestinian country in the 1967 borders. "It is necessary to talk to those forces and help them gain influence and sympathizers, because only a change in the Israeli public's thinking, bringing recognition of the Palestinians' right to a land, will accelerate the solution of the problem and lead to the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state."

Recently an argument has taken place among the Palestinians regarding the possibility of forming a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to conduct the negotiations with Israel, and talks are underway in regard to a federation-like unification with Jordan. Apparently the Arab world, and even Israel, have some elements that are waiting for Husayn to join the political peace process and are interpreting the Palestine council resolutions as signaling a go-ahead to Husayn to represent them in the negotiations with Israel. The policy the PLO has been employing is only a different tactic toward achieving the final goal. Karim Khalaf usually expresses his views coherently and he refers to this issue firmly, arguing: "We do not want the Arab countries, including Jordan, to interfere in decisions about our future. Our chief goal is to establish an independent, free country. Only after the independent Palestinian state is established will we be able to discuss a federation with Jordan from the legal point of view, and I am talking as a jurist. A federative link could only exist between sovereign countries. We, the Palestinians, must direct our struggle first of all toward the attainment of our own independent state, and only after that will we discuss the setting up of a confederacy."

Karim Khalaf does not believe in establishing an alternative leadership to the PLO in Judaea and Samaria. He ridicules the opinions of circles associated with Jordan, headed by Ilyas Frayj, arguing that these leaders only represent themselves. The true leaders, he says, are those supported by the public, and only the national leaders, those who express PLO positions, will enjoy the support and confidence of the public.

In desperation, he reviews the broken and shattered leadership in Judaea and Samaria. He longs for the days when 'Ezer Weizman was defense minister: "That was a period when we could express our views openly, hold meetings among the leaders, hold rallies and meetings, appear in public with our views before the media. I talked to 'Ezer Weizman and presented my views to him. I won a compliment from him when he said that I was a nice enemy. After Weizman resigned and Ari'el Sharon was appointed, I knew everything would change. Who knows, perhaps the new defense minister, Moshe Arens, whom we still do not know, will not follow in the footsteps of Sharon and things will change."

Minister Sharon's resignation planted in the heart of the ousted mayor the hope that he would reestablish himself in the Ramallah town hall. At the same time he emphasizes this is "provided I am not asked to conduct contacts with the Israeli authorities only through the civilian administration, but only through the military government. [as printed] The civilian administration is illegal, and I will not cooperate with it."

VILLAGE LEAGUE LEADER ON SETTLEMENT

TA300910 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 30 Jan 83 p 1

[Report by Charles Hoffman]

[Text] The chairman of the Hebron area village leagues, Muhammad al-Nasir, told Israel bonds leaders on Friday that the continued construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza is "an obstacle to peace," and called on Israel to freeze settlement there until a peace agreement is finalized between Israel and the Palestinians.

Al-Nasir and six other representatives of the village leagues in the West Bank met Friday morning in Jerusalem with the delegates to the canal founders and prime minister's conference of Israel bonds. The delegates then toured several villages affiliated to the leagues and later met with Gush Emunim spokesmen in Jewish settlements.

Al-Nasir, an electrical engineer, told the delegates that the leagues are steadily increasing their support among the Arabs of the territories, and are planning a conference in about two weeks to expand the leagues into a broad political movement for peace with Israel. The conference is to be held three days before the PLO's Palestinian National Congress in Algiers.

"We now represent the silent majority," claimed al-Nasir.

"At this conference," he said, "we will offer the democratic covenant of peace to answer the national covenant of the PLO" (which calls for Israel's destruction).

"We are the first Arab group in the history of modern Palestine to recognize the right of the Jews to live in Palestine in their own state. The PLO was imposed on us by the Arab states and never represented us. By bribery, sabotage and assassination the PLO has tried to stop our movement, but without success. We are fed up with the PLO and Arab states.

"Over 100,000 Palestinians have been massacred over the years by other Arabs due to the disastrous leadership of the PLO. After Sabra and Shatila, the only protest was in Tel Aviv--not in Amman or Damascus."

He reiterated the leagues' support of Camp David and the Reagan peace initiative.

Concerning the role of Jordan and King Husayn in the peace process, he said that "Husayn left us in 1974 in Rabat when he handed over the mandate to represent us to the PLO. If he now takes the step that al-Sadat took, we will support him. But at this stage we will reject imposing him as our representative.

Al-Nasir continued: "We will never go back to the situation before 1967, when we lived like slaves under Jordan. We are one family in two countries, and our future relation with Jordan has to be decided in the peace process. In accordance with Camp David, the Palestinians will decide their future relations with Jordan and Israel by themselves, following the five years of autonomy."

The leader of the Ramallah league, Riyadh al-Khatib, told some of the delegates who later visited his village of Bil'in, that "there is no one on earth who would not want control of his own country." When asked if this meant an independent state, he said yes.

The spokesman for the civil administration in Judaea and Samaria acted as liaison between the leagues and the bonds delegates, and his representatives accompanied the tours of the villages and Jewish settlements. The spokesman also distributed copies of the Hebron district league platform and copies of an article by THE JERUSALEM POST reporter David Richardson stating that the leagues are "a force to be reckoned with."

CSO: 4400/240

SHAMIR ON LEBANON, TIES WITH EEC

PM140859 Brussels LE SOIR in French 10 Feb 83 pp 1, 3

[Article by Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir: "Israel and Europe"]

[Excerpt] The "peace in Galilee" operation sparked off in some sections of the media a systematic campaign of denigration against the Israeli state and Zionism, attributing terrible designs to them. That is all part of a machiavellian plan to rewrite history, to identify the victim with his oppressor, to deny the very existence of the gas chambers and to erase from the story of world civilization the marvellous contribution made by the Jewish people in their ancestral land, Eretz Israel. How could people talk of genocide when the Israeli army deliberately deprived itself of the effect of surprise to save the maximum numbers of Palestinians and Lebanese and warned the inhabitants of Tyre and [apparent line drop] confusion and misinformation created a favorable climate for the attacks on the Brussels and Rome synagogues--a climate in which anti-Zionism revealed its true face, that of old anti-semitism.

Despite the denigrating propaganda the results of the "peace in Galilee" operation must be regarded as positive because they created new options. This action strengthened the moderates in the Arab world, made it possible to involve other Arab states in the peace negotiations, revealed the Soviets' limitations in the Middle East and proved that even the most radical Arab states only give verbal support to the PLO.

The destruction of the PLO's military potential simultaneously removed from our cities and villages in Galilee the constant threat of bombardment on a very big scale. After attaining those objectives we are now negotiating with the Lebanese Government to achieve a normalization of our relations to ensure that southern Lebanon never again becomes a military base against Israel. Why should we not conclude a real peace treaty with a neighboring country with which we have no territorial dispute? It must not be forgotten that Lebanon's state structure was undermined by the Syrian occupation and the PLO cancer which had grown on Beirut, its capital. Israel alone helped the Lebanese Christians, and that country's rebirth will have been made possible not by Syria or the United Nations or the big nations. By forcing the PLO to release Lebanon from its deadly grip, Israel started the only possible process for delivering that country from its oppressors.

That so-called liberation organization's terrorist objectives and methods are clear and known by everybody. According to the PLO charter the Jews are not a people and hence do not have the right to any state in any part of the world. The terrorist attacks on women and children are glorified by all the PLO faction leaders. Only recently their representative in Paris admitted and claimed direct PLO responsibility in an attack in Tel Aviv, regarded as an occupied zone. The PLO's preferential relations with international terrorist organizations from the extraparliamentary left to the neo-Nazis are also well-known.

So why urge Israel to negotiate with terrorists when the Europeans themselves have rightly decided to sever all contact with their own terrorists. The PLO only represents a desire and an attempt to delegitimize Israel.

In Brussels, Europe's capital, we must clarify a question which is important at symbolic level. It related to the European council's unilateral decisions on 29 June 1982 which froze the meeting of the Israel-EEC cooperation council and the signing of the financial agreement. In addition Spain's entry could have harmful repercussions on our economy. Furthermore, there is reason to wonder how a country which is a candidate for EEC membership can persist in not having normal diplomatic relations with Israel--a country which has signed a treaty with that same EEC. That membership, which we regard as already settled, is likely to block agricultural exports to the community by other countries. When Europe is busy expanding its Mediterranean dimension it is vital for it to avoid cutting itself off from the southern Mediterranean countries.

I am bringing a message of peace for Europe--the peace to which we all aspire and for which Israel has already made great sacrifices in Sinai. Let us hope that a united and courageous Europe may make its contribution to our region's peace and economic development by a balanced policy.

CSO: 4400/242

PRIME MINISTER ADDRESSES KNESSET ON BUDGET, SETTLEMENTS

TA020851 Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE in English 2 Feb 83 [no time given]

["Address of Prime Minister Begin to the Knesset 1 February"--GPO headline]

[Text] Mr Speaker, I must first report on the activities of the prime minister's office. The budget of the prime minister's office totals IS1.32 billion. This year this budget included a significant special expenditure of IS439 million, which is 42 percent of the budget, for funding the population and housing census, which will be taken in May-June, 1983, by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The population census will be very extensive. And when it is concluded, we will have much information which far exceeds the existing demographic data. This information will serve our policy in social, economic, industrial, agricultural and other areas.

Also included this year in the prime minister office's budget are IS120 million to fund the independence day celebrations and the events throughout Israel's 35th year, whose theme is, by Cabinet decision: the bravery of Israel.

After the deduction of these two sums, there remain IS473 million. This figure is 6 percent lower than last year's budget, as required by the government's policy regarding reduction of expenditures in the public sector.

More than two-thirds of the manpower employed in the prime minister's office--449 employees--is the staff of the Central Bureau of Statistics.

The GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE serves the Israeli press and mainly foreign journalists. Israel has the second largest concentration of foreign correspondents. Our press office deals with some 300 foreign correspondents residing permanently in Israel, and with some 6,000 foreign correspondents who come to cover various events during the year.

Among the services offered by the GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE, the translations of editorials and selected articles published in the Israeli press should be noted.

The office organises tours for foreign journalists and enables them to move freely and have absolutely free access to any place and person. This, even though we know that a number of foreign journalists who come to us are sent by their editors not necessarily to flatter us. The government is determined to preserve freedom of the press; and we have not and will not impose any restrictions, aside from security censorship which has existed since the establishment of the state.

It should also be noted that the GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE has completed moving all its departments to Jerusalem. Despite the extension of the press office's activities, there has been a 20-percent reduction in the number of its employees since 1977.

Among the other activities of the office's departments, I see fit to note the activity of the Bureau of the Advisor on Arab Affairs. The devoted treatment by the bureau's employees of the problems of the Arab minority in Israel increases well-being, as well as understanding between our two peoples. We can proudly say that the condition of Israel's Arabs is far better than the condition of many, many citizens in the Arab states.

Our Arab citizens enjoy a standard of living, education, (?and) health and welfare services that have no peer in the independent Arab states.

I must also take note from this rostrum of the devoted and many-faceted work of the state archivist and his staff, the activity of the members of the National Parks Authority, the Government Names Committee, the Office of the Advisor on the Status of Women--all my devoted and loyal colleagues who enable us to carry out all that is incumbent on the prime minister's office.

Mr Speaker, in accordance with our usual practice, a report on the prime minister's office also includes presentation of basic political issues. I will follow this practice today, as well.

The objective of Operation "Peace for the Galilee" was to insure peace for the population in the Galilee and security for all the citizens of Israel. The residents of the Galilee have peace. There is no more running to the shelters. Parents sending their children to school do not worry about their return. There is no more killing, no more murder, no more bloodshed throughout the Galilee, for the whole population.

But there is no denying that the situation in Lebanon is difficult, and the negotiations being held to insure that the bloodshed from there will not be renewed are also encountering many problems.

The question before us is: whether to be dismayed in the face of these difficulties, or to persist in those demands which will make it possible to insure that the situation will not revert to its former state, and what was (happening) before Operation "Peace for the Galilee" will not recur, neither in the Galilee nor in the rest of the country.

It is obvious that here and there something does happen, but it does not only happen here. We must always remember that we are living in a time of violence which is sometimes difficult for a rational person to comprehend. Therefore, such things happen in London and Paris, in Rome and Athens, and even in New York--in every part of the world and here as well.

But we uprooted fifteen thousand armed terrorists from Lebanon. We disarmed them, and most important, we took their heavy arms away from them--batteries of 130-mm guns and Katyushas--with which they were certainly capable of destroying entire settlements in the Galilee, such as Qiryat Shemona and Nahariya.

The question is whether before we insure that the future will not resemble the past, whether in the face of the difficulties, the IDF should withdraw from Lebanon, leaving there tens of thousands of Syrians and thousands of terrorists who still remain in the north and in the al-Biqa', thus allowing them to reorganize and rearm--whether directly from the Soviet Union or from Syria and Libya, with modern long-range weaponry with which they can once more threaten the Galilee and turn its population into hostages, as well as striking at other parts of the population.

We reply to this: We must stand firm, conduct the negotiations with awareness conscious of their urgency--there is no doubt about that--but also with a measure of patience, because we must insure this future. We cannot permit what has happened in the past to happen again.

Therefore we demand security arrangements, not on paper but on the ground, because only through them will we insure this aim. Even though we are having difficulties, we will withstand them. We hope that ultimately the negotiations will bear fruit and we, through agreement with all the elements concerned and through those security arrangements which will be implemented, will insure not only the peace of the Galilee, but also the well-being of Israel's citizens throughout the country.

Mt Speaker, moving on to another political issue, which is also being debated nationally and internationally, I want first of all to note the great principle of meticulous faithfulness to international agreements on which human civilization stands. And not only fifty years ago, not only before that terrible and unfortunate day because of which six million Jews were killed a few years later, but already in 1914 we learned (this), in that same cynicism expressed in the famous saying: For a piece of paper--the matter referred to was an agreement to ensure Belgium's neutrality--we shall make war.

International agreements must not become pieces of paper. They must be observed. We have proven how to keep an agreement, even with difficulties, even with pain, agony. We signed, we carried out. We therefore have the full right to demand this of others, that the agreement signed be fully kept.

The Camp David agreement never promised a Palestinian state with some tie or another to the Kingdom of Jordan. Not only was the word--as I said it--not mentioned, the term "self-determination" was also not mentioned in the Camp David agreement, because we knew what its real meaning is.

We have never denied the right of self-determination to the great Arab nation. Today it finds expression in the existence of 31 independent, sovereign states. Is there such justice in the world, that a twenty-second state should be established, which would endanger the very existence of the only small Jewish state which exists in the world?

I do not think there is any such justice. That is why we insist that what was promised be kept; and autonomy was promised to our neighbors, the residents of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, at our suggestion, which is the most extensive--

according to our checks of material in various states--and we insist on it. But we demand one thing. We want the responsibility for security to be in our hands. This is an indispensable necessity. If the responsibility, God forbid, were to be given to those who will be granted the administration, or to those who openly and explicitly threaten to destroy our state, bloodshed would resume all along the line. It should not be forgotten that that organization which calls itself in Hebrew "Ashaf" (Hebrew acronym for PLO--ed.) would kill Jews and Arabs alike, as it has done and as it is wanting to do, and there would be no end to that bloodshed. It would also arm itself, since it is a tool of Soviet policy, with long range weapons which would reach from the mountains to the coastal plain, and almost every city, town, village, kibbutz, and the like.

Therefore, we reserve for ourselves in our demands the responsibility for security; this is a vital necessity for us and for our neighbors. It is good for us and for them as well.

Mr Speaker, if we will ever be asked to freeze settlement, we will reply that it cannot be frozen, just as life itself cannot be frozen. Settlement has not been frozen for the last fifteen years, but especially in the last five years. It cannot be frozen. And we must always explain the connection of our right to live anywhere in the land of Israel, the land of our forefathers, with security. This is the real truth and no one can doubt that we have such a right to live in every part of the land of Israel. Whoever has declared himself a Zionist, anyone who has aspired to return to the land of Israel, anyone who remembers the past knows that there has never been any limitation on settlements. Population density, unfertile land--nothing has stood in the way of those who have built the country. And this is true today; nothing stands in their way, and they show endless idealism and devotion. We are proud of this generation which continues with that holy tradition of building the country, and it should not be stopped.

We are also not doing injustice to anyone by this settlement. We are not ousting any local resident from (any) village or town, or do we intend to do so, because the settlement is on rocky land which has not been cultivated for generations, perhaps even centuries. Nowhere in the world is there anything like this kind of settlement, and maybe it is outstanding even in our country. Therefore, since there is no injustice here to anyone, and it is the building of the country and the fulfillment of a right, and an integral part of our national security, we will continue with this great national and human enterprise and we shall not freeze it under any conditions.

Mr Speaker, Jerusalem is our capital, one city. We cannot place it under two authorities, that of the state and that of the administrative council when the latter is elected, if the negotiations on autonomy are renewed and concluded--as we hope in the agreement. That is why we said explicitly in the letter which was appended to the Camp David agreement; Jerusalem is one city, not only unified but also indivisible. Other letters were also appended to the Camp David agreement, on what can we and should we work on if not on our appeal, on the expression of our position, as given in the letters appended to the Camp David agreement.

In the Camp David agreement there is a five-year interim period. Therefore no foreign element can determine a priori what the standing in five years will be. Afterwards, everyone will come with his demands and his rights; this is perfectly permissible and legitimate, but no third element. First of all it should be remembered that these are the foundations of the Camp David agreement. There are numerous plans which came and went. There are numerous positions which came and will disappear. The only internationally significant agreement which was signed by three states, with the United States of America witnessing it, a morally and internationally important testimony, is the Camp David agreement, on which negotiations should be held.

I do not want to repeat again the invitation which I made several days ago to King Husayn. It is known to the members of the Knesset and to the entire public. The invitation exists, but please--no preconditions. No one is doing anybody a favor. No people is doing any other people a favor if it comes to sit at the table in order to negotiate peace. This is not only a privilege--this is a duty, and such a duty must be fulfilled. Therefore we reiterate: Please, we will be glad if he comes, but we will not accept any preconditions.

Mr Speaker, I do not want to deny to the Knesset that in the current diplomatic situation we are encountering difficulties. But we have known much greater difficulties in the past and have overcome them when we knew to insist firmly on our rights. We knew our right, we did not deny it and we preserved it, and the proof is--all the tremendous enterprise which has been established to this very day and which will continue to expand.

Mr Speaker, I would therefore like to tell the Knesset today that even the difficulties which we are facing these days concerning this or that issue we shall--God willing--overcome and reach the royal road, and ensure the future of our sons and our sons' sons in our land, the land of Israel.

CSO: 4400/242

POLL SHOWS SUPPORT FOR WAR DECLINING

TA161640 Jerusalem KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 16 Feb 83 p 25

[Report by Eliyahu Hasin on public opinion poll conducted by Dr Minah Tzemah of the Dahaf Institute]

[Text] The war in Lebanon has been controversial since its very beginning. This does not refer to the arguments which accompanied its various stages, such as its expansion beyond the security belt of 40 to 45 kms, the massive bombings on Beirut, the entry into West Beirut and so forth; nor to the hypothetical discussions on how the war has been conducted in order to attain more successful results, but to the entire war as it is.

At the beginning, only a small minority doubted the need for the war. However, as the war extended and became more convoluted there was a considerable rise in the number of opponents, and a significant drop in the number of supporters.

These numerical trends are reflected in the polls. Six consecutive times we checked the overall approach of the adult Jewish population in Israel to the war by means of an identical question: considering everything pertaining to the war in Lebanon--the price Israel paid and the results it achieves--overall was it right or wrong to set out on this war the way it was waged? This question was first posed from the end of June to the beginning of August last year, and it was recently posed again on the third week of January this year.

Four of the emerging results are characteristic of the trend:

End of June beginning of July: 84 percent in favor compared with 13 percent against (the rest abstained from replying).

Beginning of August: 76 percent in favor compared with 19 percent against.

Middle of October: 67 percent in favor compared with 29 percent against.

Third week of January 1983: 61 percent in favor compared with 36 percent against.

In other words, a steep decline from a ratio of 6.5 supporters for every opponent to a ratio of 1.7 supporters for every opponent. Nevertheless, a large majority still favors the war.

On the face of it this is far from being a consensus, but it is still a considerable majority. However, at this point we should take into account a phenomenon well known to pollsters. When referring to a question in dispute, almost without exception a sector of the public accepts the position of the formal authority--any formal authority--without any second thoughts. This sector is usually estimated at 20 to 25 percent of the public. Taking this phenomenon into account, one may conclude that among people who are used to self-reflection, the majority of those who continue to favor the war is decreasing--and this is before the commission of inquiry report was released.

In this context, the way positions are divided among the various socio-demographic groups is significant. Indeed, support for the war is particularly low among people with a high level of education, older people and those of European and American extraction, and is especially high among people with a low level of education, younger people, and the sons of people of Asian and African origin. It is also interesting to analyze the results according to political affiliation: although the Alignment's position about the bottomline of the war's balance is not that clear-cut, 63 percent of its supporters are opposed to the war, while a considerable minority of 18 percent among Likud supporters also sum up the war negatively. Among the "floating votes" those favoring the war are slightly over half and reach 51 percent.

In any case, it is very doubtful whether there has been any other war in Israel which has been objected to by such large minority, and even before it was over.

CSO: 4400/242

INTERVIEW WITH BURG ON GOVERNMENT, SHARON

TA162035 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1935 GMT 16 Feb 83

[Interview with Interior Minister Dr Yosef Burg by Ya'akov Ahime'ir and Nasim Mishal on 16 February in the television studio--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Ahime'ir] At this time, contacts continue between the parties to explore the possibility of establishing a national unity government in Israel. The name of Minister Yosef Burg, the leader of the National Religious Party [NRP], was today mentioned as the man acting behind-the-scenes for the establishment of such a government. However, this is not the only topic we will discuss this evening with Minister Burg. Last week, the interior minister was in the focus of events which had, and still have, the public up in arms. Together with me in the studio is Nisim Mish'al. Doctor Burg, good evening to you.

[Burg] Good evening.

[Ahime'ir] As of this hour, are you a partner to the talks and the contacts between the parties with the aim of establishing a national unity government?

[Burg] To the best of my knowledge, there are no contacts whatsoever between any parties. There are party members and there are matchmakers. However, those who have to stand under the wedding canopy have not yet spoken either among themselves or with go-betweens. I have heard about it. As far as I am concerned, a national unity government is one of the central points of our concept. We have never subscribed to the slogan: Except for Mazi [former Israeli Communist Party] and Herut. We love every Jew. In 1967 we brought the late Moshe Dayan, Peres and Prime Minister Begin into a national unity government, and we would be happy to do the same thing today. However, I am against turning this into political unrest. Were I to spot a green light I would begin acting, but I have not yet seen it.

[Mish'al] To the extent that you are a matchmaker, you are an experienced one in attempts to establish a national unity government. What should happen now in order to enable the establishment of such a government? In your assessment, are the gaps between the Likud and the Alignment bridgeable?

[Burg] What should happen now, to state it crudely, is that matters become worse. Yet nobody wishes for this. Secondly, one must hear that these people are ready to come and the others are willing to accept. This is not that simple, since at the moment the negotiations are no longer discreet, everything is shattered and futile from the beginning. Therefore, I say that if those who speak about a national unity government really want it, they had better keep mum.

[Mish'al] You know the people acting in the political scene. Do you assess that the leaders of the parties--Menahem Begin on the one hand and Shim'on Peres on the other--are interested today in a national unity government?

[Burg] I cannot tell because I have not spoken with either Mr Peres or the prime minister on this issue. I can present a scenario that states: Since we are not currently at the best of relations with the United States, it is better to have a situation whereby we are a fundamentally united nation that conducts negotiations with the Americans. This may be very important. It also may be that Mr Begin, after displaying his leadership powers in the last few days, will say: now I want to be recorded in history as the man who made up the largest coalition. However, an opposite scenario may occur: today's vote [defeating three nonconfidence motions] showed that the government still enjoys a stable basis and there is no need to expand that basis. Time will tell.

[Ahime'ir] Doctor Burg, beyond your analyses of the situation--you say that the situation must worsen in order to [interrupted]

[Burg] No, God forbid.

[Ahime'ir] Yes, God forbid, but in order to bring about a national unity government--being an experienced politician, why do you look at it from high up? Why would you not get both men, Messrs Begin and Peres, together in one room until white smoke starts to emerge, as the saying goes?

[Burg] After all, the smoke usually comes out before that in the press and that is harmful, in my opinion. Neither man--they are both very important men who lead their movements and parties--would go somewhere to hear a reply that is opposed to such a development. You are addressing this question to me, but as I said before: Were I to see a green light I would go ahead, but I will not go ahead without a green light. I am not the technician who changes the lights.

[Ahime'ir] In other words, you would like to see a green light on the part of Mr Begin and a green light on the part of Mr Peres?

[Burg] Or at the very least, since we are at a crossroads--since we are using these terms--I must know what lies in this corner in order to know how to drive around it.

[Ahime'ir] Doctor Burg, I would like to dwell on your political concept for a minute or two. Do you define yourself as a man of the greater Israel idea?

[Burg] I think there can be no doubt about this. I am in favor of the entire Eretz Yisra'el idea. The political translation is one of struggle for every inch of all Eretz Yisra'el, and I think that if we were more united, and there were no signals toward the PLO either, we would have been stronger in the negotiations. For clarity's sake I said that when some called out fascists and some called out PLOists, these two words contain the same letters [in Hebrew] and that this is unhealthy for the country.

[Mish'al] Let us be more specific about Ya'akov Ahime'ir's question. Are you, for example, in favor of extending Israel's law to Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip?

[Burg] This may be necessary one day, but at the moment this is not necessary at all. We proposed a plan which was accepted by the United States and Egypt at the time, as a result of the Camp David talks. This is the autonomy plan which I believe is a good one. In addition, I believe in two more things: 1. That the Arabs of Judaea and Samaria have missed a good thing which could enhance peace in the area; in my opinion they and their advisers made a mistake. 2. What President Reagan said on 1 September 1982 is, in my eyes, a serious deviation from the original Camp David plan.

[Mish'al] Another question in this context: You were quoted in one of the papers this week as saying you would not leave Menahem Begin. Is this out of identification with Menahem Begin's political views or out of personal solidarity with him?

[Burg] Since you ask I will give you a twofold answer. I think that Mr Begin may be closer to my positions today than I was to his.

[Mish'al] Namely, that you caused Mr Begin to moderate his positions?

[Burg] No, I will not pretend to have done this. I think that shouldering responsibility is a moderating element to a certain extent. Second, we have a personal understanding between us on the basis of certain educational and cultural values. Begin is often wronged when he is given the image of a dictator, while he is a liberal person in principle.

[Ahime'ir] In what did Mr Begin moderate his positions, as you can see this?

[Burg] It seems to me that somebody, perhaps Dr Bader [a close friend of Begin], put things more mildly and said that the concession is about the second bank of the Jordan. However, the very existence of the autonomy plan, a plan which Begin conceived of--I view this as moderation, contrary to what was earlier said.

[Ahime'ir] Doctor Burg, I would like to move on to another name which has featured numerous times in the news, the name of minister Sharon. Many cabinet ministers fear Mr Sharon's continued membership in the Israeli cabinet. Some claim he may be an agitating element in the cabinet. What are your fears and your expectations?

[Burg] First, I have nothing personal, although I made some political remarks. I am not a candidate for defense minister. I assume Sharon is not a candidate for religious affairs minister, so that we have no competition between us, either factional, partisan or one of influence. Now he is an Israeli cabinet member and his advice will surely be heard. He will have his say just like each cabinet member, each member according to his real political power. The future will tell.

[Ahime'ir] What is your opinion? What are your expectations?

[Burg] I do not see a reason for fear since we are, after all, faced with several possibilities. Let us assume he does not want to remain in his party or in the framework of the Likud. The Likud is not a party but a combination of forces, as is known. To this I have said and am ready to repeat: This can change the scenario and setting of the political stage, with one person in [word indistinct] [reference to 'Ezer Weizman] and one on a farm [Sharon's] in the Negev. So, as I say, this is one possibility; namely, if he decides to leave the framework. If not, the framework is binding. Again, in both cases, there is nothing to fear.

[Mish'al] Still further on Minister Sharon: Last week you were quoted as a person who defined as a putsch the moves adopted by Minister Sharon, including the demonstrations of support staged outside the prime minister's office when the cabinet was discussing the recommendations and discussions of the Kahan Commission report. During those hours, did the State of Israel face the danger of a putsch?

[Burg] A clear answer: First, danger--no. I was speaking of an atmosphere and I am happy you asked this question. I did not, not even in a single word, charge Minister Sharon with ideas or actions or an attempt of a putsch. Putsch is a sort of a minirevolution if we look at it from the point of view of trends, and not from the point of view of the exact definition of the word. However, I would like to say the following: the cabinet received the report on Tuesday. We studied it and began discussing it on Tuesday. On Tuesday evening it was decided that on Wednesday evening we would carry on the discussion. That Wednesday morning the then Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon, I was not present but nevertheless, he talked with the most senior IDF officers about the report of the judicial commission while the cabinet had not yet concluded its opinion on the matter. In my opinion, this should not have been done.

In the evening on Wednesday, when the prime minister gave the floor or was about to give the floor to chief of staff Refa'el Eytan, Minister Sharon asked to say something first and reported to us about his impression of the meeting at the IDF general headquarters, the moods and the various implications which he did not detail but which were apparent to everyone around the cabinet table. I think this constituted mixing the army in government affairs, while the IDF always, in absolute political clearness, observes the distinction between the defense branch and the branch which runs state affairs. There was an unsound mixture here and this is what I was referring to.

[Ahime'ir] Was this then one of the moments in the history of the State of Israel that something, to put it mildly, was deficient in the democratic regime in Israel, that something became faulty in the correct democratic practices in Israel?

[Burg] I would not say that there was real danger that very moment, but this could contain a seed, a seed for an atmosphere which turns democracy into a verbal thing. Mixing the army in policy, in government matters is not healthy. This is not healthy either in Israel, in Africa or in South America, nowhere. We will maintain democracy against the demonstrators and against the violent elements to the best of our ability, since our life depends on this.

[Ahime'ir] Doctor Burg, another question. I understand that there was a meeting today of the ministerial steering committee on the negotiations with Lebanon, the first meeting in Minister Sharon's absence. How was it?

[Burg] Leaks are banned; there was a productive meeting. I am not using this word the same way Kissinger did: Whenever a meeting produced no results he would say that it had been a constructive meeting. In the meeting we actually dealt with issues which stem from those principles and guidelines that were determined along with Mr Sharon not more than a week ago. Therefore, I must disappoint you: no revolution in thoughts have occurred.

[Mish'al] With your permission, let me rephrase the question. Under which conditions would Israel today be ready to withdraw from Lebanon?

[Burg] You are asking me to do the same thing as when I said why I am not pleased with peace now. We are in the midst of negotiations. What can I tell you? That our price will be higher or lower? One primordial thing must be clear to the world, and that is that even if the defense minister is another man we will not make any concessions on defense matters.

[Mish'al] For example, should Israel conduct a reassessment [interrupted]

[Burg] That is why there is a steering committee that thinks a lot, that is what we are discussing. There has been progress on several issues. Although the obscene word normalization is unwanted, there has been progress in that direction. I think that any talk today at this sensitive stage of the negotiations is harmful. On security matters, progress was made on various points last week, and there are other points on which no progress has been made.

[Mish'al] Where did Israel make progress toward the possibility of the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon?

[Burg] The IDF's withdrawal is not a goal on its own merit. The withdrawal may occur when: 1) after we have guaranteed our lives, just as it was necessary to cleanse southern Lebanon in order to assure the security of northern Israel--this is essential; 2) we want all the foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanese soil hoping that then Lebanon may recover. These will take weeks of negotiations, and nervousness will not serve any purpose in this issue.

POLL SHOWS LIKUS SUPPORTERS FAVOR RABIN

TA151711 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Feb 83 p 2

[Text] Yitzhaq Rabin continues to be the public's preferred candidate for the leadership of the Labor Party, more than Yitzhaq Navon and much more than Shim'on Peres. This emerges from a nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute at the request of HA'ARETZ at the end of January.

To the question: "Who, in your opinion, should head the Labor Party?" 31.5 percent opted for Rabin, 26.5 percent for Navon and 9.8 percent for Peres. Other candidates who were mentioned by at least 1 percent were Abba Eban, Hayim Bar-Lev, Yosi Sarid, Hayim Herzog, Mordekhay Gur, Moshe Shahal, Dani Rosolio, Yisra'el Qeysar, Arye Eli'av, Gad Ya'aqobi, Yeruham Meshel and Ya'aqov Levinson.

Of those interviewed, 29.6 percent had no candidate for the leadership of the Labor Party.

An analysis of the findings based on how the interviewees would vote "if elections were to be held today" and according to their votes in the last Knesset elections show that Navon and Shim'on Peres enjoy more support from Alignment voters, while Rabin enjoys massive support from Likud voters.

Question: Who, in your opinion, should head the Labor Party?

Rabin	Navon	Peres
(31.5 percent)	(26.5 percent)	(9.8 percent)

How people would vote in elections today:

Likud	50.0 percent	26.1 percent	34.7 percent
Alignment	19.8 percent	32.7 percent	40.7 percent

How people voted in the elections to the 10th Knesset:

Likud	48.4 percent	28.9 percent	32.2 percent
Alignment	22.5 percent	36.2 percent	39.8 percent

[columns and figures as published]

The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women who were given personal interviews throughout the country.

POST-COMMISSION POLL SHOWS DIVIDED PUBLIC

TA150953 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 15 Feb 83 p 2

[Report on poll by political correspondent Mark Segal]

[Text] Tel Aviv--Nearly one-quarter of the public prefers the governmental status quo since publication of the Kahan Commission report. Another quarter wants the government to resign and early elections held. One-tenth advocate personal changes in the Begin Government. Another tenth wants a national-unity coalition, and even fewer favour a labour government.

These are the findings of THE JERUSALEM POST poll conducted by the Modi'in Ezrahi Research Institute among a representative sample of 1,102 adults between February 8 and 11. (The Kahan report was published at noon February 8).

Question: "In light of the findings of the Kahan inquiry commission, what kind of a government do you want?"

	<u>All respondents</u>	<u>Pro Likud</u>	<u>Pro Likud</u>
Status quo	23.4	39.8	8.0
Changes in present Begin Government	10.7	11.9	7.6
New Begin Government	4.8	8.8	2.9
Labour Government	8.4	1.6	24.8
National Unity Coalition	9.9	9.7	9.1
Resignation of government and new elections	22.6	11.7	28.9
Other proposals	1.3	0.8	1.8
Don't know	4.3	3.3	3.5
Undecided	14.6	12.2	13.4

Institute director Dr. Sara Shemer noted that most Likud voters prefer the status quo. Smaller segments favour personal changes in the Begin cabinet, or resignation of the government and early elections.

Nearly one-third of the Labour Camp prefers the latter option, while one-quarter wish Labour to take over now.

Shemer pointed out that 18 percent of Labour supporters prefer a Begin-led government, with or without personal changes.

Another poll shows that both the Likud and Labour have advanced somewhat in public esteem. It was conducted between February 7-11. The impact of the Kahan Commission report is hard to estimate, because the report was made public on February 8, after polling started. Neither is it possible to estimate the effect of the killing of Emil Grunzweig at a peace now demonstration last Thursday night.

The opinion survey, conducted for THE JERUSALEM POST by the Modi'in Ezrahi Research Institute, covered a representative sample of 1,168 adults who were asked, "If elections were held today, what party would you vote for?"

	<u>Feb</u> <u>MKs</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>MKs</u>	<u>Oct</u> <u>MKs</u>	<u>Sep</u> <u>MKs</u>
Likud	58	57	60	64
Labour	40	39	37	34
NRP	4	5	5	5
Aguda Bloc	4	4	4	4
Tami	3	3	3	2
Tehiya	3	3	2	4
Shinuy	3	2	2	4
CRM	1	2	2	--
Telem	--	--	--	--
Rakah and others	4	4	4	4

Institute director Dr. Sara Shemer hedged her conclusions concerning the effect of the publication of the Kahan report and the Grunzweig murder during the survey. There is a known time-lag between the impact of events on people and its expression in voting patterns.

She also pointed to the 21.3 percent of those who replied "undecided." A total of 4.5 percent replied that they "won't vote" and 7.4 percent, "won't say."

However, a poll taken by the Dahaf Research Institute shows a drop in the Likud's popularity from 57 seats in January to 55, and an increase in the Alignment's popularity from 42 to 44 seats.

If President Yitzhaq Nabon were to head the Alignment list, it would win 53 seats to the Likud's 50 in an election today, according to the poll, which will be published in MONITIN magazine at the end of this month.

An Alignment list headed by Yitzhaq Rabin would get 48 seats against the Likud's 51, the Dahaf poll found.

In a popularity contest without the participation of Begin, Navon was supported by 39 percent of the respondents [22 percent in January], Rabin by 15 percent (20 percent), Sharon by 10 percent (13 percent), Shamir by 7 percent (12 percent) and 'Ezer Weizman by 7 percent (10 percent).

Sixty-one percent gave the Kahan Commission a favourable response (30 percent 'very good,' 30 percent 'good'), 35 percent responded unfavourably (18 percent 'poor,' 17 percent 'bad'), with the remainder expressing no opinion.

Thirty-seven percent of the respondents agreed that Sharon should resign from the government, 21 percent said he should resign as defense minister but remain in the government; and 40 percent said he should not have to resign at all.

The poll was conducted between February 9 and 12 among a representative sample of 1,275 Jewish men and women above age 18.

CSO: 4400/242

'MA'ARIV' COMMENTATOR ON HERUT INTERPARTY RELATIONS

TA171431 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 17 Feb 83 p 21

[Article by Avi Bettelheim: "The Race To Achieve Cooperation With the Arens Group Has Already Begun in Herut"]

[Text] Even before Moshe Arens has packed his suitcases and arrived in Israel, and before the Knesset approved his appointment as defense minister, the political kitchen of the Herut movement has already begun humming with activity. The heads of the political camps, who learned of the decision of Arens' appointment through the communications media, have begun preparing for the next events.

From the moment he enters office as defense minister, Moshe Arens will have performed a political jump upward. Without field work, without a lobby of activists and supporters acting to promote his cause at the right levels, Arens is changing his status from that of a "loyal and obedient official," as he defines it, to one of the potential successor to Menahem Begin.

Herut movement elements do not rule out the possibility that Moshe Arens may be Menahem Begin's successor, a successor, who will be acceptable to the Liberal Party and who will guarantee continued cooperation between Herut and the Liberals.

It is customary to think that Arens' place is with the hawkish camp of the Herut movement: Together with the Shamir and Sharon groups. Had there been a sound system of relations among these three personages it is assumed they would have joined arms to create a firm spearhead hard to undermine or threaten.

However, reality shows that this triumvirate will have difficulty functioning together. Up until the establishment of a commission of inquiry, correct relations had prevailed between Ari'el Sharon and Yitzhaq Shamir. People kept dropping reports about fruitful cooperation between them in the spheres of their offices and especially on the movement level. Members of these groups also acted to bring Finance Minister Aridor closer to them so as to isolate their archrival in the movement, Deputy Prime Minister David Levi.

However, Yitzhaq Shamir was careful not to get too near Sharon. He has bitter experience with the former defense minister, who more than once interviewed in his sphere of activity and resumed activities which the Foreign Ministry was

in charge of. In view of Menahem Begin's silence in those cases, the loyal Shamir had to swallow the bitter pill and keep mum. The conclusions of the commission will apparently not lead to improved relations between these two personages.

The Yitzhaq Shamir-Moshe Arens relations are rather complex. Their political concept is identical indeed, and the foreign minister upheld the appointment of Arens as ambassador to Washington at the time, but nevertheless tension prevails among the Arens group members toward Shamir's camp.

At the time, the Arens group supported Shamir's candidate, Mikha'el Degel, when he completed with Yoram Aridor for the position of chairman of the movement's secretariat. Aridor beat Degel but was particular about forming a secretariat which reflects the internal composition of the movement. Shamir sent his confidants, Roni Milo and Mikha'el Degel, to the secretariat but none of the Arens people was incorporated in it.

Furthermore, the Shamir people progressed well in the political system: Roni Milo is chairman of the Herut Knesset faction, and Mikha'el Degel serves as deputy agriculture minister. In contrast, the Arens people were pushed into a corner. David Stern did not manage to get elected to the present Knesset; Yig'al Kohenorgad's candidacy to the office of president of Israel's Bank was not seriously considered, while Yosef Rom is carrying in his pocket a year-old promise to be appointed deputy minister.

The relations between Moshe Arens and Ari'el Sharon are correct. The political line of the two is similar, but their personalities and the style of their work are totally different. Arens will want to navigate the Defense Ministry in a different manner, less militant. It is estimated that the new minister will not want to rely on cooperation with the former minister, and will take care to establish himself in the Defense Ministry through independent work.

It is estimated that in view of this picture of affairs, cooperation may develop between Moshe Arens and David Levi's camp. The latter, on the basis of sober analysis of the new development, may reach an agreement with the Arens group whereby the new defense minister will be Menahem Begin's successor while he, David Levi, will be Number One in the movement.

At the same time, David Levi wants continued cooperation with Yoram Aridor. It is not impossible that in the near future a joint front of Arens, Aridor and Levi will be consolidated in Herut. This will take place if Arens and Aridor are able to transcend the certain tension prevailing between them since Arens defeated Aridor's candidate, the late Yosef Kremarman, in the contest over the position of chairman of the Tel Aviv district of the Herut movement.

A large question mark is hovering on the expected degree of involvement of Ari'el Sharon in the government and in the movement. It seems, on the surface at least, that Ari'el Sharon may constitute a disturbing and agitating element in the government. If this is so he may arouse most of the ministers, including the prime minister, against him.

According to a different opinion, Sharon will maintain the most passive behavior in his governmental activity, and will invest his energy and time in strengthening his movement strongholds.

Sharon, who was until recently detached from the movement branches, understands that a large part of the succession struggle lies in field work and maintaining tight contacts with the prominent activists. Inviting branch leaders and key activists to his Tel Aviv office for receptions he organized, as well as on other occasions, is more than a hint about Ari'el Sharon's intentions now that he has free time and his eyes are looking ahead to the future.

Some in the Herut movement estimate that upon his return to the political arena in Israel, Moshe Arens occupied a place on the first line of the candidates slated to succeed Menahem Begin. A few months ago Yitzhaq Shamir was considered a candidate, agreed on by all, as a successor for an interim period. Following the Sabra and Shatila incidents though, Shamir is no longer considered the agreed successor. At the same time, it is also possible that Ari'el Sharon too views himself as a candidate for Begin's throne. Moshe Arens is now third on the same line, perhaps the first according to the scale of chances emerging today.

The second line, according to the concept of those circles which do not represent all camps in the movement, is occupied by David Levi and Yr (although the latter keeps claiming all the time that he is not a candidate for the premiership). Of course, these circles do not forget to mention the "subs" as well, 'Ezer Weizman and Shmu'el Tamir, who may, in a certain political constellation, return to Metzduat Ze'ev [the Likud headquarters in Tel Aviv] and be reintegrated into the Herut movement's leadership.

Moshe Arens will return from Washington to Israel enjoying very wide support. When he left Israel a little over a year ago, on his way to the United States, he was the chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Today he is praised, his personal style is complimented and his qualifications for the important position as defense minister are listed. Some in the Herut movement clench their teeth in view of the meteoric jump of Moshe Arens, but those who do so are also taking part in the race, already begun, for obtaining cooperation with the Arens group in the movement.

CSO: 4400/242

DISCUSSION ON VILLAGE LEAGUES PARTY

Ban Examined

TA120853 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Feb 83 p 14

[Commentary by Tzvi Bar'el: Politics--There Is Not Any!"]

[Text] The civilian administration's decision not to allow village leagues throughout the West Bank to meet in mid-February, as had been scheduled, may raise some eyebrows. At that time, Ramallah--the site of the Union of Village Leagues--had been supposed to witness a unique event in the history of the West Bank under Israeli rule: the establishment of a new party.

This "political" action had been supposed to constitute the peak of the relations between the village leagues and the Israeli authorities and the Arab population of the territories. This could also have been proof of the seriousness of Minister Sharon's recurrent statements that the members of the leagues may be "the Palestinian body that may be spoken to, that is not the PLO." However, the ephemeral body which was conceived and promoted by the civilian administration to become a tool through which the government might have claimed that it had fulfilled its share in the Camp David accords, namely a body which would have undertaken the administration of the West Bank according to Israeli instructions and with Israeli weapons, suddenly took a new direction which had not been included in the administration's plans.

As long as the question refers to an executive apparatus which derives its entire power and authority from the Israeli rule and without which it cannot function and as long as the Israeli rule knows that puppets play at its whim and that it has full control over them, nothing can prevent this group from doing whatever it pleases even if this scares and frightens that sector of the population that does not support the leagues and even when this "institution" is willing to harm important traditional systems such as the tribal judicial system.

It may be noted though that the village leagues have so far striven for the goals set out for them by the Israeli rule and had they not "raised their heads" and aspired to become a "serious" political body through the establishment of a party in the West Bank the civilian administration would have let them go on operating undisturbed.

However, the "good reputation" the leagues have been promoting since the day they were established 4 years ago and Mustafa Dudin's dictatorship over their ranks began showing their signs among the younger group of activists to the point that an almost overt uprising against Dudin and the "veteran group" which includes Bishara Qimsiyah of Bethlehem and Jamil al-Khatib began organizing. These "youths" decided they had had enough of this absolute regime whereby a telephone call or a raising of Dudin's finger at the head of the civilian administration would bring about reshuffles, dismissals (entailing the loss of not bad salaries) and the creation of "cliques" of equals and less so. The uprising against Dudin was to no small extent abetted by the former head of the civilian administration, Yig'al Karmon, who strived to reduce the power of Dudin, his creation, before he "willingly resigned" since the latter had stopped playing the role that had been assigned to him. Dudin expressed support for the Reagan plan and emphasized the need to stop the settlements, thus arousing the fury of Minister Sharon who loudly expressed his anger in his meeting with civilian administration personnel. In order to somewhat undermine Dudin, it was decided to appoint a man outside Dudin's inner circle in Hebron and start playing through him the famous game of "divide and rule."

This plan was greeted very seriously in Hebron: Dudin's replacement, Muhammad al-Nasir, realized that the cold breeze following at Dudin from the civilian administration headquarters at Bet El actually enabled him to behave as if he were the real leader. He conferred with his associates and enthusiastically decided to change the image of the village leagues and that, for starters, the best thing would be to change their name and give them a new title: "The Democratic Movement for Peace." However, this was not enough: Dudin's retirement to Jericho where he spends the cold winter months, further encouraged al-Nasir. Being under the impression that the civilian administration was on his side, al-Nasir began formulating "the village leagues' charter" which has meanwhile become the "platform of the Democratic Party for Peace." Through it, al-Nasir believed he would change the rural body into an all-West Bank political institution which would be the representative of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and ultimately also its recognized leader.

This "charter" contains 39 detailed clauses. Some are a condensation of the PLO's "theory"; some speak about close relations with Jordan; some unreservedly support the Reagan plan, including a freeze on settlements; yet others also "throw a bone" to Israel by recognizing its right to exist and that Jews are allowed to settle everywhere (this clause is incompatible with the freeze on settlements). It should be pointed out that the leitmotif throughout the "charter's" clauses is that the Palestinians deserve a state and that the ultimate goal of the leagues is to establish and lead a Palestinian state.

Up to this point, this business had not run into any crises. However, it is impossible to set up a party, let alone a leadership, only with an organized and detailed document. Indeed, when al-Nasir asked the new head of the civilian administration, Shlomo Ilia, for permission to hold the founding meeting he received a reply stating that "this is not the right time to hold such a convention and it would be best to wait a few more months until several political issues have become clear," this being namely, a negative answer.

Al-Nasir attributes this reply to Dudin's "harmful" influence on the civilian administration. According to him, Dudin fears that the young leadership in the village leagues and the new initiative might deprive him of his seniority and its subsequent privileges. He believes that Dudin stands behind the idea to undermine the meeting of the village leagues and also has a grudge against al-Nasir. To corroborate his claims, al-Nasir points to the fact that only at the last moment did Dudin agree to include him in the delegation that left for the United States on Sunday.

Those following the reactions of the authorities toward initiatives in the West Bank during the years of occupation cannot be surprised by the decision not to allow the meeting of the village leagues despite the fact that they were "adopted" by Israel. It is not a question of Dudin's caprices, internal quarrels in the village leagues or even of the civilian administration's cruelty. This reaction stems from the fear that seizes the authorities whenever they have to cope with a body showing signs of political activity, even if that is pro-Israel. This was also the case in 1976 when new municipal councils were elected in the West Bank which despite their nationalistic character had been ready to cooperate with the military government until such time when it pushed them into the corner. That was also the attitude of the authorities toward the national guidance committee which had hoped to establish an alternate body to the PLO in the territories and that is also the attitude toward individuals such as Ilyas Frayj or Rashad al-Shawwa who declare their willingness to coexist. Even when the latter call on the PLO, Jordan and Israel to recognize each other Israel shuts its ears and is not prepared to allow them to develop their activities.

Notwithstanding the hatred of the West Bank inhabitants toward the village leagues, there had been curiosity among the public to see Israel's reactions to their intentions to organize politically. Israel, as usual, did not dis-appoint them....

Peace Covenant

TA020929 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 2 Feb 83 pp 1, 3

[Report by A. E. Norden]

[Text] Arabs from the West Bank and Gaza Strip will be asked to approve a 39-point Palestinian national peace covenant at a founding convention in Hebron this month of a new political party, THE JERUSALEM POST has learned.

The chairman of the Hebron area village leagues, Muhammad al-Nasir, told THE POST on Monday that the covenant will be presented to delegates and others who attend the meeting of the Palestinian democratic peace movement on February 12, three days before the PLO's Palestinian National Congress in Algiers.

The covenant includes the following points:

--a rejection of the 1974 Rabat resolution, whereby the Arab states named the PLO the only representative of the Palestinians. The "peace covenant" asserts that the Rabat resolution is "null and void," since the PLO is "run by various Arab regimes" and has brought only "disaster" on the Palestinians.

--The acceptance of Israel's "right to exist" and the right of Jews "to live where they want."

--A call to the Palestinians to "hold onto their soil and national unity," and to the world to recognize their "right to a homeland in the West Bank and Gaza."

--A call for "direct negotiations" between the Palestinians and Israel, leading to a peace treaty. The basis of these negotiations is to be UN Security Council resolutions and the Camp David framework.

--A call for "internationally supervised elections" in the West Bank and Gaza, to determine the "true leaders" of the Palestinians.

--"Special relations" between the future Palestinian state and Jordan.

Other sections of the covenant deal with some of the political, social and economic institutions of the Palestinian state. A local police force is envisaged to keep "law and order." Although "free access to holy places" is cited, there is no mention of Jerusalem.

Al-Nasir, an electrical engineer, said that 60 delegates--20 from the Gaza Strip and 40 from the West Bank--will take part in the Hebron meeting as founders of the first legal political party in the areas since the Six-Day War. He said the military government is aware of these plans and has not objected to the formation of the national peace movement.

The party, al-Nasir said, will in effect be an expanded version of the village leagues.

He added that he expects "many thousands" of residents of the West Bank and Gaza to be on hand. They will also be presented with the covenant, and al-Nasir said that he thought they would accept it by acclamation.

Repeating what he told an Israel bonds group last Friday, al-Nasir said that no more Jewish settlements should be built beyond the green line, and none enlarged, until after an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty.

"We are fighting for our national rights, and that means above all for our land," he said. "The more Jewish building there is, the more land must be confiscated from us, and that's an obstacle to peace."

Al-Nasir said, however, that after a treaty Jews could remain in the new state, "just like Arabs in Israel." Meanwhile, Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon, during a tour of the West Bank yesterday, was told by civil administration and military government officials that some 200 villages in the area were now members of the village league.

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PLANTS IN JUDAEA, SAMARIA, GOLAN HEIGHTS APPROVED

TA041132 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 4 Mar 83 p 4

[Report by the economic affairs correspondent]

[Text] The investment center's executive has approved the establishment of new plants in Judaea, Samaria and the Golan.

The director of the center, Yehoshu'a (Porar) reported, among other things, that approval was given for the following plants to be set up:

- A. A metal-processing plant in Qedummim with an investment of 6 million shekels. Metal work, milling and etching will be done in this plant.
- B. Some 9.5 million shekels will be invested in the establishment of the (Pord-Yeriho) plant for metal processing where metals will be processed and moulds produced by the electroerosion technique. Other products such as blocks, moulds and machine parts will also be made at this plant.
- C. A plant for the production of electronics control systems with an investment of 1.8 million shekels will be set up in the Ari'el industrial zone.
- D. Some 92 million shekels will be invested in the building of a modern dairy in Qazrin. Three bodies will participate in this dairy: the Strauss and Tara companies and Moshav Nuv. The size of land allocated for the dairy is 20 dunams.
- E. A factory for the production of cultures of home plants will be set up in Qarne Shomron with an investment of 6 million shekels. Most of the production is intended for exporting.

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JUDAEA, SAMARIA SETTLEMENT SURVEYED

TA031517 Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 2 Mar 83 pp 10, 11, 12

[Report by Shlomo Mann]

[Text] "It is just as impossible to freeze the settlements as it is to freeze life," Prime Minister Menahem Begin said recently, and his remarks adequately reflected what is presently going on in Judaea and Samaria. What is called "The West Bank," Israel's problematic area for 16 years now, has been forever changing, sometimes unrecognizably so. New Jewish settlements mushroom one after the other, heralding the current building momentum in Judaea and Samaria.

The figures speak for themselves: some 72 settlements currently exist in Judaea and Samaria, and in 4 years another 42 new settlements will have been added, raising the number of settlers up to 100,000. These figures speak for themselves if we take into account the fact that up until 5 years ago there were only 10 settlements with 3,000 settlers throughout Judaea and Samaria.

The Likud's rise to power is what led to the great impetus in the development and settlement of Judaea and Samaria. In 4 years (between 1977 and 1981) 68 settlements were established, establishing a firm hold in Judaea and Samaria and becoming faits accomplis there. In a large number of those settlements the number of inhabitants does not exceed 100, but the very establishment of those places achieves the prime objective of the promoters of Judaea and Samaria settlement: setting up settlement nuclei that have established the infrastructure for the creation of additional sites for construction. The number of settlers there is for the moment a secondary issue.

A large part of the 72 settlements in Judaea and Samaria were established quietly, as distinct from the stormy settlement affairs that rocked the country and the whole world in the past.

A binge of Judaea and Samaria land purchasing has been started by private companies that plan urban settlements with a rural, countryside style. The economic firm, "Nofim," was among the early birds that brought tidings of the great rush for Judaea and Samaria lands, and through a huge advertisement campaign, dragged behind it additional private entrepreneurs who began to discover the profit potential in building in Judaea and Samaria.

The cost of villas in Judaea and Samaria currently ranges from \$86,000 to \$150,000. The appealing and flashy advertisements have brought many families from all parts of the country, but especially from the metropolitan areas, to the arid land of Judaea and Samaria both for idealistic reasons and out of the desire to improve their standard of living. The motto of "only 10 minutes from Kefar Sava" has driven home the realization that Judaea and Samaria are not the end of the world and this is abetted also by the near completion of the access roads leading to that region. And when the proposed villas come with a plot of land, and in view of the fact that the settlements are not far from the center of the country, with easy financial conditions and an encouraging government, there is no wonder that the responsiveness to purchasing homes in Judaea and Samaria is that great.

Before and up until 1977, Judaea and Samaria was a district with an Arab population that swallowed 10 pioneer Jewish settlements: Qiryat Arba', Elon Shevut, Kefar 'Ezyon, Mevo Horon, Mishor Adummim, 'Ofra, Rosh Zurim, Har Gilo and El'azar.

A short time after the Likud assumed power, Menahem Begin declared on the advent of introducing a Torah scroll to the new settlement of Elon More, that "there will yet be many Elon Mores." This declaration remained a mere declaration for a while, and every new site that went on the ground created a furor and a storm in the world, as well as agitation among leftist circles in Israel.

The overall political problems involved in settling Judaea and Samaria was complicated and complex. Thus, for example, the government had to decide what character the 11 new settlements would assume: should the settlers there move about donning IDF uniforms in order to lend the place a military-security nature?

The fact that the Camp David accords in fact constituted the breakthrough for massive settlement in Judaea and Samaria is a bit odd. Nowhere in the specifics of the accords is there even one clause regarding the question of settlement in the "West Bank." Since this is the case, the initiative for action remained the only way to actually implement a speedy opening of settlement and population drive for Judaea and Samaria. Then Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon took upon himself the job. Sometimes in established, set ways and other times by partisan action, he began moving the wheels of settlement in Judaea and Samaria.

At that time, two regional development plans were suggested at the cabinet. The first, compiled by Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizman, talked about only six large settlements, and the second, Ari'el Sharon's, supported the deployment concept, that is to say, emphasized the importance of having as many settlements as possible, with the importance of the number of settlers there only accorded second place on the scale of priorities. The cabinet ultimately endorsed the deployment concept, as the first stage as it was known. Even before that, the head of the Jewish agency's land settlement department, Matityahu Drobles, had submitted a plan for the establishment of 59 settlements with approximately 100,000 inhabitants. The plan was adopted by the entire cabinet.

After the policy was adopted and the settlement planning was approved, the building stage began. Thus Bet El, Shilo, Ari'el, Sal'it, Rehan, Shave Shomron, Qarne Shomron, Ma'ale Shomron, Teqo'ah, Elqana, Bet Horon, Kefar Adummim and

other places cropped up. The world Zionist organization's settlement division and the Housing and Construction Ministry, through the rural construction administration, were the actual bodies that implemented the policy building the infrastructure for the new settlements and actually constructing them.

But the turnabout happened in 1981, when private entrepreneurs, encouraged by the Agriculture Ministry, entered the scene. Deputy Agriculture Minister Mikha'el Deqel, who supports the ideological concept of settlement, took advantage of his authority as the person in charge of the Israel land administration which owns the state land, and introduced the private entrepreneurs into the scene in order to build in Judaea and Samaria, on state-owned land, and give momentum to the drive. Another version has it that the idea of private entrepreneurs came from Matityahu Drobles, who thus established a precedent that public institutions, such as the Jewish agency, for the first time relinquished its heavy role in developing and settling the country.

Mikha'el Deqel says that the reliance on the limited state budgets would have "established beautiful things, but on a small scale." Thus the private entrepreneurs were introduced into the matter, and they "seized" the land adjacent to the coastal area and Jerusalem and began planning settlements and neighborhoods. Thus the campaign of eye-catching advertising by the private companies in order to attract a buying public began, and that public was captivated by the wonderful offers.

Simultaneously with encouraging the private entrepreneurs, a rift occurred between the Agriculture Ministry and the Housing Ministry. The latter contended that the former, with the cooperation of the Defense Ministry, was encouraging the private entrepreneurs without coordinating things with it. The Housing Ministry personnel argued that one must guarantee that private construction work in Judaea and Samaria be done through the direction and supervision of an authorized professional element, that is the Construction Ministry, and that in addition to this the building work should be given to large, well-based construction companies, not small private companies that might find themselves in difficulties. The Housing Ministry argued that the Construction Ministry does not have the professional ability to supervise the private building companies and that it could not protect the rights of the buyers who paid with their good money for the villas drawn up on paper.

On the other hand, Deputy Agriculture Minister Mikha'el Deqel claimed that it was his ministry that was in charge of settling Judaea and Samaria and that the ministerial committee on settlement affairs supervised the private entrepreneurs. There is an interministerial steering team, which includes among others also representatives of the housing and agriculture ministries, whose job it is to supervise, oversee and approve building plans despite the joint team, but the coordination and cooperation between the two ministries for some reason leaves a lot to be desired.

Following the "short circuit," the director general of the Housing and Construction Ministry, Asher Winer, threatened his ministry would not carry out infrastructure work, would not establish public institutions and would not provide loans for

residing in settlements the establishment of which was not previously with the Housing Ministry. Mikha'el Deqel is not eager to enter into a confrontation with the Construction Ministry and believes that in the final analysis everything will be solved and at the worst, the cabinet will have to intercede in order to make peace between the two ministries.

These internal differences somewhat harm the momentum of apartment purchasing. The buyers are confused when on the one hand they witness the building momentum and the government's encouragement while on the other doubts crop up in regard to the actual professional implementation of the building plans in the area, and in view of the Housing Ministry threats.

All this has recently been compounded by malfunctions and loopholes uncovered in the building contacts of some private companies, while several Knesset members and various political bodies have been warning the buying public not to fall into the entrepreneurs' traps. MK Rafi Edri (Alignment), the director general of Shikun 'Ovdim [Histadrut Building Company] has expressed his fear that the lack of supervision over the activity of the private entrepreneurs might put the lid on the money innocent citizens put into the schemes, hoping to live sometime in the future in villas in Judaea and Samaria. On the other hand, "Nofim" director general Dani Weinman promises that his company will live up to its commitments and will, as promised, build splendid, exemplary neighborhoods.

A sensitive issue that emerged in the first stages of building in Judaea and Samaria is the question of the ownership of the land. In 1980 a ministerial committee was established to solve the Judaea and Samaria land shortage problem. It in turn appointed an interministerial committee headed by Pli'a Albeck of the State Attorney's office. She says that the land issue is today controlled and regulated and is being handled with extreme caution. The question of land ownership in Elon More, which after an appeal was submitted to the high court of appeals forced its settlers to evacuate part of its territory, was the first burn, and so far the last. Recently an information bureau was set up in the Agriculture Ministry to provide information on ownership of land in Judaea and Samaria to anyone who seeks that kind of information. This bureau is likewise expected to prevent cases of attempted fraud on the part of private entrepreneurs who might try to sell apartments build on land that does not belong to them.

The land in Judaea and Samaria is today given to the settlers with a loan repayable after 5 years at 5 percent. Thus it happens that the gap in the cost of land in Judaea and Samaria versus the coastal plain and the financial possibility of owning a house on the plot of land provide the opportunity to many citizens residing in densely-populated areas to improve their living conditions and also get into a new social framework and enjoy a higher quality of life.

The Defense Ministry attaches great security significance to the Jewish settlements in Judaea and Samaria. These settlements, which overlook important junctions, also prevent the theft of land by hostile elements. Recently, these elements have been noted to try to establish facts in the field, which could in

the future cause political problems. Surveys conducted by the Jewish agency's land settlement department have shown that in parallel with the Jewish demand for residence in Judaea and Samaria, there is a simultaneous growth in the departure of Arabs from those areas.

All the government and state bodies dealing with building in Judaea and Samaria anticipate that within 2 to 4 years there will be some 150 settlements in Judaea and Samaria, the largest of which will be Ari'el, Qarne Shomron, 'Immanu'el and Alfe Menashe. Some of the settlements established by private entrepreneurs are also expected to be widely inhabited: some 2,000 housing units are planned for Yosifya and Ramat Qidron, and another 1,200 in Elqana Dalet. Meanwhile roads are being paved to the Judaea and Samaria settlements, to be supplemented by the Trans-Samaria highway and the Karmel Road.

Is the Jewish population of Judaea and Samaria in the early decades of the 2000's expected to number more than 1 million? Matityahu Drobls believes so. Mikha'el Deqel is a bit more cautious, but also hopes that this figure will be attainable. These numbers indicate the degree of seriousness given to building in Judaea and Samaria and its scope as well as the political trends behind them. Even those favoring returning the "West Bank" find as each day passes that the scope of settlement in that part of the land will make it difficult for Jordan to use Judaea and Samaria as a bargaining chip in the negotiations--if indeed they take place--with Israel.

In Judaea and Samaria today, the proposal raised by David Ben-Gurion, who at the time advocated the distribution of the land and using land beyond the coastal area, is being implemented. The increased exodus of inhabitants of the coastal towns eastward implements this suggestion by way of thinning out the Tel Aviv region while not "stealing" anything from the development towns. The social cross-section in Judaea and Samaria is diverse, with the settlers coming from idealistic settlement nuclei, religious and political bodies to some civilians who come to live in those places out of economic considerations and the hope to improve their lifestyle.

The Judaea and Samaria building momentum and the regional settlement plans still raise a few questions. Will the private entrepreneurs manage to set up the settlements already marked on the settlement map? Will those planned 100,000 settlers for the next 2 or 3 years really come to Judaea and Samaria?

Even those questions, dubious as they might be, cannot alter the signs indicating that the development and settlement of Judaea and Samaria will be carried out as planned, if only thanks to the current policy which is taking pains to establish clear-cut facts that will be hard to be uprooted quickly.

Settlements in the approval, planning and early construction stages (October 1983)
 [Note that due to limitations of teletype machines the following table originally presented in five columns has been split in two]

<u>Placename</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Units planned</u>
Avne Hefez	Southeast of Tulkarm	1,000
Kefar Zur	East of Sal'it	400
Qedummim Gimmel	West of Kefar Qadum	1,000
Qarne Shomron		
Dalet	Between 'Azzun and 'Asla	1,000
Hevla	East of the Hablah village	5,601
Sha'are Tiqva	West of Elqana	800
Elqana Gimmel	North of Elqana	900
Elqana Dalet	Near al-Shaykh Subh	1,200
Barqan	Near (Kafr Barqin)	500
Yo'ezer	Near Kafr al-Dik	700
Dir Qela'	East of Dayr Ballut	300
Netafim	North of Bet Abba	300
Haris	At the crossroads of the Trans-Samaria Road and the 'Immanu'el settlement	600
Yosifya		
(Yaqir Bet)	Near Yaqir	2,000
Oranit	East of Kibbutz Hahorshim	600
'Asa'el ('Ofarim)	Near Bet Arye	1,000
'Ofarim Bet	(St Barbara) near 'Abud	800
Na'ale Bet	East of Nili	1,000
Gane Modi'in	West of Mattityahu	700
Mattityahu Bet	East of Mattityahu	1,000
Ra's Kurkar	East of Kharbata	400
Betar	Near the historic Betar	500
Daniyyel	Between Bethlehem-Efrat	200
'Anatot	Near 'Anatot	200
Ne'ot Addumim	Between Ma'ale Addumim and the Qidron Spring	100
Radar Hill	Radar Hill	700
Ramat Qidron	Khirbat al-Mintar; east of ('Abbadiyah)	2,000
Ginnat	Near Janin	300
Teqo'a Gimmel	Near Herodian	300
Anhil-Kibbutz	Gush 'Ezyon	80
Adora	Mizpe Lakhish	300
Negohot	Mizpe Amazya	300
Susiya	Khirbat Susiyah	300
Yaqir	Southeast of Hebron	300
'Omarim	Near al-Zahiriyah	150

<u>Placename</u>	<u>Settling Movement or responsible body</u>	<u>Building stage</u>
Avne Hefez	Land preservation society	Processes of land purchase and plots' sale
Kefar Zur	Moshav Union	Organizing of the nucleus
Qedummim Gimmel	National Religious Party [NRP]	The land will be preserved for the NRP settlers
Qarne Shomron Dalet	Herut youths	consolidation of nuclei almost over
Hevla	Private entrepreneurs	The plans were approved by the steering committee
Sha'are Tiqva	Judaea and Samaria mortgages	Building of structures underway
Elqana Gimmel	Judaea and Samaria mortgages	Roadbreaking
Elqana Dalet	The Gal Company	Roadbreaking
Barqan	NRP	Pending planning
Yo'ezer	1. Herut movement Moshavs. 2. Independent nucleus, NRP	Roadbreaking
Dir Qela'	NRP	Pending planning
Netafim	Zionist organization, independent nucleus	Roadbreaking
Haris	Land preservation society	Processes of purchase and plots' sale
Yosifya (Yaqir Bet)	Private entrepreneurs	Roadbreaking, sale of apartments
Oranit	The Delta Company	Planning stages
'Asa'el ('Ofarim)	The Communications Ministry employees; the Farmers Union	Approval of plans almost over
'Ofarim Bet	Private entrepreneurs	pending consolidation of plans
Na'ale Bet	Nucleii: 1. Hatzav [Constructive Zionist Groups] 2. Israeli Aircrafts Industries	Roadbreaking
Gane Modi'in	Judaea and Samaria mortgages	Roadbreaking
Mattityahu Bet	A private company	Pending planning
Ra's Kurkar	Po'ale Agudat Yisra'el	Pending planning
Betar	Private entrepreneurs	Pending planning
Daniyyel	An independent nucleus	Planning almost over
'Anatot	An Amana nucleus	Roadbreaking
Ne'ot Addumim	Zionist organization, an independent nucleus	Pending planning
Radar Hill	Independent nucleus (Farmers Union)	Roadbreaking
Ramat Qidron	Private entrepreneurs	Pending planning
Ginnat	Zionist organization, Amana	Pending planning
Teqo'a Gimmel	Zionist organization, Amana	Pending planning

<u>Placename</u>	<u>Settling Movement or responsible body</u>	<u>Building stage</u>
Anhil-Kibbutz	Zionist organization, the religious Kibbutz Movement	Pending planning
Adora	Zionist organization, Herut Moshavs	Pending planning
Negohot	Zionist Federation	Pending planning
Susiya	Zionist Federation, Amana	Pending planning
Yaqir	Zionist organization, Amana	Pending planning (settled by a Nahal nucleus)
'Omarim	Zionist organization, Amana	Pending planning

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TRANSFER OF JORDANIAN FUNDS TO WEST BANK DISCUSSED

TA031552 Tel Aviv YOMAN HASHAVU'A in Hebrew 4 Mar 83 pp 16, 17

[Commentary by Roni Shaqed: "Husayn Is Bribing the Arabs of Judaea and Samaria"]

[Text] A vast and accelerated building momentum has been noticeable over the last few years in the urban and rural Arab sector of Judaea and Samaria. Millions of Jordanian dinars funneled to the area brought about the change in the traditional Arab scenery. The prevailing view is that the money was funneled into Judaea and Samaria from the Arab countries. There is no doubt that the Arab countries, all of which are involved in the Palestinian problem, are trying to promote their political interests with the help of money. The amount and frequency of money contributions are closely tied to political developments and events in Judaea and Samaria and to the fabric of relations among the Arab countries and their relations with the PLO.

King Husayn, who has not yet relinquished his dream of again ruling over Judaea and Samaria, wants to maintain his interests there and create centers of power for himself. Husayn believes that through massive financial aid to the Arab inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria he will in time attain their sympathy and support. At the same time, with the help of his allies in the Arab world who funnel astronomic sums of money to his coffers, Husayn can exercise his influence on Judaea and Samaria and stabilize his regime. Indeed, since 1967 Husayn has not stopped funneling money to the inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria in order to attain their support.

George Hazbun, a leader of the Palestinian Communist Party, does not disclaim the Jordanian centers of power: "One cannot make light of the support for the king particularly among the well-to-do former Jordanian civil servants including teachers and businessmen who maintain trade relations with the East Bank. The money they receive influences their way of thinking.

As far as the Jordanian king is concerned, Jerusalem is "the crown's jewel" and therefore he exerts many efforts to recruit the support of the inhabitants. The residents of Jerusalem enjoy the Jordanian money and know how to repay the king. Sums estimated at several hundred thousand dinars arrive in Jerusalem every month and are distributed among the king's faithful and supporters. This

money arrives mainly through Anwar al-Khatib--who is the most senior Jordanian civil servant in Judaea and Samaria and holds the title of "district governor"--and members of the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce and with the recommendation of its director, Fa'iq Barakat. Many of the king's followers built luxurious houses in Jerusalem with this money and one of the new prestigious neighborhoods northwest of Neve Ya'akov is mockingly called by inhabitants of East Jerusalem "Jabal al-Sumud" (neighborhood of steadfast resistance) and it is clear to everybody where the money for this luxurious building came from.

A representative of the Jordanian tourism minister, (Bahagat Isma'il), has recently visited Judaea and Samaria. On the face of it, it was a family visit but in fact his purpose was to recruit people in the tourism business to support the king, thus exploiting the crisis currently afflicting this field. At the end of his visit, hotel managers in East Jerusalem received from the Jordanian Government a 750,000-dinar loan (some \$2.2 million) which will be distributed among them. The loan was given for a period of 15 to 20 years with an annual interest rate of only 1 percent. While hotels in the Jewish sector are trying to cut on expenses, hoteliers in East Jerusalem are renewing equipment and sprucing up buildings. Tourist bus companies and travel agents have also received loans and grants to help them overcome the crisis afflicting their business. All this was meant, of course, to create an economic dependence on the king's economy and regime.

Funds are funneled directly from the Jordanian al-Awqaf office's budget to the al-Awqaf institutions in Jerusalem on a monthly basis. The al-Awqaf workers are actually considered Jordanian civil servants. The money is allocated for salary payments and for regular activities, mainly involving the development of religious institutions. Two Jordanian emissaries arrive in Jerusalem every month carrying some 200,000 dinars (some \$600,000). The money is subject to the control of the al-Awqaf administration and "surpluses" are almost entirely subject to the exclusive control of (Hasan Tahabub), the director of the al-Awqaf in Jerusalem.

Businessmen organized in trade unions and workers organized in workers' unions affiliated with the Jordanian trade union also enjoy vast financial aid. In order to expand his circle of influence, the Jordanian king decided to give monetary awards to every member of a union registered as a professional or trade organization and subject to Jordanian law.

Various unions have blossomed throughout Judaea and Samaria since 1981. George Habzun, a communist and member of the executive of the Association of Trade Unions in Judaea and Samaria, says in a regretful and angry tone that "At the beginning of 1981 there were 29 real trade unions in the West Bank whereas there are 73 today, including unions of ironers, barbers, laundry workers, tilers and other tradesmen who established their unions with one and only purpose--to receive money from Jordan."

Referring to the way money is transferred, Habzun added: "Union members get the money when they personally go to Amman and not through the trade unions. Thus, the king creates a personal loyalty to him rather than to the trade unions."

In order to prove their existence, the new unions' members have rented "offices," and posted eye-catching signs above them, while in fact no professional activities go on there, and all efforts are devoted to one purpose: receiving money. During recent months, hundreds of the unions' members have gone to Jordan where they were given personal grants ranging from 600 to 1,000 dinars. They receive the grant after signing a document written in small print which is basically a declaration of support for the king. YOMAN HASHAVU'A spoke with some who had signed the document but did not know what it said. Most claimed that when they got the money, they quickly signed the document with one hand, while they pocketed the money with the other. In addition to the grants, the tradesmen are also eligible for a loan of about 2,000 dinars, as stated, with a yearly interest rate of only 1 percent repayable over a 15-year period.

Inhabitants who want to build themselves homes also receive financial assistance from Jordan. Any landowner who acquires a building license from the administration authorities in Judaea and Samaria can go to Jordan with his certificate of land ownership and building license and receive a special loan of 8,000 dinars (\$24,000) to build his home. He must repay the loan within 3 years by monthly installments of 40 dinars [as published]. The purpose of the Jordanian loan is to prevent a migration of inhabitants from Judaea and Samaria and to use their land for building. At the same time it is clear that the intention was to create economic and political dependence on the Jordanian king.

Capital is necessary to set up an industrial plant. Obtaining it is easy. All one must do is set up a partnership among at least four persons who have ties with one of the king's associates. Then the "entrepreneurs" go to Jordan, where they receive a loan of about 200,000 dinars on easy terms. This opens the road to the establishment of the factory, the products of which will be marketed in the East Bank.

The money gets to Judaea and Samaria by many paths. At first it came by way of the bridges, but the civilian administration limited its transfer to prevent PLO money from reaching Judaea and Samaria, and anyone crossing the bridges today is entitled to carry only 1,000 dinars. Nevertheless, ways of circumventing this have been found. The money is divided among family members or acquaintances. A Jerusalem merchant told YOMAN HASHAVU'A that "The farmers usually carry cash, but we transfer large sums of money by bank checks or bank transfers, and, in fact, we are not limited in the amounts of money." The checks reach the money changers who convert them into cash. The bank transfers are sent from Jordan to a bank in Europe and from there to a bank account in Judaea, Samaria or Jerusalem. The banks' secrecy does not make it possible for Israel to control the transfer of these funds from the PLO.

Bribery as political harlot's pay and financial support have always been a factor in political moves in the Arab countries. Under Israel's watchful eye considerable funds are being channeled to the Arab inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria by elements hostile to the country--the PLO, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

CSO: 4400/238

CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION DECISION ON WEST BANK LAND REPORTED

TA301015 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Jan 83 p 1

[Report by Tzvi Bar'el]

[Excerpt] The civilian administration has in the last few days issued guidelines and instructions pertaining to the seizure of some 20,000 dunam of land in the West Bank. Some of the land would serve as reserves for the settlements, to expand existing settlements and to form nature preserves which would be used for settlements in the future.

The civilian administration also issued expropriation orders for areas where new roads are to be paved. Most of this land is cultivated and its owners are registered in the tax books. Following is a list of the land that will either be seized or expropriated:

--4,000 dunam of land is designed to become East 'Immanu'el. The land is owned by villagers from Dayr Istiya and Zayta in the Tulkarm area. It includes enclaves of cultivated plots of land that are not included in the seizure.

--3,500 dunam northeast of Hebron near the village of Si'ir, is to be transferred to the Hebron Mount Regional Council.

--2,000 dunam is slated for use to expand the settlement of Mizpe Yeriho.

--1,600 dunam near the villages of Surif and Kharas west of Hebron is to expand the settlement of Mizpe 'Adullam.

--1,000 dunam near the village of Jaba' north of Hebron will be leased to the Hebron Mount Regional Council.

--1,000 dunam in the Janin area will be allocated for the establishment of Sannur B.

--700 dunam will be leased to the Samaria regional council to expand the settlement of Qarne Shomron.

--250 dunam south of Hebron, in the Jabal al-Sindas area, will be leased to the Hebron Mount Regional Council.

--30 dunam will be used to expand the settlement of Giv'at Ze'ev north of Jerusalem.

The civilian administration will expropriate other areas to pave the following roads:

--a 9-km road linking the settlement of Mikhmas on the Allon Road with the Arab village of Mukhmas and from there to Jerusalem. The road is to run through cultivated land of the villages of Dayr Dibwan and Mukhmas.

--a road to (Jabal Mughr) south of Bethlehem.

--an addition to the road linking Ma'ale Adummim with northern Jerusalem over an area of some 7.5 dunam.

The civilian administration has also cancelled a declaration as state land of 100 dunam near the village of Batir in the Bethlehem area after it emerged that the land is owned by a Greek church and is not state-owned land.

CSO: 4400/240

WEST BANK SETTLEMENT DRIVE MOMENTUM ASSESSED

TA281220 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 28 Jan 83 p 14

[Commentary by Yosef Goell: "Stumbling Blocks"]

[Text] Has the process of Israeli settlement in the occupied territories, and primarily in Judaea and Samaria, gone beyond the point of no return? Has it become well nigh irreversible, as some local and foreign observers would claim?

To attempt an answer, one must tackle the question in the two contexts it is being asked, leaving aside the ideological desirability or undesirability of large-scale Israeli settlement of all of the territories, or selected parts of them. These two contexts are the feasibility of attaining the goals set by those currently in charge of the settlement drive--100,000 settlers within three to four years and over a million by the end of the century; and what effect attaining these goals will have on the political purposes behind the government's settlement plans.

In the beginning of this series, I wrote that the Gush Emunim-type settler and settlements have run their course. Of the 20,000 to 25,000 settlers in Judaea and Samaria today--about two-thirds of them children--Gush Emunim accounts for substantially less than half.

One may choose to view Gush Emunim and its accomplishments as either analogous to the first 'Aliya, the first wave of Zionist settlers who came to Turkish Palestine starting in the 1880s, [word indistinct] up a string of colonies and burnt themselves out within 20 years; or to the second 'Aliya, which went on to leave a much deeper imprint on the future growth of the Yishuv [the Jewish settlements]. What is clear in either case is that the Gush Emunim phenomenon has hit the bottom of the barrel from which its human resources are drawn.

The government's present settlement drive and its goal of 100,000 settlers in the next few years are based on a different human reservoir: the combination of need, greed and the striving of many young Israelis for their dream house away from the claustrophobic pressures of living in the greater Tel Aviv area.

Can the goal of 100,000 settlers be reached? There is every indication that it can, but not in the three years or so [word indistinct] by the government planners. Rather, this seems to be a reasonable goal for the end of this decade. The reason for the time lag lies mainly in the fields of money and of bureaucratic friction.

The competing government leaders in charge of various aspects of the settlement drive, in their recent testimony before Knesset committees, seem to agree on one thing: that the basic investment needed to settle one family in Judaea and Samaria comes to around IS4m. to 5m. at current prices. A major critic of the government's settlement policy, Prof Ra'anan Weitz, who heads the Jewish agency's settlement department together with Herut's Matityahu Drobles, estimates the cost at about \$100,000 per family. These two estimates are fairly close to one another.

To bring the Jewish population up from the present 20,000-25,000 to 100,000 means financing the settlement of an additional 20,000 families, an expenditure of \$2 billion. It is very unlikely that the government and the world Zionist organization will be able to allocate such a sum during the next two to three years. It is much more feasible to spread the outlay over a period of seven to eight years.

The bureaucratic infighting, which is so typical of government programmes that span departmental boundaries--and which was responsible, for example, for the excruciatingly slow progress in the settlement of the Golan and the Jordan Rift Valley under the Labour governments--seems to be as bad as ever, and possibly even worse, in the Likud Government.

Despite Prime Minister Begin's pro forma intervention, there is little hope that this infighting between Drobles, agriculture's Micha'el Deqel and housing's Asher Weiner, to mention only a few of the protagonists, will cease in the future. Its continuation will undoubtedly be responsible for delays of months and even years in the realization of the 100,000 goal.

Of perhaps even greater importance will be the initial difficulties in providing the infrastructure that the "quality of life" oriented settlers expect to find in their new settings. Even in the best of cases in central areas of Israel, there is always a lag of many months to several years between the completion of new housing estates and the provision of schools, kindergartens, post offices, telephones and the like. There is every reason to believe that the performance in this regard in the territories will not be better than the norm in Israel itself, and may well be worse. Settlers and home buyers who are disappointed in not finding an instant higher quality of life in the new settlements may well infect other prospective settlers with that sense of disappointment, and dissuade them from making the move. All of these are factors that will most likely lead to a delay of several years in attaining the goal of 100,000 settlers. This number, however, can definitely be reached by the end of the decade. When it comes to the more utopian goals of a million or more Jewish settlers in Judaea and Samaria by the end of the century, we have definitely entered pie-in-the-sky land.

The first problem in regard to the higher target is that the \$2 billion assessment for 100,000 settlers turns into a minimum of \$20 billion. Perhaps it is not totally impossible to divert such an astronomical sum from other purposes over a period of 17 years, but it would require a veritable social, economic and political revolution in Israel to do it. It is enough to point out that the Likud government is not the sort that has been keen on any revolutions at all.

But an even more serious stumbling block is the problem of Jews, or rather the lack of them. One hundred thousand can reasonably be expected to move from the present locations within Israel--although even this number raises problems such as the populating of Ma'ale Adumim and Qiryat Arba' with Jews from Jerusalem, thus lowering the proportion of Jews to Arabs in the disputed capital.

Getting even a few hundred thousand Jewish settlers into Judaea and Samaria is simply not on the cards unless net 'Aliya during the same period is substantially larger than that figure. To our regret, given the realities of the last decade, there would seem to be absolutely no basis for such a prognosis.

Can the presence of 100,000 Jewish settlers in Judaea and Samaria over the next seven to eight years prevent the recurrence of another surrender of territory? Conversations with government politicians and with settlers in the territories convey the distinct impression that the sense of urgency attached to the present settlement drive derives mainly from the trauma of Camp David and Yamit. In that situation, a determined American president, siding with the Egyptians, forced an Israeli prime minister to agree to a retreat from all of Sinai, including those parts which even an ostensibly "dovish" Labour Government had considered essential for Israel's security.

When one views the intentions of the present settlement goals in the light of Camp David and the subsequent Yamit withdrawal, one can only conclude that the number of Israeli settlers (if we are speaking of a ratio of 100,000 Jews to 800,000 Arabs) will not be the prime factor in determining whether an Israeli prime minister will again have no choice but to succumb to American pressure.

Of much greater importance, if and when the time for another such confrontation comes, will be the degree of Israel's political, economic and military dependence on the U.S.; the extent of Arab influence over Washington policymakers; the state of Israel's image, and especially the negative effect of the settlement image in the eyes of America's political and opinion-making communities.

Also of major importance will be the personality of the incumbent American President and his views on the Palestinian question; the degree of disarray within the Israeli political leadership at the time (remember Rabin and Peres in 1975 against Kissinger and Begin, Dayan and Weizman pulling in different directions in 1978); and especially the personal determination and tenacity under pressure of the Israeli prime minister of the day.

The ability to stand up to future American pressures for withdrawal is not as hopeless as the obvious imbalance in power between client Israel and patron America would indicate. For Israel and its leadership--of all mainstream political stripes--the question of maintaining Israeli control over a substantial part of the territories and the prevention of the rise of an independent Palestine is seen as a matter of life and death. For America, the Palestinian issue is of fluctuating importance. Ironically, the experience of the past few years shows that the infusion of Jewish settlers into Judaea and Samaria, alongside the indigenous Palestinian population, has had the effect, by way of the American media, of intensifying the concern of American policymakers.

To my mind, the goal of lowering the Palestinian issue on America's list of political priorities is of much greater importance than that of getting on with a provocative forced-pace Israeli settlement of the territories.

Pragmatists among Herut's political leaders and in many of the settlements, when they let their hair down, often go over to speaking of a combination of Jewish settlement and Arab migration as the factors that will eventually lead to full incorporation of the territories into Israel, despite international opposition and the limitation of Israel's own monetary and human resources.

They point out that these pragmatists dismiss the cassandra-like prophecies of a rapid increase in the Arab population. They point out that during the 15 years of the Israeli occupation, the ratio between the two populations in the area made up of Israel proper and the territories under Israeli control has remained relatively stable, at 63 percent Jews to 37 percent Arabs.

These figures can be attributed to a large Arab migration from the territories that is offsetting the admittedly higher rate of Arab natural increase, they say.

Labour's Ra'anana Weitz refutes these views in their three versions, which he calls "the messianic, the pragmatic and the brutal."

The messianic view, he holds, argues that a determined "greater Israel" drive on the part of the government will bring about the immigration of a million Jews from the diaspora, akin to the mass 'Aliya that followed the war of independence and the creation of Israel. Weitz believes that this is self-delusion and that the events of the war of independence period, regarding both the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs, were unique and will never be repeated.

This, he says, is especially true of the thesis advanced by the Herut "pragmatists" who believe that a combination of legal measures (not sheer force), the realities of an ever-increasing number of Jewish settlers and the push and pull factors of the Arab economy in the West Bank and in the Arab oil states will induce a growing number of Arabs to leave the territories.

To illustrate the Herut "brutal approach," Weitz recounts a conversation he had with a representative of this "school of thought" about eight years ago-- "with a rational type and not with the likes of a Rafi [Rafa'el Eytan]."

"The man told me: 'The next time there's a war--and rest assured that there will be a next time--there will be no problem in organizing things so that in the first two or three days, with a minimum of force, we can get an additional one million Palestinians across the Jordan and out of the West Bank!'"

Weitz says that he agreed that such a plan was definitely feasible but added: "You should be aware that one day after that war is finished, the U.S. will impose far-reaching sanctions against Israel to make sure that it beats the Soviet Union to the punch."

"It will take at most six months to bring Israel to her knees and to permit the U.S. to dictate a drastic 'solution' that will force Israel out of all of the territories. We won't get any grain, any oil and any money, not to mention arms, and that will suffice, regardless of which Israeli government is in power at the time."

Weitz claims, while adamantly refusing to identify his Herut interlocutor, that a few years later he (the Herut man) admitted that "you were right and I was wrong."

Ironically, the recent settlement drive, and especially the media reports it has generated, has had a distinct and major impact that flies in the face of the official American litany that "settlements are prejudicial to peace."

In the past few months a growing number of Arab leaders in the territories--and according to some reports, even King Husayn of Jordan and the PLO's Yasir 'Arafat--have been spurred on by the settlement drive to argue that "if the Arabs do not turn around and negotiate with Israel today, there may well be nothing left to negotiate about tomorrow."

This is certainly not the intention of the Begin government in the urgency that has informed its latest settlement campaign. But it may well be that the sense of parallel urgency that it is engendering among the Arabs could in the end lead to some movement, at least some form of interim accomodation between Israel and the Palestinians.

CSO: 4400/240

'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTARY ON ERETZ YISRA'EL

TA251430 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Jan 83 p 9

[Commentary by Eliyahu Salpeter: "The Temptation of Greater Eretz Yisra'el"]

[Text] Despite the intense desire to establish "settlements" and build bedroom building blocks beyond the green line, we are not "5 minutes before midnight" from the aspect of determining facts in the field from which there is no return. Despite the enormous efforts by the government and giant investment sums, the number of genuine settlers is tiny. Most of the about 20,000 people who have settled in the West Bank have done so for reasons of economic profit. A "settlement" of this type is incapable of curbing an Arab military invasion and in the end it will also not prevent genuine autonomy or even a transfer of the territories to an Arab administration, if for political and economic reasons the government of Israel is not able to stand up to pressures put upon it.

In contrast to this, the "settlements" have internal political importance: they institutionalize a class of thousands of voters for whom annexation will remain their personal interest even after "correct economics" and the stock exchange fantasies lose their glitter.

Even those who believe that ideological settlements have a military, not only a political value, must know that and officials and merchants, the academics and nouveaux riches who have gone to the West Bank to get Arab land at a price of 5 percent of the actual value and to take advantage of the taxpayers' money to lower the construction costs have not detracted from the settlements in Tel Hay or Negba. Security experts who are no less reliable than the defense minister thinks that civilian settlements that have been established for political objectives could cause more trouble than help to the military effort in the event of war; even today many of them are a security burden.

According to the figures published over the last few weeks, some 4,500 Jewish families now live in the West Bank, representing about 20,000 people. The decisive majority has settled at a distance of up to 30 minutes traveling time from Tel Aviv or 10-15 minutes from Jerusalem. At least two-thirds of them go to the West Bank to sleep, they work within the green line borders. A considerable section of the remaining third is occupied in services, mainly

in those connected with the Israeli administration. This then is not a type of pioneering settlement that plants roots in the land and from the numerical aspect, too, it does not fit in, to put it mildly, with the figures being claimed by the Deqel-Droble duo.

Rejecting "the settlements" and all the political and social evils involved in them is not then necessarily a rejection of the continuation of an Israeli security presence in the West Bank; these two things are quite separate. This should be emphasized now, when people are trying to create the impression by taking the deeds of ownership the government has found a way to create a mass flow to the West Bank, which will, by the very fact of its weight--or at least that of the astronomical cost of paying potential compensation--guarantee that no government will be able to give back West Bank territory.

Cynics will say that if Saudi Arabia is prepared, as was once published, to give the al-Asad government \$15-20 billion to make its position more flexible on the issue of Israeli-Arab arrangements, it might also agree to give several billions to an international fund that would compensate the Israeli owners of villas in the West Bank.

There is no longer any need to expand on what the lust for settlements and the expropriation of land is doing to our image in the free world. The pro-PLO decision made by the European parliament last week--a body considered to be one of the few remaining pro-Israeli ones--is the latest expression of this process. The democratic countries and public opinion in them were in the past prepared to take security considerations into account to justify our settling the West Bank, and sometimes even to accept them; but they are no longer prepared to take into consideration nationalist-religious-mystical claims trying to consolidate rule over a million Arabs and taking away lands and rights in existence for 3,000 years.

And so, even with regard to abroad it is not then correct to say that anyone who rejects the settlements is rejecting the Israeli security presence in the West Bank, although the policy in the territories has made no small contribution toward confusing the difference between the two things.

President Mubarak has pleaded with the PLO to recognize Israel and join the peace talks as soon as possible, before "there will no longer be anything to talk about." Whether or not he is right in this evaluation, his words are now being published as proof that the settlement policy is really making a contribution toward persuading Arabs to accept the Israeli presence in the Middle East. There are indeed various signs, more than Israel is prepared to admit exist, that the Arabs still do not want us here, but that they are beginning to get used to the idea of our existence in the area. However, it would be a mistake to conclude from this that if we persist with the settlements, the Arabs will also accept our rule over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The "topical" meaning is tempting, but erroneous for two reasons:

First, a generation and a half passed; or, perhaps, it would be more correct to say 100 years, before we reached the current semiacceptance situation. In the meantime several "events" and six wars have occurred, thousands of soldiers

have fallen and scores of thousands of cripples, widows and orphans have been created, and who knows how many years it will take until the semiacceptance turns into full acceptance and peace. Even those who think that the provers of some of Eretz Yisra'el applies to the moral of greater Eretz Yisra'el should ask whether it is really worthwhile, and whether the nation of Israel really is prepared, to fight several more wars and sacrifice thousands more victims and another 100 years of terrorism in order to maintain Israeli sovereignty over the remaining part of Israel, from Jordan westward.

Secondly, and mainly: signs of Arab acceptance of a partition of Eretz Yisra'el and the giving up of part of it to a Jewish state do not reach us of willingness to also, in the future, give up the remaining part. Nations, like individual people, are willing to make partial concessions; but if they are pushed beyond that, they also go back on the previous concessions. A person or a people who accept an inconvenient situation, will not, because of this, accept an insufferable situation, such as that the settlements and Jewish assumption of control of the West Bank are creating in Arab eyes. Historical examples teach the opposite: expanding the settlements and the daily confrontations involved in them perpetuate the Palestinians' hostility to Israel and could jeopardize acceptance of its existence.

These are the facts and the morals that must be changed in view of the temptations and benefits being offered to a nation under the title of "settlement". The use of Mubarak's warnings and Sharon's "breakthroughs" as a proof of the contrary are doing a disservice to the nation of Israel.

Beyond the precise reasoning against the imaginary charms of expanding the settlements there is, of course, the old reasoning, which is more basic and closer to our souls: the country is wasting scores of billions of shekels (250,000,000 shekels of the calculation according to which the settlement of each family in the West Bank costs "only" 4.5 million shekels, as was reported in the Knesset economics committee, is acceptable) at a time when there is no budget to heat schools and tens of thousands of elderly people are suffering from cold because of lack of money to heat their homes. The billions are being split like water on the rocky land of the West Bank, but there is no money to keep what exists in the 'Araba; Galilee's population is thinning out and it is losing its Jewish character. Young couples are being forced to leave Musrara and other old quarters of the capital city in order to prove that there is a demand for the thousands of building developments being constructed beyond the green line around Jerusalem.

The conquest is corrupting the youth, which is learning to attack, to "cut the balls off" and shoot at demonstrators and is being pervaded by barbarization, contempt of the law and contempt for human life. Thousands of young people will find it hard to accept the hypocrisy according to which values that are not considered on one side of the green line are sacred on the other side.

And when we read about the moods among members of Kakh and Gush Emunim and hear about the establishment of "supervision teams" from among the settlers, memories from Middle East history of not too long ago are aroused: how General Franco took advantage of his power base in Spanish Morocco and what the generals of the "Paras" tried to do when De Gaulle decided to leave Algeria.

PROFIT ESTIMATES FOR PROPOSED CANAL REVERSED

TA250823 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 25 Jan 83 pp 1, 2

[Report by Charles Hoffman]

[Text] The profit estimates of the Mediterranean-Dead Sea project have flip-flopped again, with the release yesterday of figures by Energy Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i showing a net economic benefit of \$400 million for the ambitious hydroelectric project. Last month Moda'i said that the project was only a "break-even" proposition.

Moda'i made the announcement yesterday in Jerusalem after two days of deliberations on the final economic and engineering feasibility studies of the project. The ministry decided yesterday that detailed planning for the project would start soon, with construction to begin in the 1984/85 fiscal year and finish by 1992.

The final recommendation to go ahead with the project was submitted to Moda'i two weeks ago by Prof Shlomo Eckstein and Prof Yuval Ne'eman, based on their reviews of the feasibility studies.

Eckstein headed a committee in the early 1970's that examined proposals for generating hydroelectric power with water brought from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea.

Ne'eman, who is now science and development minister, headed a committee set up in 1977 that recommended running a canal and tunnel system about 100 kilometres across the Negev to a hydroelectric power plant at the outlet at the Dead Sea. The 800 megawatt capacity plant is supposed to produce electricity only at peak-consumption hours.

The figures showing a \$400 million profit for the project over a 50-year period are based on what the project planners now consider to be reasonable assumptions about the interest rates on the capital needed to invest in the project and on the future prices of the fuels to be replaced by hydroelectric power. Higher fuel prices in the future would increase the benefits from the project.

The current estimates indicate a six percent interest rate and a projected rise of one percent per year in the price of coal and oil.

Moda'i's assessment last month that the benefits would equal the cost of the project were based on more pessimistic assumptions of an eight percent interest rate and no increase in the price of fuels.

The projected cost of the canal was also recently revised upward, and now stands at \$1.4 billion, including \$200 million in interest charges. Last month it was pegged at \$1.3 billion.

The current assumptions emerged during the last few weeks of intensive discussions of the conclusions of the feasibility studies with a view towards their impending publication.

It was also decided recently that the profit to be made by the project would also include indirect benefits such as provision of water for cooling inland power plants to be built in the Negev during the next decade. Previously the calculations included only direct energy yields.

Moda'i said last weekend that the detailed planning on the hydroelectric plant would be delayed for several years until the situation in the world oil markets clears up, while work on the canal and tunnel would begin immediately. Ministry sources stressed yesterday that work on the two parts of the project would be timed to be completed together.

CSO: 4400/242

ISRAEL

NEW RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON VISITS TO LEBANON

TA091414 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1345 GMT 9 Feb 83

["Visits to Lebanon Henceforth To Be Approved Only for Vital Needs"--ITIM headline]

[Text] Rosh Haniqra, 9 Feb (ITIM)--The Interior Ministry will no longer approve private and family visits to Lebanon. Henceforth, civilian permits for entering Lebanon will only be issued for vital needs, and after receiving approval from authoritative sources and the northern command.

ITIM correspondent Arye Me'ir reports that the new regulation will come into effect on 15 February.

IDF soldiers, civilians serving in the army, and journalists will receive entry permits as in the past from the IDF.

Every Israeli now entering Lebanon will have an exit permit stamped in his passport, and he will not be allowed to cross the border without it. In urgent cases, in which the applicant has not yet managed to get a passport, it will be possible to get the exit permit stamped on the back of a special form.

It has been reported from the Interior Ministry that the decision to restrict visits to Lebanon was made primarily to protect the safety of Israeli citizens in view of the recent attacks and shooting by terrorists against Israeli vehicles in Lebanon. The exit permits will be issued free of charge and the border crossings will be at Rosh Haniqra and Metulla.

The ITIM correspondent reports that the new regulation has caused great bitterness among the Galilee Arabs who have relatives in Lebanon with whom they lost touch after the war of independence. Since the war in Lebanon they have been making frequent family visits during recent months since it was no problem to obtain entry permits for Lebanon, and there was even a trade in these permits.

The ITIM correspondent notes that in contrast there are not restrictions against Lebanese citizens entering Israel and the border is open to them and their vehicles.

CSO: 4400/242

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARABS DISCUSSED

TA181122 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Feb 83 p 16

[Commentary by Dani Rubinstein: "The Rule of Arbitrariness"]

[Text] One evening 2 weeks ago I traveled from Jerusalem to Beersheva via the Hebron road. A few kilometers beyond Hebron the road was deserted: After passing the Sammu crossroads and the Dura turn I do not remember having seen even one car. It was then 2000 local time. There was an IDF roadblock before the entry to the hamlet of al-Zahiriyah and a soldier shivering with cold stated that it was forbidden to stop in the hamlet. About a week before stones had been thrown from there at a military vehicle, stones that had hit Ester Ohana of Bet She'an. A curfew was imposed on the hamlet and has lasted until now (and up to the time of writing these lines--almost 20 days). I drove rapidly through the silent center of al-Zahiriyah and came upon a large mound of stones. I was alone in the car and was somewhat frightened. The dark road was blocked on all sides by mounds of large stones. I moved on to the shoulder, stopped, moved some stones away and continued, at a distance of 100 m, after a curve in the road, there was another IDF roadblock. I told the soldiers there about the rock piles and one of them said: "There are always problems."

This week Ester Ohana, who was injured in al-Zahiriyah, died of her wounds, as did Shlomo Abergil from Netivot who was also killed after a shopping expedition to Gaza. On Tuesday the radio reported a warning campaign carried out by dozens of inhabitants of Giryat Arba' in curfewed al-Zahiriyah. Rabbi Levinger announced there over loudspeakers that "Jewish blood will not be spilled. And afterward yet another of the settlers was interviewed on radio. I am quoting his remarks from memory. He asked angrily why a ruckus was being made and a debate held in the Knesset over the murder of Emil Grunzweig while Ester Ohana's murder in al-Zahiriyah was not being similarly condemned. Noticeable in his words was a complaint about a distinction drawn between blood and blood. One day later the inhabitants of Netivot went out to demonstrate and protest over the death in Gaza of the town's inhabitant. Rabbi Levinger and other settlers issued announcements about the deterioration of the security situation in the territories. They claimed that a security committee of their own would take law and order in the West Bank and Gaza into its own hands in order to defend the Jewish settlers.

I have mentioned all this as a preface to a short description of the rule of Israeli law and order in the West Bank and Gaza, which is regarded by many critics as a rule of lawlessness. It is doubtful that this is lawlessness. It would be more correct to call it a rule of arbitrariness. The signs of this new rule are also gradually spreading to the western side of the green line (which no longer exists) and the murder of Emil Grunzweig, as many people have already noted, is only one of its signs.

The rule of arbitrariness in the West Bank and Gaza makes it possible to do practically anything to the Arab inhabitants. It is certainly possible to do anything to those who demonstrate and harm Israelis, either within the framework of the law or in a marginally legal framework (such as settlers' firing). It is clear that laws can be altered, and military orders--which are just the same as laws, certainly when given verbally by a military commander can be issued. Thus, for instance, it only takes a moment to declare a "closed zone" in a place where peace now demonstrators want to protest against the settlers of Qiryat Arba' who destroyed Arabs' homes and electricity poles. An extended curfew and searches, restrictions on movement, arrests, a ban on expressing views and rallies, humiliation and harassment, dismissals from work, economic blows, pursuits and annoyances are a daily occurrence and are being carried out within the framework of the law, with the settlers on the one hand and the armed militia of the village leagues on the other acting as the forces of volunteers defending the arbitrary rule.

There is no problem in arresting any West Arab and it is no problem to accuse him of something--if someone wants to, of course. Here or there he attended some meeting of a political nature that is banned by law, or he has a picture of 'Arafat or poems by (Samih al-Qasim) and these are defined as inflammatory material. And if no one wants to arrest him because holding him involves a financial outlay and there are no longer any places to imprison Arabs (as the chief of staff has explained) he is summoned to the military government again and again and forced to wait for days and weeks in the courtyard. These are some of the harassments.

What is called law in the West Bank stoops and rises in accordance with the policy of annexation and the settlements' demands. The "supreme planning council," which is supposed to approve construction plans in the West Bank, is directed by Israeli officers and civilians and its legal role can be described in one sentence: to legally restrict and reduce any building by the 800,000 Arab inhabitants and to expand and develop any building by Jewish settlers. The entire area north of Ramallah as far as Gush 'Etzyon was declared to be a planning area more than a year ago, an area where any Arab who wants to build a house encounters great difficulties. Broad expanses have been declared agricultural land, green land, military zones, nature reserves and, as well as this, there is an addition of "special territory." The military government is trying its test to make it almost always possible to declare Arab building as illegal while the building of the settlements, which is based on the principle of "grab what you can," is absolutely legal. Once, when the (dismissed) mayor of al-Birah, Ibrahim al-Tawil went to the governor of the district and asked him how it was that the Pisgot settlement was being constructed inside the town's municipal territory without a license, the governor looked at him with amazement and told him: "Do me a favor, leave me alone." (According to al-Tawil's evidence). Now a special patrol of Gush Emunim settlers is being organized in the West Bank, financed with plentiful government funds; and under the guise of guarding an arbitrary law its members will try to implement all the new building laws.

These are a few examples of the social-ruling order set for a third of Eretz Yisra'el that was conquered in 1967 and this is a "legal" order and rule of repression and discrimination against Arabs who do not want our rule. Anyone

in Israel who does not want this, anyone who is not prepared to accept a permanent rule of arbitrariness and discrimination in the territories, is at once said to be helping and defending the Arabs. Those saying this are not just Rabbi Kahana's and Gush Emunim's people, who in fact rule the West Bank, not just street toughs who attack any demonstration and signature-collection booth of the alignment, Shinuy, the citizens' rights movement, MAPAM and peace now. Those who see the matter in this way are also the leaders of the rule and the government, coalition speakers, Knesset members and ministers. Willingly or unwillingly they are pushing the rule of arbitrariness from Nabulus and Hebron to Tel Aviv or, simpler and closer: from east of Jerusalem to west of it.

Against this background we can already understand the demonstrators of Qiryat Arba' who went out to al-Zahiriyah and were furious at the great noise made in Israel about the murder of Emil Grunzweig (who, with his movement, are called PLO agents by them and their friends) while the Arab PLO supporters murdered Ester Ohana in al-Zahiriyah and Shlomo Abergil in Gaza. The war against the Arabs in the conquered territories has expanded for a long time now and has also turned into a war against those who appear to be their supporters in Israel. The area of the rule of arbitrariness simply cannot stop at the door of amputated Bassam al-Shak'ah's house in Nabulus and it is reaching the gates of those who are presented as his sympathizers in Tel Aviv, whose entire goal is not exactly to help al-Shak'ah but to rescue us from the ugly fate of a rule of conquest and repression.

CSO: 4400/239

GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE MORE AWQAF ASSETS

TA090938 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 9 Feb 83 p 3

[Report by Yo'el Dar]

[Text] Nazareth--The government plans to hand over to the Muslim community additional assets of the Awqaf, the Muslim religious trusts, which have been frozen since 1948.

Binyamin Gur-Arye, the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs, told Arab dignitaries from Galilee yesterday the government would take this step only after it establishes that the properties concerned were donated by their owners to the Awqaf for charity and not for other purposes. Gur-Arye said the government has so far released 150 properties to the Muslim people committees in Haifa, Acre, Jaffa, Lod and Ramla. The released assets included land, mosques, shops and other buildings valued in the billions of shekels.

The Awqaf assets are said to be one of the most sensitive problems affecting relations between the government and the Muslim community. In 1948, the government froze all Awqaf property, the income from which had been used by radical Arab elements to fight the independence of the state. Since then these assets have been administered by a department of the Finance Ministry.

For years the Muslim community has urged the government to release all the frozen property. In recent years the government decided to use part of the income of these assets to finance religious, social and cultural projects in Arab villages.

Six years ago the government allocated 30,000 Israeli shekels for Arab villages. This year, however, the total sum reached over 14 million shekels. In addition, the government allocated 35 million shekels this year to renovate Jaffa's Hasan Bak mosque and 2 million shekels to preserve the traditional character of old Acre.

Gur-Arye hopes to treble the sum released from the Awqaf religious and social projects within one or two years. Nevertheless, the Muslim community is determined to get all the frozen assets released. Community leaders say the release of the assets would enable the Muslim community--which constitutes 78 percent of all the Arab population--to develop needed social projects and to be more independent in dealing with its own religious and domestic affairs.

CENSORSHIP, STATUS OF EAST JERUSALEM PRESS DISCUSSED

TA131342 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Feb 83 p 9

[Commentary by Tzvi Bar'el: "Press in Manacles"]

[Text] AL-FAJR publishes a crossword puzzle on page six nearly every day. The clues, down or across, are usually pretty innocent. A name of an actress, names of towns or villages, and sometimes simply letters to close off a line or a column. What is interesting about these crossword puzzles is the graphic picture that comes out of the black squares. Sometimes, although extremely infrequently, the shape is insignificant, and even symmetry is not observed. But usually the shape constitutes a means to drive home an idea, a notion or a fact that cannot be written about because of censorship interference. Thus, for instance, in the issue that appeared a day after the publication of the conclusions reached by the commission of inquiry. The black squares formed the combination of SS; a week before that, they formed the word "freedom" or the letter "F" hinting at FATAH. Other shapes remind the readers that the national struggle, even if there is yet no permission to write about it in detail, still lives on.

Page six is usually meant for the young readership from among the newspaper's 8,000 subscribers: for the sportsfans, the horoscope readers, the avid gossips. In that mixture, to repeat, is introduced the crossword puzzle, which puts even in this nonpolitical page a touch of awareness. However, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, this crossword puzzle, just like the sports pages and the obituaries, is scrutinized by the censors.

Like its two other East Jerusalem counterparts, AL-QUDS and AL-SHA'B, which are later distributed in the West Bank, this newspaper is called by the Arab press branch open press. It is true that there is another Arab newspaper published in Jerusalem, AL-ANBA', but the attitude toward it, as the newspaper vendors note, is a biased newspaper, a government mouthpiece "on which there is no need to waste money."

This open press, operating by license from the civilian administration which according to its wishes grants it distribution and printing permits and can likewise withdraw them at whim, is actually subordinate to all the rules and obligations imposed on any other Israeli newspaper. But the significant difference lies in the daily practice, because while the Israeli newspapers only transmit to censorship those portions that may refer to security matters,

the East Jerusalem papers must hand in the entire content of the issue that is to be published the next day. "Sometimes I have to prepare reports for a newspaper and a half in order to be able to publish the newspaper," the AL-FAJR editor once told me.

At the same time, the AL-FAJR editorial staff is considered most active in the newspaper field. On Friday it publishes an English edition which is popular particularly among the foreign press, and is likewise used as a tool by diplomats who base some of their reports on data published by that newspaper. Its circulation is relatively small, some 2,000 issues per week, but its importance lies in the target readership. The newspaper will soon get some professional innovations thanks to its younger offspring, AL-FAJR AL-'ARABI which comes out in Hebrew. Underlying this idea is the desire "to provide a precise picture to the Israeli public of events in the territories and strengthen the tie between the Palestinian people and the Israelis." It is true that the newspaper, which sometimes publishes significant press scoops, can be purchased from the stands, still it is currently most widely found in kibbutzes and sometimes in academic institutions. Incidentally, a special scoop scored by that newspaper but not published in the Arab edition was the interview with the Israeli prisoners conducted by the U.S.-based publisher, (Paul 'Ajluni').

Despite the great activity going on in the old AL-FAJR building, its competitor, AL-QUDS is considered the most widely-popular West Bank and Jerusalem newspaper. It was first published in 1968 and managed to establish for itself an image claiming that "if you have read AL-QUDS, you have read the newspaper."

The authorities' attitude toward it, too, was slightly different compared to its attitude toward the rest of the newspapers: the censors cut it less severely, and when the civilian administration stopped the distribution of the newspapers in the West Bank during the war, AL-QUDS got permission to be distributed before the others did. The newspaper's editor and owner, (Mahmud Abu Zuluf), is careful to maintain good ties with "those who sign distribution licenses," but it looks as though not even these ties can sometimes immunize the newspaper against any harm.

Yet the greatest "damage" falls upon the third largest newspaper AL-SHA'B. The West Bank civilian administration has for 7 months refused to renew its distribution license for the West Bank. Its editor, 'Ali Ya'ish, has tried several times to establish contact with the heads of the civilian administration, but to no avail. Meetings that had been set up were postponed; indirect contacts by his friends with those in charge did not help, and even his attorney's appeals had no substantial results. The official excuse was "security reasons"; but in fact, they were censorship violations. He claims, however, that no one bothered to show him those reports or articles that were the pretext for the revocation of the license. Today, and for 7 months now, the newspaper can be distributed only in East Jerusalem, the number of advertisements in it has dropped to half and its editor cannot today estimate how long the newspaper can survive only on family financing. He said desperately "that this is probably the new method employed by the authorities to bring about the closure of the newspapers. Their distribution is limited until they have to shut for budgetary reasons, in which case the

authorities could be happy and claim that their hands are clean." This limitation on distribution comes, of course, in lieu of a censorship examination. But even this ban, one should remember, is not supposed to come instead of the censorship, and this newspaper, too, even though it is distributed only in unified Jerusalem, must submit all of its pages to the censorship's approval. This, however, does not apply to another Jerusalem-based newspaper, THE JERUSALEM POST.

These limitations and rulings on the open Arab press, as distinct from clandestine publications which come more often in the form of brochures whose publications is totally banned but whose publishers somehow manage to give to the public, have created a situation where these papers deal less with news and daily events because very often even reports copied from Hebrew papers on the radio are banned, so they become a public arena for the expression of opinions, each paper following its political path and expressing the views of its target readership. Thus the control over the paper also becomes a highly important means to imbue views and opinions and consolidate public opinion. "And today's public," one of the editors emphasizes, "is no longer a bunch of people calling them the intelligentsia, today the villagers, the activists, youths and women constitute the broadest stratum of readership, and so these are the groups which will one day decide on their political future. We still do not have a country or a government we could criticize and condemn, as any normal newspaper does. Therefore, our job is to prepare a thinking, wise people with a highly-astute political awareness and ability to make decisions. Perhaps were it not for the limitations and the need to become a sophisticated political arena capable of combatting the scissors, we would not have reached the level where one letter in a crossword puzzle reveals an entire political idea."

CSO: 4400/239

MORE THAN 800 ISRAELI ARABS STUDY IN EAST EUROPE

TA021616 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 2 Feb 83 p 3

[Report by Muhammad Khalaylah]

[Text] More than 800 Arab Israeli students are presently studying or have completed their academic studies in Eastern Bloc countries over the past 20 years. Some 650 of them have been sent by RAKAH, while the others are studying at their own expense, primarily in Romania.

These statistics emerge from a study conducted by the Labor Party's Arab Affairs Department, headed by Ra'anana Kohen. The study's results have been reported to members of the Alignment Knesset faction and the party's headquarters.

RAKAH began sending Arab students for studies in Eastern Europe in 1973 and more went after the Maki split in 1965. Studies by Arab students in Europe acquired new momentum after the 6-Day War. Between the years 1967 and 1981, 541 students were sent to study in the Eastern Bloc. Sixty percent of the students have left to begin their studies within the past 5 years. On average, 60 students leave each year: 30 percent are sent to the Soviet Union; 20 percent to Czechoslovakia; and the remainder to the other communist countries. Sixty percent of the students study medicine; 20 engineering; and the remainder political science, economics and law. In Romania, 203 students are now studying, 157 of whom are studying without RAKAH's financial aid.

Most of the students studying in the Eastern Bloc are from the Galilee and the Triangle. RAKAH takes advantage of the dispatch of students to penetrate sectors where it lacked a foothold, such as the Druze and Beduin sector. The criteria RAKAH uses in choosing candidates are as follows: membership and activity in the party or its youth wing for 3 years; at least one member of the student's family must be active in RAKAH; and the student must have an average mark of 7 on his matriculation exams. RAKAH organizes the students it sends in party branches and cells at their places of study and provides them with propaganda material. Party envoys are active among these students, and once a year RAKAH holds a general assembly in one of the eastern European countries with the participation of main activists of the party. On the eve of Knesset elections, the party summons all the Arab students it sent on studies to take an active part in its election campaign in Israel.

CSO: 4400/240

BRIEFS

ANSAR CAMP COSTS--The 5,412 prisoners being held at the Ansar detention camp are costing Israel IS1 million a day, it was learned yesterday. In addition to the detainees at Ansar, Israel is holding 293 Syrian prisoners of war, 24 of whom are officers. There are two full colonels and eight pilots. Since the beginning of the war, 9,200 detainees have passed through Ansar. Of the 5,412 still in the camp, over 1,000 are Lebanese civilians, the rest Palestinians. Several dozen detainees are being held for the second time, having been released earlier. There are no foreign nationals left at Ansar, according to the officer, who said that among the foreigners originally detained there were several Europeans and one Canadian. [Text] [TA031119 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 3 Feb 83 p 1]

ISRAEL, HUNGARY AGRICULTURAL CARTEL--The Hungarian Government has invited official Israeli Government representatives to operate jointly a cartel to market agricultural produce, particularly pate de foie gras, in France. A senior Israel Agriculture Ministry official visited Budapest recently, as did the Agrexco [Israeli agricultural produce exporter] director of the France branch, Dr Arye Dagan. They were invited by the Hungarian Foreign Trade Ministry. In the meetings between the Israeli representatives and the Hungarian deputy minister (who served in the Hungarian Embassy in Israel for 5 years) it was agreed that the cartel will be established and that as part of that the two countries would coordinate prices and maintain control over the marketing of those goods in France. Hungary supplies some 800 tons of pate per annum, and Israel 250 tons. The initiative toward establishing the cartel came from Hungary, in view of the fact that for years Israel would get a price averaging 20 percent more than the price of the Hungarian product. The two countries decided that their representatives will meet once every 3 months and that a commercial communication setup will also be established for marketing in France. The director of the French branch of Agrexco, Arye Dagan, said that last year there was extremely bitter competition in France between Agrexco and (Hilaron) on the sale of avocado and that "as a result of the price reductions that were unnecessary, the Israeli growers suffered losses of \$2.5 million." [Aharon Pri'el] [Text] [TA031350 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Feb 83 p 1]

MOSSAD, SHIN BET AUDITS--The Knesset Public Audit Committee will henceforth also audit the activities of the Mossad and Shin Bet. Until now, the state comptroller had audited the activities of these institutions. Henceforth, this will be done by a special committee of the Knesset Public Audit Committee. Our economic affairs correspondent says that this is meant to increase the Knesset's control over these two institutions. The reports to be prepared by the committee will be classified. [Text] [TA022002 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 2 Feb 83]

NEW IMPORT REGULATIONS--The Industry and Commerce Ministry is creating difficulties for the import of footwear and clothing to Israel. Industry and Commerce Minister Gid'on Pat signed an edict making the import of such goods conditional on possession of a license before importing anything. However, this decree does not apply to imports from the EEC countries. It is being noted in the Industry and Commerce Ministry that it was decided to change the regulations after it became clear that the country is flooded with cheap imported goods, primarily from the Far East. The growth in imports was accompanied by a sharp drop in the exports of these goods from Israel. The ministry will also increase supervision and control of importers, and will prevent imports under the guise of personal imports. The ministry spokesman denied there being an intention to make imports more cumbersome, but admitted that the new regulations would make it possible for the ministry to have a great say in the scope of imports. Still, he said, the intention of it all is only to prevent wild competition. [Text] [TA020748 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 2 Feb 83]

ISRAELI, ROMANIAN RESEARCH AGREEMENT--Jerusalem, 31 Jan (ITIM)--An agreement on cooperation in historical research and the exchange of archival material concerning the history of Romanian Jewry, especially during the holocaust, was signed between Yad Vashem [Holocaust Research Institute] and the Socio-Politico-Historical Institute of the Romanian Communist Party's Central Committee. Details about the agreement were reported by Yad Vashem director Yitzhaq Arad to Education Minister Zvulun Hammer. The agreement was reached following Arad's visit to Romania as a guest of the Romanian Institute, Romania's main historical institute. The agreement, approved by the highest political echelon in Romania, is the first agreement of its kind to be signed between Romania and a non-communist country. Following the agreement, Romania will open its archives to researchers from Yad Vashem. The Romanians are also interested in learning the extensive archival material in Israel on Romanian Jewry. Hammer praised the signing of the agreement, calling it an important step toward promoting Yad Vashem's research of the holocaust, and particularly of the chapter about Romania. [Text] [TA311615 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1530 GMT 31 Jan 83]

TRADE WITH THAILAND--Thailand is considering the purchase of complete factories from Israel. This was one of the ideas for increasing Israeli exports raised at a meeting between a commercial delegation from Israel and the Thai commerce minister. This was reported by the delegation's chairman, Yehuda 'Azmoni, the Industry and Commerce Ministry official in charge of trade with Asia, Africa and Latin America. [TA301946 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 30 Jan 83 p 3 TA]

LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION--The Liberal International Executive has decided to hold a convention of all the liberal parties from all over the world in Jerusalem next year. Israel has so far never hosted a convention of any political party, hence the great political significance of this resolution. [Text] [TA041843 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1815 GMT 4 Feb 83]

NO TERRITORIES TAXES--Senior elements in the Finance Ministry have told MA'ARIV that there are no intentions to collect land betterment taxes from owners of land and homes in Judaea and Samaria. They said that the current policy was to encourage rather than curb settlement in Judaea and Samaria. They also pointed out that the imposition of Israeli taxes in areas beyond the green line contradicts the principles of the autonomy and it would be inappropriate now to set faits accomplis in the field which might cause problems upon the establishment of the autonomy. The proposal to impose land betterment and purchase taxes in Judaea and Samaria is mentioned in the publications "platforms for debate in the income tax department program" for 1983, income tax officials have discussed this proposal but no decision has yet been made. As said, senior treasury elements object to adopting this proposal. [Shraga Meqel] [Text] [TA211455 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 21 Jan 83 p 8]

PLO FUNDS HOTEL--The joint Jordan-PLO committee recently granted 90 million shekels to support East Jerusalem hotels that have been harmed by the tourism crisis. DAVAR has learned that Jordan and the PLO have recently begun sending huge sums to support various commercial firms that have suffered from the crisis in the tourism industry in Israel. It will be noted that many East Jerusalem businessmen have businesses connected with this branch, including sellers of mementos, jewellery, leather and textile objects, tourism agents and, of course, hoteliers. Yesterday various elements indicated the possible implications of this support, particularly when this involves East Jerusalem businessmen who have to date been known not to dabble in politics, but prefer to devote themselves to their businesses. [Tova Tzimuqi] [Text] [TA251202 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 25 Jan 83 p 3]

AID TO LEBANESE PALESTINIANS--Nazareth--A public committee for giving financial and moral help to the Palestinians in Lebanon was set up by Israeli Arab dignitaries on Monday. This is the first time Israeli Arabs have established such a committee since operation peace for Galilee. The committee, consisting of 10 Arab notables including the chairmen of three local councils in western Galilee, yesterday met with economic coordination minister Ya'aqov Meridor. They said they intend to build classrooms for the 'Ayn al-Hulwah Palestinian refugee camp in South Lebanon and to persuade the Palestinian representatives to be less hostile to Israel. The minister said Israel is still helping the Palestinian refugees directly and trying to persuade the Lebanese not to change the permanent status of the Palestinians who have lived in South Lebanon since 1949. The minister welcomed the initiative and promised to help. [Text] [TA271059 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Jan 83 p 3]

ARAB NATIONALIST FILMS--Nazareth, 27 Jan (ITIM)--Videocassettes with nationalistic, anti-Israeli films have recently been distributed in the Arab sector around Nazareth and in the western Galilee villages. ITIM correspondent Arye Me'ir reports that the movies include, among other things, "the description of the murder of Palestinian refugees in Sabra and Shatila," "the heroic tale of the elimination of the Israeli sportsmen in Munich," "the Davr Yasin massacre" and more. In addition to this, the Israeli television film called "Hirbat Hiz'a" was also copied, and it is also being circulated together with anti-Israeli nationalistic interpretation and commentary. The cassettes were brought to Israel from Lebanon by Israeli Arabs and were reproduced in the Nazareth area. They are being circulated by nationalistic elements, among other things as part of their attempt to incite the Arab population in anticipation of the upcoming "land day" on 30 March. The films are being aired in private homes, where relatives, neighbors and friends are invited. The ITIM correspondent point out that the police know that the videocassettes exist, but have not yet managed to lay a hand on them. On the other hand, the police have succeeded in catching people who distribute tape cassettes with nationalistic songs, relating how the Israeli authorities "are oppressing the Palestinian people." These cassettes were also smuggled from Lebanon and reprinted in Israel. Security element regard the distribution of the video films with great gravity, and point to the sophisticated exploitation of the "wonders of the technical age" to win over souls for the Palestinian cause. [Text] [TA271611 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1545 GMT 27 Jan 83]

W. BANK PLANT--Supreme Court Judge Shlomo Levi published an interim order preventing the civilian administration in Judaea and Samaria from destroying a marble cutting plant belonging to a resident of Hebron. (Faysal Muhammad Badawi) appealed to the supreme court of justice over the fact that the civilian administration in Judaea and Samaria told him that it intended to destroy the building belonging to him and his brother on the grounds that the land on which the plant is built does not belong to him. The plaintiff claims that the administration wants to destroy the plant because of pressure from the residents of Qiryat Arba' who, according to him, have coveted the land for a long time. The plaintiff notes that about a year ago the residents of Qiryat Arba' destroyed the house of a local resident near the area because they dislike any building in the area. [Text] [TA281548 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 28 Jan 83]

FAMILIES BEYOND GREEN LINE--A nucleus comprising young families from Rosh Ha'ayin has "crossed" the green line and is establishing a new communal settlement called Netafim near the trans-Samaria highway. An area of 200 dunams belonging to the Israel land administration has been slated for the new settlement, and development work is underway there. When that work is done, prefabricated housing units will be put up and the first nucleus of 25 families will move in within a few months. About 9 km from Netafim, the settlement of 'Ofrarim will be established. This settlement is planned for some 700 families of Communications Ministry employees. This was reported yesterday to MA'ARIV by Avi Tzur, who is an aide for settlement affairs to Deputy Agriculture Minister Mikha'el Degel. The ministerial committee on settlement affairs has received a plan for the establishment of additional settlements in the area. Among the proposed

settlements in Oranit, which will be established by the Petah Tiqva-based Delta Company on an area of 500 dunams northeast of Kafr Barra. An access road will lead to that settlement from the trans-Samaria highway, near Elqana. At present the only way to reach Oranit is through Kafr Barra and Kibbutz Hohoreshim. Some 2 km south of Barqan, near the new trans-Samaria road, a 500-dunam area has been located belonging to the Israel land administration. This area has been promised to the National Religious Party for the purpose of setting up an urban settlement. [Mordekhay Elkan] [Text] [TA271453 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Jan 83 p 9]

JUDGES APPOINTED--The Hebron Village League has begun to appoint judges to tribal [hamulati] courts which have been in existence for many years in the Hebron Hills, but so far have not been binding. The head of the Hebron Village League, Muhammad al-Nasir, has told our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari that there is no question of setting up a legal system that would interfere with the normal legal establishment. The village league just wants to create a possibility for anyone who wants to appeal to a tribal judicial decision of his own free will instead of appealing to a normal court. [Text] [TA030736 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 3 Feb 83]

CHARITY COOPERATION INCREASES--Recently, the cooperation between the international charities and welfare institutions active in the territories and the authorities has increased. This was stated this evening by Eli Tzur, the Labor and Social Affairs Ministry official in charge of welfare in the territories. Our correspondent in Judaea and Samaria, Arye Gus, reports. [Gus--live or recorded] The Labor and Social Affairs Ministry is holding its traditional reception for 32 international welfare and charity institutions that are active in the territories. The compliance of their representatives with the invitation shows the improvement in relations between them. In the past, there were sharp differences of opinion between the military government in the territories and some of the organizations, especially the U.S. ones, because of their activity. Israel had claimed that these organizations had deviated from the welfare sphere and had begun to engage in politics, in sedition and other illegal activities. Recently, Eli Tzur said, the situation has improved greatly. The charity organizations are from various countries, though most are U.S. ones connected with the official aid program. There are international organizations like the Red Cross, and there are other organizations that operate specific institutions. Usually, they complain that the Israeli authorities put difficulties in the way of their projects and footdrag in dealing with their requests. Generally, Israel welcomes the activity of the international organizations, and would like to expand their activities. [Excerpts] [TA021846 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1705 GMT 2 Feb 83]

W. BANK CIVIL SERVANT WAGES--The 12,000 Arab civil servants in Judaea and Samaria this month got pay raises up to an average of 50 percent, but our correspondent Arye Gus reports nevertheless that their wages are still lower than the parallel wages in Israel. The civilian administration has told our correspondent that the intention is to continue to raise the Arab civil servants' wages. [Text] [TA021228 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 2 Feb 83]

ACTIVITY RENEWED--The Triangle, 7 Feb--The sons of the village movement, whose center is in the Triangle villages and which is known for its support for the extremist wings of the PLO, has recently renewed its political activity through explanatory leaflets after a period of inactivity. In an announcement issued at the beginning of the week in the village of Umm El Fahm, the sons of the village movement claims that "in view of the decision by the government of Israel to settle 60,000 new inhabitants in the West Bank during the coming year, it has ordered the takeover of land covering thousands of dunams in this area." The leaflet's authors claim that "the takeover of Arab land is also continuing inside the green line area." In this context, the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs has reported that from information he has received it emerges that the issue of the inclusion of land in the area of competence of the new Misgav Regional Council in Galilee will be used by local extremist political elements in the land day events at the end of March. In accordance with a decision by the minister of the interior, the area of competence of the new regional council, which is gathering together the new footholds under its authority, will also cover private land belonging to Arabs from 16 villages in the area which have to date been outside any jurisdiction whatsoever. The official in charge of the northern district for the Ministry of the Interior, Yisra'el Koenig, has said that all the villages in this area have authorized construction areas which will suffice until the year 2000. [Text] [TA071615 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1445 GMT 7 Feb 83]

VILLAGERS LAND SALE--Nazareth--Ultra-nationalist groups among Israeli Arabs are said here to be exerting pressure on villagers not to sell land to the Israel lands administration or the Jewish National Fund. They reportedly call at night at the homes of villagers, mainly from the Little Triangle, who intend selling land and warn them to stop negotiations. They have also denounced real estate agents as traitors and "Zionist agents." RAKAH, the new Communist Party, distributed a leaflet in al-Tayyibah village this week calling for a stop to trading the land "which we have received as a holy heritage from our fathers and grandfathers." It also called for the boycott of all who sell land. The ultra-nationalists started their campaign after recent sales of Arab-owned land on both sides of the green line. Officials claim no more than 1,000 dunams were sold to the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and other purchasing authorities during 1982. The recent statement by prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs Binyamin Gur-Arye that land belonging to Arab villages would be excluded from the jurisdiction of Misgav, a new regional council in Galilee, has not eased tension in the 16 villages involved. [Yo'el Dar] [Excerpt] [TA111217 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 11 Feb 83 p 3]

ARAB POPULATION STATISTICS--Non-Jews in western Eretz Yisra'el form 36 percent of the population, while non-Jews form 45 percent of the population up to 14 years old. This emerges from Central Bureau of Statistics figures reported yesterday in the Knesset Immigration and Absorption Committee. Other figures show that 24 percent of the births within the green line are of non-Jewish parents, while 11 percent of the deaths are of non-Jews. The fertility rate among Muslims within the green line is an average of 5.5 children per woman, while it is 7 among the Arab women on the West Bank. [TA220631 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 19 Jan 83 p 8 TA]

SETTLERS IN 'IMMANU'EL--The first 400 families will settle in 'Immanu'el in Samaria within 3 months. Some 900 housing units and public institutions are now being built there. The company building in 'Immanu'el also has sales offices in New York, London, Antwerp and Switzerland. Among other things, it offers free flights to Israel to any foreign resident buying an apartment in 'Immanu'el. Our correspondent Gid'on Rotem points out that a special arrangement has been laid out for poor families who will be able to pay for the apartment just \$100 a month for 20 years at the end of which they would attain ownership. [Text] [TA061338 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 6 Feb 83]

'ARAFAT SUPPORT--According to a poll conducted by the Arab political organ AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI, which appears in East Jerusalem, a decisive majority of the inhabitants of the territories (90 percent) supports Yasir 'Arafat's leadership and policy and a similar majority (80 percent) favors a Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue. The poll involved a sample of 740 people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of various ages and professions. To the question "do you support a Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue?" 80 percent replied affirmatively, 17 percent replied negatively and 3 percent had no opinion. To the question "are you satisfied with Yasir 'Arafat's leadership?" 90 percent replied affirmatively, 26 percent answered negatively and 4 percent had no opinion. To the question "will the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue be fruitful?" 31 percent replied positively, 65 percent replied negatively and 4 percent had no opinion. To the question "would you support a rapprochement between the Palestinians and the Soviet Union." 60 percent replied "yes," 33 percent answered "no" and 7 percent "had no opinion." [Text] [TA131348 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 13 Feb 83 p 3]

GAZA ADMINISTRATION HEAD DIES--The head of the Gaza District Civilian Administration, Brig Gen Yosef Lunz, died last night. Yosef Lunz died after an illness in the Sheba Medical Center at Tel Hashomer. He was 48 years old. He was appointed the Gaza civilian administrator in August 1981, and before that was an instructor in the IDF's staff and command college. [Text] [TA131010 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 0925 GMT 13 Feb 83]

CAIRO POLITICAL TALKS--Figures from the territories are continuing to go to Cairo for political talks. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari reports that some of them have left secretly for Egypt to avoid being pressured by those opposing the political process. Deputy al-Birah Mayor (Jamil Tarisa), formerly a prominent national guidance committee activist and organizer of opposition to the Camp David accords, was returned from Cairo. [Text] [TA121516 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 12 Feb 83]

RAMALLAH TREE PLANTING--Ramallah inhabitants have said that the Agriculture Ministry branch subordinate to the civilian administration has been forcing any man wanting to plant fruit trees to sign a declaration saying that trees will not be on state land, but on properly registered privately-owned land.

Involved are farmers who get their saplings from the Agriculture Ministry with the aim of obtaining ministry guidance on planting a grove. Elements in the West Bank Agriculture Ministry have reported that next year the ministry will have to supply permits for this kind of planting activity, and that this license will be given only after an examination proving that the plot of land involved is not part of areas proclaimed to be state land, or about to be proclaimed state land. A bomb made out of explosives and nails was found yesterday morning at the entrance to the Bethlehem branch of the area village leagues. [Excerpts] [TA141018 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Feb 83 p 3]

POLL ON 'ARAFAT--Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari reports that according to a public opinion poll conducted by the East Jerusalem weekly AL-'AWDAH, 88 percent of the inhabitants of the territories are in favor of awarding full powers to Yasir 'Arafat to pursue the political path. Some 71 percent are content with a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 12 percent favor the establishment of a so-called secular democratic state over the entire territory of Eretz Yisra'el. [Text] [TA121242 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 12 Feb 83]

VILLAGE LEAGUES APPEAL--Qalqilyah (ITIM)--Heads of village leagues in Samaria yesterday called on Jordan's King Husayn to immediately join peace talks with Israel. Only in this way, they said, is it possible to protect Arab lands, and only through good neighbourly relations with Jews can the Palestinian people achieve their aims. The meeting was held in Hablah village near Qalqilyah on the occasion of the organization of another league in the Tulkarm area, where 80 villages are organized in leagues. Among those at the meeting, attended by thousands of village and family heads, were the head of the civil administration in Judaea/Samaria, Tat-aluf [Brig Gen] Shlomo Ilia and members of his staff. The head of the new league, Isma'il Maruq, said that he had once participated in what he called the "Palestine revolution," and had even been imprisoned. "But I achieved nothing," he said, calling on Husayn to join the negotiations "together with us, because we are part of Jordan and Jordan is part of us." The secretary-general of the leagues in Judaea/Samaria, (Yunis al-Hantuli), said that the leagues are an instrument of achieving Arab-Jewish peace. "The time has come," he said, "to learn from Israel what democracy is." [Text] [TA180713 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 18 Feb 83 p 2]

COMPANIES IN WEST BANK--The directorates of 80 companies have submitted a request to be transferred to Judaea and Samaria because of the tax reliefs given to plants there. This was disclosed by Industry and Commerce Minister Gid'on Pat at a Liberal Party executive. He added that he had instructed that manpower-based firms not be allowed to [word indistinct] to Judaea and Samaria, adding: "I am not interested in having people seeking easy windfalls and enjoy them at the country's expense." He also said that the peace for Galilee was one of the causes for the rise in inflation. Pat added that according to his ministry's policy, only sophisticated, money-based companies that would supply employment to the local inhabitants would be directed to Judaea and Samaria. [Text] [TA180940 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Feb 83 p 5]

ANTI-ZIONIST DOCUMENT--A document calling for uniting ranks among Israeli Arabs for a confrontation with the "Zionist movement" has been circulated in the Triangle villages these days and a copy of it has reached MA'ARIV. "We are hereby appealing to our fighting people," the document opens, stating that "since the Zionist movement emerged and took control, through settlement, over Palestine, 100 years ago, the Zionists and their friends have been concentrating efforts on evicting the Arabs from their land and are building their homeland on the land of Palestine. They lied to and misled the world, and are building their country as if there were no other people here." "The committee for the defense of lands, the local Arab councils and the progressive Jewish force are calling on the Arabs to unite and immediately start the confrontation against turning areas in the Galilee into Jewish settlements," the document adds. The document is signed by the "progressive forces of the sons of the village organization." ['Amos Levav] [Excerpt] [TA171104 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 17 Feb 83 p 2]

TOWN NEAR NABULUS--A town, most likely to be called Upper Nabulus, will be set up on 150,000 dunams of land on the southern slopes of Mt Gerizim, beginning on the mountain ridge up to the Arab village of 'Iraq Burin and down to the foot of the ridge beside the trans-Samaria highway. This is disclosed in the Israeli Samaritan sect's biweekly, HADSHOT HASHOMRONIM, in its newest issue, which reports on "the new facts taking shape in Judaea and Samaria as a result of the settlement momentum and the development of these regions, which are directly affiliated with the Samaritans of Nabulus and Holon. These facts are currently being established on Mt Gerizim and on the access connecting it to the Samaritan community in Holon." The periodical sees signs of the town's establishments in the fact that the Berakha outpost on a hill south of (Qiryat Luza), which is a Samaritan settlement and which was originally a Nahal outpost, has been populated by civilians. Further indications are seen in the preparations of water reservoirs for a town as large as Ari'el and in the fact that clear signposts have been put up for places like Berakha Bet and Gimmel. Another fact with respect to the development of Judaea and Samaria connected with the Samaritans is, according to that publication, the breaking of a new road branching off from the Nabulus-Jerusalem road about 1 km north of the town of Hawwarah, which shortens the descent from Mt Gerizim and links the Samaritan settlement of (Qiryat Luza) which is on the hilltop with the Samaritan community in Holon, along the trans-Samaria highway, the Tappuah junction, Rosh Ha'ayin and Petah Tiqva. Thus far the Samaritans reached the mountain by the Kefar Sava-Qalqilyah-Nabulus road. [Zohar Blumenkrantz] [Text] [TA180948 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Feb 83 p 3]

JORDAN VALLEY SETTLEMENT--There are 500 empty buildings in 23 Jordan valley settlements, some of which are still under construction, which can absorb about 2,000 additional people. This was disclosed yesterday by head of the Zionist organization's settlement department Drobles. Drobles noted that 909 families, numbering about 4,000 people, live in the Jordan valley settlements today. According to him, an arrangement was achieved with the IDF whereby the border fence, currently located near the road, will be removed to the Jordan River so as to supply more land for agriculture for the settlements. He emphasized that the additional land will provide production means for an additional 2,000 settlers. It was reported that the settlement department has so far prepared 6,200 dunams for settlement in the Jordan Valley, and that it intends to prepare about 15,000 dunams in addition. So far 36 million shekels have been invested

in landbreaking operations in the area. The deputy head of the settlement department, Professor Ra'anani Weitz, defined the new agricultural region as the "cream of the crop." [Text] [TA081117 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Feb 83 p 2]

NEW VILLAGE LEAGUE SET UP--In the Tulkarm area a new village league--the sixth in Judaea and Samaria--was established today. At the meeting held today in Hablah village, one of the league leaders said that the leagues are a national liberation movement and that they want to end the Israeli occupation, establish peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and take part as a side in the negotiations. The civilian administration head, Shlomo Ilia, said that the meeting has special importance at a time when groups professing to represent the Palestinian cause are convening far from the true arena of events. [Text] [TA171623 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 17 Feb 83]

AREA VILLAGE LEAGUES--The ousted head of the Hebron Hills area village leagues, Muhammad al-Nasir, has frozen his plan to appeal to the high court of justice over his dismissal until after he meets with the head of the civilian administration, Shlomo Ilia. The meeting has been scheduled for next week. Al-Nasir told our correspondent Arye Gus that he agreed to freeze his appeal in order to pave the way for a compromise. Our correspondent reports that central figures in the Judaea and Samaria area village leagues have taken action in the last few days to make peace between al-Nasir and the other members of the league, as well as between himself and the head of the civilian administration. Personnel changes have also taken place recently in the Bethlehem area village leagues. The head of the league, Bishara Qimsiyah, has retired and his son, Samir, has taken his place. Bishara Qimsiyah has been appointed member of the Council of the Federation of the area village leagues in Ramallah. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari reports that Samir Qimsiyah is an engineer by profession and was appointed as part of the policy of appointing to head the area village leagues those with educations. Jamil al-'Amlah, the head of the Hebron area village league, is an attorney. Our correspondent has learned that there was competition for the post of head of the Hebron area village league between two notables from the Dura village, but it was decided to appoint al-'Amlah because of his education and in order not to delegate most of the important jobs to the inhabitants of Dura. [Text] [TA040731 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 4 Mar 83]

FEBRUARY SOVIET IMMIGRATION--Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union showed a slight increase in February. A Geneva-based intergovernment committee for migration said 125 people arrived in Vienna last month compared to the low of 81 in previous months. [Text] [TA021106 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 2 Mar 83 TA]

SETTLERS CHARGES REJECTED--For the first time an Arab mayor has been charged in a court in a Jewish settlement in the territory. Hebron Mayor al-Natshah was accused of ordering the building of an electricity pylon near Qiryat Arba' and refusing to tear it down. Legally al-Natshah is required to appear in court and take the charge, but he told a Voice of Israel reporter that he will not go. He charged that the court case shows Jewish settlers are trying to set up a state within a state. He charged the court case is another aspect of what he calls harassment by the settlers against the people of Hebron, but al-Natshah offered to face the settlers in front of the high court of justice. [Text] [TA060735 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 6 Mar 83]

BOMB NEAR TEMPLE MOUNT--Jerusalem police investigators think that an extremist Jewish group was involved in placing a bomb that was discovered and defused on Friday, 4 March, at the Majlis gate near Temple Mount. At that time hundreds of Muslim worshippers were passing by the site on their way to the traditional Friday prayers and the discovery of the bomb prevented a serious tragedy. The bomb weighed 0.5 kg and was made of explosives used by the IDF. A local policeman discovered the bomb hidden in a polythene bag in a niche in the wall and he alerted the police bomb squad. When the bomb was discovered all the roads leading to Temple Mount were closed off and everyone leaving was scrupulously searched. Several youths were detained and released less than an hour later. [Ilan Bekher] [Text] [TA061054 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 6 Mar 83 p 1]

HONG KONG TRADE--Finance Minister Yoram Aridor arrived in Hong Kong today, and during his visit he will inquire about the establishment of an Israeli trade representation there. Our correspondent on economic affairs, Hayim Plattner, points out that such a representation will round up the setup of Far East commercial representations, which could open a substantial market to Israeli exports. Moreover, a commercial representation in Hong Kong could also open the gate to the PRC to Israeli industrial goods. The finance minister arrived in Hong Kong at the close of a visit to South Africa, during which he signed an agreement on economic cooperation which expands earlier economic agreements between the two countries. [Text] [TA061943 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 6 Mar 83]

ARMS TO CISKEI DENIAL--Jerusalem political circles have denied the report broadcast this morning on the supply of Israeli arms to Ciskei, in southern Africa. They said that Israel has no ties whatsoever with that country and moreover has no intention of establishing ties with it in the future. [Text] [TA041140 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1135 GMT 4 Mar 83]

ETHIOPIAN TIES--Relations between Israel and Ethiopia are "continuing to develop positively." Minister without portfolio Mordekhay Ben-Porat said yesterday in reply to a motion for the agenda by Dror Zeigerman (Likud-Liberals). Ben-Porat said that with the encouragement of the Ethiopian Tourist Corporation three delegations, from Israel and Jewish communities abroad, recently visited Ethiopia. They had been warmly received not only by the Jewish community but also by the Ethiopian people. The Jewish schools have been permitted to offer an eight-year curriculum instead of one of four, although teaching Hebrew is still forbidden, Ben-Porat said. The Jews, like the rest of the population, are required [word indistinct] lectures on Marxism and efforts are being made to sever the Jews from their heritage, he said. Zeigerman blamed the lack of coordination among government ministries for the failure to launch a public campaign for Ethiopian Jewry. He said that Ethiopia's opening its gates to Western investment and tourism has created a unique opportunity for Israel to appeal to friendly nations to use their influence to get Ethiopia to change its policy on the emigration of Jews. [Text] [TA040735 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 4 Mar 83 p 3]

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AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS DROP--Central Bureau of Statistics data report that January has registered a substantial drop in agricultural exports, which went down from \$69 million worth in January 1982 to \$42 million in January 1983--a drop of 33 percent. There was a 23-percent drop in citrus whereas in other agricultural areas there was a 50-percent drop. However, there was a rise of 12.9 percent in industrial exports in January. A farmers association official cited the bitter competition with the EEC as one of the reasons for this drop, noting that Greek and Spanish growers enjoy massive subsidies paid by their governments. [Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 15 Feb 83 p 8 TA]

JANUARY IMMIGRATION RISE--In January 1,367 new immigrants arrived in Israel, which is a 24-percent rise compared to the same month last year. This was reported on 14 February by the head of the Jewish agency's immigration and absorption department, Refa'el Kotlowitz. [Text] [Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 15 Feb 83 p 8 TA]

SEA-TO-SEA TUNNEL--The Dead Sea, 27 Jan (ITIM)--The 210 Israel bonds campaign activists participating in the prime minister-sponsored conference, and the founders of the Mediterranean-Dead Sea canal 1983, today participated in a ceremony where the cornerstone was laid 2 km north of the 'En Boqeq junction for a tunnel that would connect to the canal from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea. The 61 founders of the canal, who participated in the conference, each raised more than \$100,000 for this purpose. Later the bonds activists heard an address by Energy Minister Mr Yitzhaq Moda'i who said, among other things: This tunnel will be the longest in the world and will ultimately be 80-km long, with an interior diameter of 5.5 meters. This is four times longer than the tunnel inaugurated today in Japan. The minister told the Jewish leaders: "Yesterday you toured the plant where the Merkava was being mounted. This is the present battle. Today you observed the first stages of the sea-to-sea project, and this is tomorrow's battle." At the close of his remarks, Minister Moda'i thanked the bonds campaign for its contribution toward the establishment of the Mediterranean-Dead Sea project. The 210 leaders of the Jewish organization met with President Yitzhaq Navon this afternoon. [Text] [TA271622 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1600 GMT 27 Jan 83]

EASTERN EUROPE SUPPLY DEAL--("Astris"), a sister company of "Koor," will supply raw materials and unprocessed Israeli-made products to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. These will be trading deals rather than transactions paid for in cash. The payment will be in goods which will either be transferred to Israel or sold in West European countries. The deal with Hungary will be worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Israel will supply concentrated orange juice and raw materials for the medical industries. In exchange, the Hungarians are offering cotton wool, light bulbs and kosher alcohol. MA'ARIV learned about the deals from the director of ("Astris"), (Yosef Eisenbruk). ("Astris") is connected with the European group ("Ank") and deals with imports and exports of raw materials from Israel for the food and beverage industries. [Ben Zagenreich] [Text] [TA211405 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 21 Jan 83 p 2]

NEW HEBRON LEAGUE--Our correspondent Muhammad Nasiriyah reports that the board of directors of the Hebron village league decided at the emergency meeting it held this afternoon at the league offices in Hebron to expand the board from five to nine members and to elect Jamil Falah al-'Amlih as head of the league and Muhammad Dudin as his deputy. The board also decided to approve the decision of the head of the village league federation to dismiss Muhammad al-Nasir from his post as head of the Hebron village league and from the league. Jamil Falah al-'Amlih said the league would increase the scope of services it is providing to the citizens in the Hebron district, especially in the fields of water and electricity supply, schools, health clinics and roads. The new head of the Hebron village league added that the league will further cooperate with the civilian administration in the interest and welfare of the citizens. He said that the league would request the civilian administration head to expand the scope of family reunion in the Hebron district and submit applications for the establishment of new societies in Hebron, including a cooperative marketing society and a cooperative society for agricultural tools and services. [Text] [JN061818 Jerusalem Radio in Arabic to the Arab world 1530 GMT 6 Mar 83]

REFUGEE COMMUNITIES DISSOLVED--In the wake of PLO pressure, a Palestinian committee which acted for the refugees in southern Lebanon and supported relations with Israeli representatives has been dissolved. The Beirut paper AL-NAHAR reported that the decision was made at a meeting of the committee members in the 'Ayn al-Hulwah refugee camp. Our correspondent Yo'el Dar points out that various committee members had maintained close ties with IDF representatives in the Sidon area in order to solve refugee problems. [Text] [TA020624 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 2 Mar 83]

SHARON SECRET MEETINGS--At the end of the week preceding the release of the Kahan Commission's conclusions, between 3 to 5 February, the then defense minister, Ari'el Sharon left for secret meetings in Nigeria and Zaire. Sharon conducted talks with the leaders of these two countries with the aim of tightening their security links with Israel. In Zaire Sharon also met with another African leader from a country which does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel and is given to Libyan influence. This meeting too was intended to form ties with the leaders of that country and to promise them security aid. Prior to Sharon's trip a special ministerial consultation was held in Jerusalem to discuss the details and objectives of the secret trip. Sharon briefed the ministers that he was taking with him arms which would demonstrate to his interlocutors the aid Israel is capable of extending to them. Begin wondered in that meeting if such a demonstration was useful and Sharon's reply was: "In any case I am flying in an empty plane." As said, that was the last trip of Sharon in his position as defense minister. Incidentally, in the last cabinet meeting Sharon fell asleep while Moshe Arens, the new defense minister, surveyed Israeli-U.S. relations (Sharon did not even bother to congratulate Arens upon his assumption of office, as Shamir and Begin did). One of the ministers said on this: "I really justify the fact that Sharon fell fast asleep. In fact now, after he left the Defense Ministry, we all can afford this luxury, especially after we accumulated so many hours of sleeplessness as long as he was in charge of Israel's security." [Yisra'el Segal] [Text] [TA021717 Jerusalem KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 2 Mar 83 p 13]

IDF WAR EXPENDITURE--By the IDF's accounts on the cost of the peace for Galilee operation up until 31 March of this year, apparently the overall expenditure will reach 48.2 billion shekels. The main brunt of the expenses can be broken down as follows: ammunition--12.3 billion shekels; manpower and equipment operating hours--23.6 billion shekels; construction, transportation and winter equipment--3.4 billion shekels; fuel--1.5 billion shekels; food--1.1 billion shekels; and miscellaneous--6.3 billion shekels. Our correspondent Avi Gott adds that the foreign currency expenses for the procurement of items abroad are also included in this calculation. [Text] [TA271954 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1915 GMT 27 Jan 83]

EEC FRUIT EXPORTS ACCORD--The first agreement between Israel and the European Economic Community since the invasion of Lebanon last summer was signed here last week. The pact renewed a previous accord which grants a 30-percent reduction in import duties on Israeli canned fruit, in exchange for limitations on the quantity of such exports. The economic value of the agreement is slight, but it is considered important in light of the "boycott" imposed on Israel since June by EEC members, who resolved to freeze credit to it and not to engage in any negotiations for improvement in trade terms. [Text] [TA130924 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 13 Feb 83 p 3 TA]

GOLAN, HAIFA PLANNING COUNCILS--Jerusalem, 15 Feb (ITIM)--Interior Minister Dr Yosef Burg has established seven new local planning committees for the Golan Heights and the Haifa District. The three local planning councils for the Golan Heights are: Golan, Qazrin and Ma'ale Hahermon, which includes all the Druze villages on the Golan. The Interior Ministry spokesman who reported this notes that the establishment of the planning committees will greatly relieve the inhabitants in terms of administration, and will leave in the hands of the local inhabitants the authority to draw up blueprints and master plans, to control licensing and building supervision, as well as to control environmental protection. [Excerpts] [TA151442 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1420 GMT 15 Feb 83]

LA'AM FACTION--The Likud faction of La'am is joining the Herut movement and abolishing its independent framework. An agreement on this was reached last week between the faction's leaders under Health Minister Eli'ezer Shostak and Herut movement leaders. According to Prime Minister Menahem Begin's proposal, La'am's joining the Herut movement will be on the basis of the faction's present representation in the Likud Knesset faction (three Knesset members on the list of candidates with real chances of election) and this will also serve as the basis for representation in the next Knesset. La'am's three Knesset members are Shostak, Ehud Olmert and Yig'al Kohen-orgad. Herut and La'am representatives will soon discuss how many representatives La'am will have in the Herut center. [Text] [TA061341 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Feb 83 p 1]

JANUARY CONSUMER PRICE INDEX--Last month the consumer price index rose by 8.5 percent. Fruit and vegetable prices went up by 25 percent, while the other kinds of food rose by 8 percent. Housing and health services rose by more than 10 percent. The residential housing input index rose by 11.9 percent last month, reaching 8,911.35 points. [TA151904 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 15 Feb 83 TA]

ETHIOPIA TOURISM ENDORSED--There will be Israeli tourism to Ethiopia, as per an agreement [Sikum] brought home last night from Ethiopia by the heads of the Israeli "Ne'ot Hakikar" Travel Agency. The director general of the company, Moshe Sadir, told our correspondent this evening that his tour of that country, held for 2 weeks as the official guest of the Ethiopian Government tourist office, has shown him that this would be an important step toward resuming ties between Israel and Ethiopia. The agreement [Heskem] signed yesterday at the close of the Israeli delegation's visit to Ethiopia allows for free tourism of Israeli groups to Ethiopia beginning next month. [Text] [TA272022 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1915 GMT 27 Jan 83]

CSO: 4400/242

REALISTIC PLANNING, POLICIES STRESSED

Dhaka ITTEFAQ in Bengali 30 Jan 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Improvement of Lifestyles of the Masses and Reality"]

[Text] At the certificate awarding ceremony of Rapport (?) Bangladesh, the chief guest, Food Minister, Air Vice Marshall (Ret.) A G Mahmood, emphatically stated in his address the government's sincere efforts to improve the living condition of the masses. He said that everybody may or may not agree with the steps the government has taken, but the government is sincerely interested in improving the living condition of millions of suffering humanity. The food minister has once again reiterated the same old statements of government's good intentions and sincerity in improving the life of the people. The statement may not be new, but its veracity cannot be denied.

In a poor country such as ours there are many reasons for the lack of any accomplishment and failure in this respect in spite of good intentions and sincerity. To find its cause, history must be researched, and we must go deeper. After arriving at the final analysis, no one can help but admit that limitation of resources, lack of skills, absence of required infrastructure, faulty management, after effects of prolonged colonial rule are some among the many reasons which are responsible for this condition. It is true that the mere presence of desire to improve living condition cannot always bring the desired results; it requires proper planning and creation of adequate atmosphere. Absence or paucity of such conditions in our country is no less painful. We feel as before the people still have confidence in the government's good intentions and sincerity. However, the government would have to take steps to sustain the very important task of maintaining this confidence through its policies, ideologia and activities. The food minister himself only 2 days earlier in a speech had emphasized the importance of expert management for the fruitful completion of the 'Food For Works' program. It should be remembered that expert administration is extremely important to improve the living condition of the masses. Among many of our problems, this crisis of expert administration is no less serious.

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CSO: 4607/3

IMPORT POLICY TERMED INEFFECTIVE, QUESTIONED

Dhaka ITTEFAQ in Bengali 29 Jan 83 p 2

[Editorial: "Government Policy Versus Prices of Commodities"]

[Text] Substantial amount of import duty must be paid to import any item from overseas. For that reason, it is natural to assume that imported items would cost more than indigenous ones. But in reality the opposite is true in this country. In most cases, imported items cost less than indigenous ones. Last Thursday, in a news item published in ITTEFAQ it was stated that indigenous sugar was being sold at 12 taka per 'ser' [approximately-two pounds] at the ration shops and 13 taka in open market. On the other hand, imported sugar, even after paying high import duty, can be purchased at 11 taka per ser at the most. If this was limited to sugar or any other single item, we could have consoled ourselves that this was an exception. But it is true in case of almost all types of merchandise. And, for that very reason, the matter is very serious.

It is not unknown to anyone that in Bangladesh labor is cheaper than in other, industrialized countries. Raw materials are not expensive either. In addition, the government has been providing various protections to Country's industries by imposing tariff and other duties (on imports). Under these circumstances, naturally it is expected that indigenous industries would be able to supply their products to their customers at a comparatively lower price. The sad failure of indigenous industries in this respect is the result of incompetence and lack of management skills. In addition, industrial policy that is being followed by the administration is no less responsible. The sole objective of establishing factories in the country and providing facilities for their development is not to create merely a few industrialists. Its main objective is to guarantee a supply of various products at a low, competitive prices to the consumers. It cannot be denied that imposition of import restrictions on foreign goods and at the same time granting of protectionist privileges to our own goods have created a monopoly for indigenous industries. We feel that the government's protectionist policy is mainly responsible for the inability to develop proper management skills in our factories even after a decade. If this policy is changed, and if these industries are allowed to compete with foreign industries in the open market, it can be predicted without any doubt that in the interest of their own survival they would try to develop their skills and expertise

in their respective fields. We also think that any policy should be formulated by keeping the interests of consumer in consideration, and for this purpose all protectionist and other special steps that have been adopted to restrict imports should be abolished; and indigenous industries should be provided with opportunities to compete with foreign merchandise by means of unrestricted imports. In this way, on the one hand the price of merchandise will normalize, and on the other hand consumers would not have to become victims of any monopoly and pay excessive price for the items they buy.

12195

CSO: 4607/4

MINISTER TELLS PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION IN BANGLADESH

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 1, 2 Feb 83

[Speech by Minister of Education, Religious Affairs, Sports and Cultural Affairs Majid Khan; date and place not given]

[1 Feb 83 p 3]

[Text]

The following is the English rendering of the Education Minister's address :

Assalamualaikum,
Dear countrymen

You know there had been lot of discussion, debate and research during the last 25 years to formulate the country's education system in accordance with the needs and requirements of the nation. A number of commissions were set up. Various facts and information were collected through them and reports compiled. But the efforts to build up an active and skilled youth force with moral and social awareness have not been implemented through education. Wastage and corruption of different types had spread in all stages of education. The number of students in different stages of education has gone up too high compared to the past as a result of social demands and population increase. But in the absence of accessaries and equipment and because of corruption, the present education has become merely a certificate-based (system) or in other words a substanceless formality. The facts which came to the government as a result of enquiries and research during the last seven to eight months are really deplorable. These are for example :

1) Only 56 per cent of the boys and girls of primary school age get themselves admitted. Out of them only 60 per cent leave the schools before being

promoted to class II and only 20 per cent reach up to class V.

A more deplorable reality is that the number of students admitted to primary schools in 1981 was less by 12 per cent compared to the number of 1978 despite the usual growth of population. Out of the government's total expenditure incurred on primary education, only 20 per cent become useful in achieving the objective and the remaining amount go waste. This expenditure would have been more effective in achieving the goal of national literacy had there been proper management, social awareness and initiative of the primary teachers.

The government has ensured a sense of security among the primary teachers by taking over the responsibility of paying salary to them. But due to corruption many teachers do not get their salary and hence they do not give proper attention to their schools. In many schools one will find the salary register only. As a result, there is a fear of reduction in the real primary education.

Scholarships are given to students of different regions on the basis of their results in the primary and lower secondary examinations. In the hope of getting these scholarships, children from the cities appear in the scholarship examinations from the village schools. As a result, the students from the

rural areas are deprived of their legitimate dues. Many of you know that the government at present had been making a survey of the primary schools to gather information about them. Side by side with this survey, some organisational steps are also being taken.

New mathematics was introduced in the primary and lower secondary classes in 1978 following the recommendations of the Kudrat-e-Khuda Commission. But due to lack of proper training facilities of the teachers, study of mathematics was about to be stopped in these classes during the last four years. Basically, there was no system of prior evaluation

of text books and training of teachers on the basis. The government has now introduced a system of prior evaluation of text books and training of teachers. Steps have already been taken to impart training to seven thousand secondary school teachers each for English, Bengali and science subjects of class nine and ten.

During the last six years preparations were going on to introduce science curriculum from class nine. When we wanted to implement this we found that (1) Book was not written, so prior evaluation was also not done. Teachers were also not trained and of course, the book was not printed. (2) Besides, equipment for imparting practical science education was not collected and they were not sent to the schools. Basically, these materials are not produced in the country. On the other hand there is an Education Equipment Board in operation under the Ministry. Foreign assistance was taken for the project. If equipment are imported from abroad with that assistance, some indentors and employees will be benefited and not the country.

Since there is no scope for technical or vocational education at the secondary level lakhs of boys and girls who leave or are compelled to leave schools before appearing at the SSC examination, either increase the rate of unemployment in the villages or make futile exercise to secure a job by going to cities and there by becoming victims of various corrupt practices.

On the otherhand, as the procurement of certificates is the prime objective of the present education, extensive use of note books is made and ser-

VICES of private tutors are utilised for procuring certificates without quality but by adopting unfair means at the examination centre. Even then, out of nearly three and a-half lakh SSC examinees, the number of successful candidates stands between one lakh 25 thousand and one lakh fifty thousand. The two lakh unsuccessful candidates and another 40 to 50 thousand students, who after passing the SSC cannot take higher education for various reasons. Increase the number of educated unemployed youth in the country. It is not possible for the government, national organisations and non-government establishments to absorb so many people with such qualifications every year.

During the current year, the government has fixed the rate of fees for SSC and HSC examinations and made publicised it several times through newspapers. Despite this, reports were published in newspapers about collection of extra money from various schools or centres. On enquiry, it was revealed that unwritten agreements to provide facilities for adopting unfair means in the examination, and other fees like for coaching which is beyond the amount fixed by the government, were the reasons behind the collection of additional money. Examination centres have been opened indiscriminately through various movements with a view to providing facilities for adopting unfair means in the examination halls. Many students also change centres to avail themselves of the facilities of copying. At the secondary level, 95 per cent education are entrusted with the non-government schools. Its number will be nearly 12 thousand comprising schools, colleges and madrasahs. The government is carrying out a survey these institutions to take appropriate steps on them. We have appointed nearly six hundred HCC passed brilliant students for carrying out this survey. To help them, another 75 college students were appointed.

From SSC examination usually it takes two years to begin university education or other higher education of that level, but experiences of the last few years have shown that it takes three to four years. Out of this, the period

of study in the HSC classes in 14 to 15 months while the rest of the time is spent on various reasons many students become victims of corrupt practices and chaos during this long idle and meaningless time. It was known from the experience of a student of polytechnic that he passed his SSC in 1977. After that, he tried to get admission into polytechnic and through that effort he passed HSC in 1979 but he secured admission into polytechnic the same year.

But before classes resumed in the polytechnic institute; he got himself admitted in to the B.Sc. (Honours) in a college when he was appearing at the B.Sc. subsidiary examination; classes in the polytechnic began and he started attending the classes. Now he reads in the first year of polytechnic. He hopes to get the polytechnic diploma in 1985 if no accident takes place; to his lot. It is his own version that his father fails to understand why he has been reading in the first year for the last seven years. If looked from the point of view of the nation and society; the boy who was scheduled to pass from the polytechnic in 1980; he could have contributed through his own income at least 50 to 70 thousand Taka in five years till 1985. In the present situation his family has to spend at least 30 to 35 thousand Taka more for him. In this way many families are becoming penniless by selling lands, bullocks and various other properties.

According to a survey of 1981; 40 per cent of the students with education for 12 years and above and numbering 42 lakh are unemployed. Every year the number of educated unemployed is on increase. A few of them try to avoid the horrors of unemployment by getting admitted to new and newer courses after passing B.A or M.A. But by this the pecuniary pressure on their families remains all the same.

The technical and engineering institutions; that were opened in the country during the last two decades have turned into class-room centred text books and note books oriented like the other schools and colleges. Equipment worth lakhs of Taka remains unused or inoperative. As a result the students of these institutions could not achieve due qualifications. They failed to popularise the

attributes of technical education and create an image for it. Being victimized by corruption and mismanagement, four engineering colleges of Bangladesh were closed in 1980-81. These colleges, though they did not possess administrative ability and management demanded autonomy through movements and strikes. If the autonomy would have been granted, the colleges could have been closed by this time. Still many equipment of these colleges remained unrepaired and unused, on the

other hand, the number of engineering and technically educated persons is still limited causing serious hindrances in our potentials for industrial development. There are only 30 000 engineers or scientists and one lakh skilled workers in the country. There are only 4 scientists, technicians and skilled workers for every ten thousand people in our country. In the South and South-East Asian countries, the number of people in this category is 20 per ten thousand population.

[2 Feb 83 p 3]

[Text]

The following is the remaining part of English rendering of the Education Minister's address creeded by BSS.

The results of the B.Sc. and B.Com examinations of the Dhaka University have been published where the percentage of successful candidates are 14.7 and 10.6 respectively. No examinees of 40 colleges have come out successful in terms of number, out of the nine thousand students only 1111 have passed. The aims of the unsuccessful candidates as the sacrifices of their parents are about to be frustrated. The timing of this examination was in the April-May of the 1982 and the results were to be published in the month of August-September. The examinations of the Rajshahi University for 1982 are being held at present. In the past, the examination of 1977 was held in 1980 and the examination of 1978 was held in 1981.

Besides, the universities, 32 colleges of the country offer honours courses though many of them have inadequate facilities. Still the percentage of pass in honours classes is higher than in the pass-courses. Because, the students of pass courses are required to take Bengali and English as compulsory subjects which are not necessary for honours courses. Many students fail to pass in these subjects because lack of efficient teachers. From these limited examples, it is very clear that if the present system or the mal system of education continues the progress of the country will be simply impossible. On the

other hand, it will be impossible to continue the existence of the country. So, the present Government wanted to change the present system of education.

Following are the three main objectives of the reformed system of education: (1) expansion of literacy among the people of the country—in the first phase, five-year basic education for all and in the next phase, objectives have been fixed to make universal the preparatory education upto eight years. In the present plan, 50 per cent children between 10 and 11 years will be given primary education within the next five years, (2) provisions for technical and various engineering education side by side with the secondary stage of education and (3) scope for formal education in case of necessity and will of the students at any period of age. The formal education will be possible through mass media also.

The proposed education system will have four stage—primary, preparatory, secondary and higher education. Stress will be given on moral and religious values, aesthetic sense, and on nationalism through stories in the primary stage. It was learnt from direct enquiry that almost all the Muslim children learn Arabic in the maktabas or by engaging maulvi in their houses before going to school. Many of them cannot avail themselves of the opportunity because of economic constraints.

A proposal has been taken to impart lessons on Arabic alphabet to Muslim children

under Governmental Arrangement. Arrangements will also be made for non-Muslim children to impart religious education, according to their wishes in Sanskrit or Pali in lieu of Arabic. The next stage is the preparatory stage—from class six to class eight. At this stage, the children will be encouraged to prepare individual and collective plans and also to get themselves acquainted with the production process and various professions of local economy. Besides, pre-vocational technical and other trades will be introduced. In the next stage of the preparatory stage, the students will either straightway qualify for a general secondary school certificate of a two-year secondary course or they will take up vocational training course with a duration of six months to two years. This vocational training and approved job experience or apprenticeship will be recognised for higher education.

After 10 years of learning, the successful students of the final examination in the tenth class, will receive two-year long higher secondary certificates on various subjects or a three-year diploma. The subjects are:—1) Humanities and Science, 2) Technical higher secondary, 3) Pre-university qualification on General and Technical subjects, 4) Higher secondary course on business and office management, 5) Higher secondary on nursing, 6) Primary teachers training, 7) Higher secondary course on agriculture, 8) Leather technology, 9) Diploma on printing and graphic, (three years), 10) Polytechnic diploma (three years).

After acquiring requisite qualification on these subjects, the students will be able to receive higher education suiting to their needs and get education according to their competence. Under the new education system there will be five courses in the proposed post primary stage: 1) Fulltime general academic education course, 2) Profession-oriented special education course such as medical or engineering, 3) Attaining vocational and technical efficiency, sand-

with academic education and industry or industrial experience, 4) Part time school and course for attaining vocational skill along with part time job, 5) Course for school leavers (from class six to nine). There will be close coordination with the above mentioned sandwich course or vocational course with the industry. In the past these courses were school based and emphasis was on class room practice.

The characteristic of the proposed education policy are to rearrange the education system in the light of the socio-economic and industrial development of the country. Vocational and technical education will be deeply involved with the production system and realistic professions. The Government will set up industries for production and supply of educational appliances and equipment. These industries will provide training to the students during the study period and later on create employment opportunities for them. The industries to be set up with the schools will produce school dress and utensils and manufacture different leather and house building items.

Besides vocational courses in coordination with part time jobs will be introduced in selected higher secondary school. A number of technical schools will also be opened in the higher secondary level. These factory attached academic institutions will in time help the country's industrial development process.

The synchronisation of the academic standard throughout the country was a difficult problem. Without solving this problem the overall development of the education system of the country was not possible. In the present day world education is fast changing. The new trends in the education system should be reached to the teaching community. That is why a large-scale programme has been drawn for 'distance teaching'. Under this programme primary teachers in the far flung areas of the country will be able to keep themselves in touch with the modern trends of education and the newly evolved techniques of education system through newspapers, post, radio

and television. Besides, the distance teaching will also help in imparting language course to higher secondary level teachers and improving their standard of teaching.

I want to emphasise on one thing before you: that is, the proposal for reorganisation of education system was not the outcome of any individual thinking. It will grow on the basis of the thinking of the people from all walks of life of the country. The education system has to be developed keeping in pace with the feeling and trends of the nation and in the interest of the country.

The considered suggestions of the concerned people in different fields will be there in the formulation of this education policy. It is really deplorable that some section of the country's student community without being well acquainted with the proposed outlines and arrangement of the education policy have been expressing opposing views. We are very eager to hold discussion and exchange views with them. I have gone to almost all universities and held discussions with the teachers and students, both formally and informally. Even this week I have come back after

holding discussions with the teachers and many students of two leading colleges of northern region—Bogra Azizul Haq College and Ranapur Charni-chael College University.

At present a questionnaire has been formulated and printed to receive the active opinion and advice of people of all walks of life. The questionnaire had identified the defects of our present education system and given indication of a realistic solution. It is necessary to have the support and cooperation of the countrymen and the directly concerned sections before taking a decision on a highly important subject like education.

The questionnaire will be available in the Education Ministry and the National Institute of Educational Administration extension and research in Dhaka and also at the district, sub-division and thana education offices. Answers to the questionnaire will be received till 14th of February and I hope that every body will take this opportunity and participate in the solution of the problem of national education.

Khoda Hafez Bangladesh
Zindabad.

CSO: 4600/1752

INVESTMENT IN RURAL AREAS URGED

Dhaka DAINIK BANGLA in Bengali 31 Jan 83 p 5

[Editorial: "Investment Responsibilities in Rural Areas"]

[Text] In our country economic activities are mainly concentrated in urban areas. There has been very little investment in rural areas. Ultimately the nation's wealth becomes concentrated in the cities; people in the rural areas get very little benefit--village economics and the populace do not move at the same pace and, as a result, disparity continues to increase.

Mr Muhit, Minister of Finance and Planning, has stated that because of this dual economic policy, our national development is being hampered. He commented that in order to thwart this dual economic policy, a large capital investment in rural areas is needed.

There is no doubt that city-centered development and modernization program are responsible for this condition. It should be proper to describe this program as 'limited area centered program' instead of city-centered, because if development and modernization programs were carried out on a wide area basis, such serious discrepancies between rural areas and cities would not have become so prominent. The conflict between modern and antiquated economic policies would not have become so evident at every step. However, this condition can be brought to an end if the recently adopted rural development program is carried out with discretion. In this regard, the large capital investment which the minister spoke about should most certainly be considered.

However, right now, considering the state of capital investment in the cities, it is not easy to imagine that the status of such investment in the rural areas would be favorable. It is natural to expect that in these times of depression it would be comparatively difficult to encourage capital investment in rural areas. Nevertheless, in times of need, efforts must be made to complete even the most difficult task. The first step toward encouraging capital investment in villages would be to make rural areas habitable. The second step would be the improvement of communication between the cities and villages. If the villages appear to be isolated islands away from civilization, there could not be any inspiration to start permanent economic activity in the rural areas. Those who have the ability to make large capital investments are virtually urbanites. To make capital investment in rural areas attractive to them certain appropriate steps must be taken.

Anyway, however, the government probably would have to undertake the primary responsibility for investing capital in the rural areas. Once (official), economic activities get started in the rural areas, other (investors) would not hesitate to come forward.

DETAILS OF TEHRAN'S ARMS PROCUREMENT REVEALED

Paris LIBERATION in French 7 Feb 83 p 13

[Article by Jose Garcon]

[Text] Khomeyni has no trouble getting the arms he needs for his war with Iraq. Ever since the hostage business was settled, Italians, Germans, British, Swiss, Israelis, and even a few American companies have been supplying the Iranian army. Just one more way to cope with a recession.

On 25 July 1981 an Argentine aircraft was shot down over Soviet territory. Aboard it were 360 tons of spare parts for M-68 tanks and American-made ammunition. The aircraft was on a milk-run between Cyprus and Iran; one of the many circuits on which Israel supplies war materiel to Khomeyni. Now better than 2 years old, the Iran-Iraq war amounts to a gold mine for arms dealers the world over. While France's support for Iraq is an open secret-- Paris is readying 29 Mirage F-1s for delivery and is considering Iraq's request for five Super Etendard equipped with Exocets -- Iran's suppliers in the West are considerably more discreet. Practically speaking, it is no easy matter to hurl anathemas and compound one's moral denunciations of the "religious fanatics" in Teheran while merrily supplying them with arms and ammunition. Whether through official state-to-state contracts or through numerous intermediaries, Khomeyni has no problems in obtaining the materiel he needs to pursue his war. And he can do it, despite the fact that Iran has yet to find a way around the impact of the cutoff in American military aid, particularly with regard to its air force.

In the initial months of the conflict that started in 1980, Iran made use of the American aircraft it already had on hand. Surface weapons were supplied principally by the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries, and by the two Arab members of the "Firmness Front" -- Syria and Libya.

Soviet Aid Flowing Through Korea

When Khomeyni rose to power, the Soviet Union had already fulfilled 60 percent of a billion-dollar arms contract sealed with the shah in 1971. Moscow perceived, in continued deliveries under that contract, a way to increase its influence in Teheran and to bring pressure to bear on the new Islamic regime. Beginning in October 1980, the Soviets accordingly shipped trucks, jeeps, Kalashnikovs, SAS and SAM missiles, and spare parts for Russian guns already delivered to the shah... and even sent kerosene for aircraft fuel.

In the fall of 1981 and again in March 1982, on the eve of "Victory and "Holy City," the Soviets made more deliveries. But Moscow resumed shipments of war materiel to Iraq at the same time, and Iranian-Soviet relations deteriorated as a result. This, however, did not mean a total cutoff of Soviet deliveries to Iran. What the Soviets did was to resort to the "laundry" circuits, and through them shipped -- via North Korea -- American-made weapons captured by the Vietnamese. Materiel from the Warsaw Pact countries also filtered through Syria and South Yemen.

Soft-Pedalling the Hostage Crisis

We shall not dwell, though, on the enormous amounts of aid that everybody knew about, which was shipped from Tripoli and Damascus to Teheran, depending upon how well such shipments fit with certain ideological and strategic concerns, among them bringing down the "honni" regime of Saddam Hussein. The Westerners, who had other motivation, would benefit greatly by Teheran's decision to diversify its suppliers in the spring of 1981.

And France, which was backing Iraq, was clearly not in the least reluctant to remind Iran of all that western aid, as a device for warding off charges that it was nothing more than a "cannon-monger."

Theoretically, the United States sells no arms to Iran directly -- the hostage thing prohibits it. And that applies even if the Iranians did try to alter the situation by sending a secret military mission to Washington in December 1981. Yet, although sales to Iran are still officially banned, American companies do not hesitate to send it arms through third countries, using false declarations as to the final destination of their shipments. American Motors, for instance, shipped 26 jeeps to Khomeyni, but certified that they were bound for Singapore! People are more forthright in Western Europe. Beginning with Italy which, in February 1981, lifted its embargo against Iran and resumed delivery of spare parts for Augusta Bell helicopters and sold 50 Chinook CH-470 helicopters, manufactured under license from Boeing. Italian aid, though, goes primarily to the Iranian navy: Italian advisers in Iran, trainees from Iran in Leghorn, sales of coastal

radar systems and electronic countermeasure devices. Combat-tante patrol boats procured in France are equipped with Italian-built Oto Melara cannon. Not to mention the 150 Sea-Killer missiles supplied to Iran and delivered via Libya and Turkey. Italy is also one of the roundhouses for the free market in arms: Iran made good use of the network maintained by Syrian arms dealer Henri Arsan, which was broken up a few months ago by the Italian police, and implicated in their investigation of the attempt on the pope's life...

As for Germany, it officially sells no arms to Iran...except for some jeeps and 3,000 Mercedes trucks! And Messerschmidt reportedly offered to deliver several MB-105 helicopters. A number of private transactions are also under way, in which the main man is none other than Mr Tabataba'i, Khomeyni's close adviser, who was arrested several weeks ago in the FRG for opium trafficking.

London to Teheran via Madrid

And as to the government of his gracious majesty, it is one of Iran's long-time suppliers. The moment the hostage business was settled, London concluded an agreement with Teheran to maintain and supply engines and spare parts for British-built, Iranian-owned Chieftain and Scorpion tanks. The British advertise this understanding as a way to "balance" a similar contract they have with Iraq to repair Chieftain tanks captured by Baghdad at the start of the war. Great Britain is currently busy trying to peddle some 50 or so Westland MX-3 Lynx helicopters. Its arms manufacturers route their shipments primarily through Spain, which has become one of the busiest arms transit depots for shipments bound for Iran. In October 1980, Madrid gave permission to British Leyland's Spanish subsidiary to supply Land Rovers to Teheran. These vehicles were shipped as parts to the Soviet Union and assembled in the Iranian city of Tabriz...in the Leyland plants there. The Spanish seem particularly taken with the Land Rover, since the Santana plant has signed a contract with Iran for \$53.8 million for delivery of 12,000 of these vehicles built under American license.

Switzerland, the busiest rendezvous point for unofficial meetings between Iranians and arms dealers, has found a way to ship Oerlikon guns via Singapore to the Iranian DCA. The Herstal plants in Belgium supply Teheran with G-3 assault rifles, thanks largely to the friendly services of Italian neofascist Stefano Della Chiesa, himself involved in the fascist murders in Italy of recent years. Countries like Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, or Greece act primarily as transit countries.

Sharon in Bucharest

Nowhere near so much trouble is taken by Israel, the size of whose deliveries to Khomeyni is no longer in doubt: 107mm recoilless rifles, artillery ammunition, airborne rockets, Hawk missiles,

electronic equipment, aircraft tires, and spare parts. Most deliveries are routed through London, Rome, and Frankfurt, and Iran credits Israeli accounts in hard currencies in Swiss banks.

The goal for Israel is to maintain the close ties it had under the shah between the Israeli and Iranian armed forces, to weaken Iraq, and to prolong a conflict which splits the Arab-Islamic world. So much the better if that also enables it to discredit Khomeyni by showing how very relative his anti-Israeli propaganda is! The fact remains that these deliveries do not take place without close consultation with the United States: Last October, Mosha Arens, Israeli ambassador to Washington, himself referred to contacts "at almost the highest level." Americans and Israelis alike, however, tend to play down the dimensions of arms supplies to Iran and Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon talked in May 1982 of \$27 million, whereas deliveries in the autumn of 1980 alone have been estimated at \$200 million. Some Israeli shipments have transited Rumania, which General Sharon visited last June in total secrecy. Since there is no such thing as a small profit, there seems to have been an understanding reached last August between Jerusalem and Teheran through the Geneva-based Dreikot company: this would reportedly have enabled Teheran to get arms from the PLO and Syrian supplies seized by the Israelis in Lebanon... Value of the contract: \$50 million, paid in Iranian crude oil. Lastly, Japan has just delivered 500 armored light trucks for use by the Revolutionary Guard.

All this goes to show that, despite their discretion, the western countries, once the hostages were freed, have pounced on the Iranian arms market. Another interesting point is the United States' broader "opening" toward Iran: Americans and westerners in general are taking care to supply enough arms to Iran to keep it from growing too dependent on the Eastern bloc, but not enough to let it win a victory over Saddam Hussein. And of course, this policy has the additional advantage of bringing in anything but a negligible number of millions of dollars to their military industries. One way is as good as the next to cope with a recession.

6182

CSO: 4619/38

BAGHDAD'S DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE DESCRIBED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 9 Feb 83 p 3

[Text] Iraq yesterday unleashed a major diplomatic counteroffensive aimed at winning the support of the Arab nations, in the wake of Sunday night's new Iranian offensive, which Baghdad claims to have repulsed.

On the ground, 24 hours after the Iranian forces attacked in the Missan region (300 kilometers southwest of Baghdad) , Monday night seems to have been relatively calm. No military communique was issued yesterday by either of the belligerents to clarify the situation.

According to the latest communique issued on Monday by the Iranians, the Sunday attack enabled the "warriors for Islam" to regain control of 250 square kilometers of Iranian and Iraqi territory which had been held by Baghdad's forces since the beginning of the war. Comment in the official press in Teheran, however, yesterday underscored the point that Sunday's attack was only "a first step toward the liberation of Iraqi territory," and the biggest operation ever launched in the course of this war."

Iraqi communiques confirmed that "the enemy has not yet been able to set foot on Iraqi soil," adding that the Iranians had sustained 7,000 fatalities.

One thing is certain: in Baghdad as well as in Teheran, "there is agreement that Sunday's battle may well be decisive to the outcome of the conflict," which has now raged for 29 months.

At the diplomatic level, Baghdad is seeking now to rally support from its traditional Arab allies, including financial and logistical support from Saudi Arabia and Jordan: on Monday evening, the Iraqi news agency, INA, reported telephone communications with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hussein of Jordan, and even with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

Some Modest Proposals

In Ryadh, a joint communique published at the conclusion of a visit to Saudi Arabia by the president of North Yemen -- a country from which thousands of citizens have gone to fight side by side with the Iraqis -- calls on Iran to cease its aggression.

Baghdad authorities followed suit with a call to Arab nations and pan-Arab organizations to honor their commitments to Iraq.

Observers in the Gulf region meanwhile commented on the relative moderation of the proposals by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Aziz. While he did cite the resolutions adopted at the Arab summit conference at Fez last September, which underscored the point that any aggression against an Arab country would be considered an attack on the whole Arab nation, he did not refer to the Arab League's common defense pact which calls for application of military measures in such cases. (AFP, Reuter)

The secretary-general of Iran's communist Tudeh Party, Nureddin Kianouri, has been arrested along with members of the central committee on charges of spying for the Soviet Union, official Iranian sources announced.

This step bears witness to the deterioration in relations between Iran and the Soviet Union. Under Kianouri's leadership, the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party endorsed the ayatollah Khomeyni's policies ever since the Islamic revolution of February 1979.

6182

CSO: 4619/38

TACTICS OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM VIEWED

Tehran SALEHAN-E SAZANDEH in Persian 25 Jan 83 p 6

[Text] A few days ago, Leonid Brezhnev, who had held the sensitive position of leader of the Soviet Union since the time of Joseph Stalin, the dictator of that country, passed away as the result of a heart attack. The death of Brezhnev and the coming to power of Yuri Andropov, the former head of the Soviet spy and intelligence organization (KGB), who had a major role in suppressing the uprising of the people of Hungary in 1956, once again attracted the attention of the world to the Eastern bloc and raised the question in the public mind: What will the Soviet Union do without Brezhnev? If we look at how the Communists came to power in Russia and other Communist countries in the world and also study the changes in the Eastern bloc since the new leaders of the Kremlin came to power, we will see that the coming to power of new faces has always brought with it other changes as well. With the death of Lenin and the coming to power of Stalin, the use of political police, mass arrests and massacres, which ultimately resulted in the military aggression on neighboring countries, including Poland, became common. Stalin, who was after conquests and had not yet given up the expansionism of the Red army, reached an agreement with Hitler over Poland in World War II. During the first days of the fall of the Third Reich, he began to lean towards the West. In the talks with the leaders of England and the United States in the Tehran and Potsdam conferences, he proposed the issue of dividing the world. By the end of World War II, the United States had taken Western Europe under its domination and created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Soviet Union also took over the Eastern European countries, including Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, and created the Warsaw Pact to preserve them. From this time, it became clear that despite their propaganda, the Soviets, who call themselves the protectors of the masses and the workers, oppose the oppressed nations and are awaiting an opportunity to bring them under their own domination under the pretext of socialism by using the imperialistic method, which is the military takeover of countries. With the death of Stalin and the coming to power of

Khrushchev, changes were made in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the policy of peaceful coexistence was pursued. After Khrushchev was set aside and Brezhnev came to power, once again the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union resumed in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East and suppressive actions became common. In 1968, an uprising began in Czechoslovakia in which the people demanded such things as social justice and political freedom, which were suspended as a result of the invasion of the Red army and the massacre of the people. In 1970, an uprising by the people of Poland began which was also pursued in 1976 and 1980. Finally, last year, with the coming to power of the military under the leadership of General Jaruzelski, the slaughters began again and tanks appeared in the streets. During the period that Brezhnev was in power, Muslim Afghanistan was faced with the attack of the Soviet Red army, the massacres and slaughters of which still continue, Vietnam attacked Cambodia at the provocation of the Soviet Union and took over that country and in Eritrea, Muslims have been and are being massacred. Of course, it is interesting to note that all these slaughters and massacres have taken place in the name of socialism and, according to the Soviets, to protect the people. The Soviets also supported the Pahlavi rule and have been the most important supporters of Iraq in terms of arms during the imposed war. The death of Brezhnev and the coming to power of Yuri Andropov, who was the head of the criminal and frightful KGB, may show the new tendency of the Soviets to use military power and suppression. In other words, the presence of the aggressive Red army forces in Muslim Afghanistan still continues, the military still continues its suppression in Poland by relying on its military might and the arms race between the East and the West will be pursued most ardently and strongly.

What might attract the attention of the public in regards to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union since 1917 is its imperialist, expansionist policy in the Third World and its being in line with the United States in regards to bringing the masses under domination. This relationship, despite the rise [and fall] in Kremlin leadership, has been stable, showing little escalation or weakness. Although the imperialist policy of the Soviet Union ultimately reached the same point as that of the United States, the two countries also have their differences. The Soviet Union, in contrast with the United States, has a substitute ideology called Marxism, which it uses to metamorphose the masses. The Eastern imperialists have always used the tortoise method, which is to say, a slow movement, and after coming to power, defend their throne and crown with all their might. Here, it would be better to refer to the Brezhnev doctrine. He believed that if the Red flag is raised in a country, all efforts must be made to keep it flying and not to allow it to fall. Hence, thus far, we have not witnessed any Communist country being destroyed or its regime being changed, because any movement is violently

suppressed. Another difference between the United States and the Soviet Union is the kind of weapon used by each. Because of its vast economic capacity, the United States mostly uses the economic weapon, whereas, the Soviets have relied on military power to maintain their domination and have used the so-called iron arm. But, ultimately, the two poles of world power move in the same direction, which is to colonialize the nations of the world under various pretexts.

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CSO: 4640/118

ARTICLE DETAILS SOVIET QUAGMIRE IN AFGHANISTAN

Tehran JAHAD in Persian No 45,29 Dec 82 pp 58-59

[Text] During the presence of the Soviets in Afghanistan, not only has the Soviet Union been unable to quell the rebellions in Afghanistan, but, every day, it has faced a large number of them.

The failure of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the signs of which are now clearly undeniable, will, in the long term, become a decidedly inescapable issue.

Socialist Russia has now realized full well that the military invasion of the oppressed Afghan country has brought and will bring about nothing but failure for them and heroism and glory for the Afghan fighters.

We are approaching the fourth year since the unrelenting struggles of the Muslim Afghan people began. In the fourth year of the shameless aggression of the heathen forces in Afghanistan, we are witnessing a movement wherein Eastern and Western imperialism resort to any means to break apart this history making resistance. The passage of time and the course of events in Afghanistan clarify this reality even more for the superpowers every day that the Islamic reformist uprisings and movements of the Muslims in the farthest reaches of the world advance undefeatably and with more strength towards increasingly deep and broad expansion and stability. Socialist Russia has realized full well that the military aggression against the oppressed Afghan country has brought and will bring about nothing but defeat for them and heroism and glory for the Afghan strugglers. The truth is that the Soviet Union, after many coup d'etats and finally the replacement with Babrak Karmal, this enslaved pawn, imagined that the Muslim Afghan strugglers would not be able to put up resistance against their aggressive army and that they either will be forced to accept defeat or prepare themselves for

compromise. But, the history of the Islamic movement demonstrates otherwise. The bloody struggles of the Afghan strugglers have a very long history which indicates another reality. The reports from inside Afghanistan indicate the escalation of the strugglers' actions and their many successes. The regime has pressured the people through the force of bayonets and resorting to tactics of fear, terror and violence. Now that we are at the onset of the fourth year of the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan, it would not be inappropriate to see what the new policy of that country will be towards Afghanistan after the death of Brezhnev and the coming to power of Andropov.

Since the death of Brezhnev and the selection of Yuri Andropov, the former chief of the "KGB" (the Soviet intelligence organization), as the secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party, the opinions of a number of high ranking European and Asian officials as well as the recent decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, are proof of a probable change of positions by the Soviet Union in regards to the Afghanistan issue.

In this connection, the following examples will suffice:

16 November 1982, BBC Radio

The British deputy foreign minister said: "The Soviet Union must be given the opportunity to withdraw from Afghanistan without hesitation. (He) explained the indirect talks between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan through the United Nations as a step in this direction."

16 November 1982, Radio Cologne

Helmut Kohl (the West German chancellor) requested an immediate meeting between president Reagan and the head of the Party and high head of the Soviet Union, Andropov.

"It seems that the Soviet intelligence organization had frequently warned Leonid Brezhnev . . . against a military expedition in Afghanistan."

Zia-ul-Haq, the president of Pakistan, said in an interview in the FINANCIAL TIMES, published on 30 November 1982:

"Yuri Andropov, the new secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party, has told him that the Soviet Union wishes to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan."

Zia-ul-Haq added: Andropov made this statement in a visit during the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev, the former Soviet leader.

Pakistan's military leader added in this interview that in his opinion, with the coming to power of Andropov, a new closeness and some degree of flexibility can be expected.

Zia-ul-Haq also said: The negotiations can begin on the assumption that the Soviet Union wishes to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. In any case, it must not be forgotten that the Soviet Union is a superpower; why should we not trust its promise? In short: "The General Assembly of the United Nations in a resolution on 30 November 1982, with a majority of 114 votes in favor, 21 against and 13 abstentions, called for the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the peaceful solution to the problem with consideration for the rights of the people of Afghanistan in regards to autonomy and total independence and the continuation of the mediation of the United Nations."

Based on the above, can it be deduced that the new Soviet leadership, despite declaring that it will faithfully follow Brezhnev's foreign policy, may try to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan?

Certainly, a precise answer cannot be given at the present time. But, analyzing the Soviet position in Afghanistan, new possibilities may be opened.

When on 27 December 1979, the Soviet Union sent 50,000 of its fully equipped military forces to Afghanistan, it was said that in addition to gaining the resources and mines of Afghanistan (Afghanistan has natural gas, oil stone, iron and chromium and many of these resources can be exploited), the Soviet Union had taken a great leap towards achieving its plan to reach the warm waters of the Indian Ocean, which has been its hope for more than 100 years.

It had been analyzed that with the military occupation of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had arrived behind the borders of Baluchestan, Pakistan, which is no more than 400 km from the Indian Ocean and that, because of the activities of the Baluchestan Liberation Front, which is affiliated ideologically and financially with the Soviet Union, naturally, the way to the entry of that country to the warm waters has been somewhat paved. And . . . now, four years have passed since that period.

During this period, not only has the Soviet Union been unable to quell the rebellions in Afghanistan, but every day, it has confronted a larger volume of them. In fact, from the process that the Soviet Union has passed through in Afghanistan, we can conclude that the United States has benefitted from more than it has been harmed by the Afghanistan issue.

The reason is that U.S. policy during this period has been based on trying to force the Soviet Union into a most bloody battle by directly or indirectly supporting the armed Afghan groups to show, more than ever before, [Soviet] harshness to the Muslim nations all in its own interest.

In this manner, the United States, in addition to propagandizing Afghanistan as a Vietnam for the Soviet Union, increased the resistance against and consequently weakened the consolidation of the imposed Soviet rule for a long time. Also, the military expedition of the Soviet Union to Afghanistan was a useful excuse for the United States to increasingly arm the Persian Gulf countries, Pakistan and Turkey.

In addition to the above considerations, the United States thinks that the Afghanistan issue is an obstacle blocking Iran's inclination towards the Soviet Union, because the existing situation of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan is fundamentally contrary to the goals of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, it gives a major part of the credit for the anti-Eastern propaganda of Iran to the Afghanistan issue.

Furthermore, it cannot be denied that aside from the mingling of the goals of a number of so-called struggling Afghan groups with the representatives of U.S. imperialism, the authentic Islamic struggles of the nation of Afghanistan, which follow the example of the Islamic revolution of Iran, are being strengthened every day, moving towards independence and making the situation more difficult for the Soviets.

Similarly, the flight of nearly 4 million of the people of that country to Iran and Pakistan as well as the flight to foreign countries of many of the educated and expert Afghans who are badly needed by Afghanistan have placed that country in a crisis in terms of manpower and experts and has forced the regime to use Soviet experts, which adds to the anger of the people.

The flight of the young people from military service, on the one hand, and the soldiers and non-commissioned officers joining the guerrilla groups [on the other] have made the Karmal government highly dependent on the Soviet military forces, escalated its illegitimacy and . . .

Therefore, the lack of success on the part of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the time of Brezhnev was also not unknown to the politicians of that country and the dark future of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was becoming increasingly clear to the authorities of that country every day.

The failure of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the signs of which are undeniably clear, will become in the long term a

decidedly inescapable issue. The occurrence of this issue, that is, the decisive defeat of the Soviet forces, can be considered nothing less than tragic for that country.

Hence, the withdrawal of the military forces before it is too late instead of trying to find ways to make possible the political control of Afghanistan is a way to contain the military failure of the Soviet Union.

This containment will become increasingly secure once the Soviet Union takes steps to remove its forces from Afghanistan at the request of the United Nations, justifying this action in terms of the political considerations in Afghanistan, the region, the world and . . .

But, was the acceptance of this proposal not practical during Brezhnev's time?

No, because the aggression on Afghanistan was an offspring of Brezhnev's policy. If such a proposal had been followed during Brezhnev's time, it would, in fact, have been interpreted as nothing less than the defeat of a superpower through the resistance of a poor nation. Its acceptance by the Soviet Union would have been nothing less than to admit defeat and would have been contrary to the political and military prestige of the Soviet Union in world opinion.

But if such an occurrence were to take place during the time of Andropov with the justification that he was against Brezhnev's military expedition in Afghanistan from the beginning, it would be to the credit of the new leadership and would not signify the flight of the Soviet Union and the failure of its forces in Afghanistan.

Of course, the grounds for the preservation of the political presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan has been prepared to a certain extent and will be more prepared with the withdrawal of the military forces.

Which is to say that many of the economic projects, military contracts and political relations have been signed mainly with the Soviet Union and also, to a large extent, with the Eastern bloc countries which, on the whole, can be considered favorable channels for the indirect presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Also, it is natural that following the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the Babrak Karmal regime will be recognized by countries such as Pakistan and China, which will also support the Soviet political presence in Afghanistan.

From the point of view of the Soviet authorities, the withdrawal of the military forces will, on the one hand, probably cool the anti-Eastern policy of Iran and pave the way for more friendly ties, especially since Iran, as a result of the prestige it will gain in the region after the victory over Iraq, which naturally makes this country enjoy a stronger position in dealing with the Afghanistan issue, will be seriously considered by the Soviet Union. Therefore, gaining more agreement on the part of Iran is important to them. On the other hand, it will influence the decrease in the military arming of Pakistan by the United States which takes place under the pretext of the Soviet soldiers being in Afghanistan. And India, as a friendly country, will be released to a certain extent from the military policy of Pakistan.

Such an occurrence as the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan will influence the new Sino-Soviet relations. The importance of this issue, given the Soviet interest in expanding relations with China, cannot be ignored.

The point must also be made that the solution to the problem of Afghanistan in the style of the superpowers can facilitate dealing with the West over Poland.

Meaning that the West would give up its support of the internal events in Poland in exchange for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. At the same time, the point that the withdrawal of the Soviet military forces from Afghanistan may prevent the probable entry of the United States to the region is also interesting.

There is no doubt that the rulers in the Persian Gulf, despite their strong dependence on the United States, have no desire for the military presence of the United States followed by the provocation of the Soviet Union because they necessarily think that allowing the region to become part of a power struggle between the two superpowers will destabilize their own situation.

Also, the European countries do not want the grounds to be prepared for a confrontation between West and East, because in addition to the security of the Gulf being endangered, Europe would suffer a loss before the United States would. The frontline of these two powers is positioned in Europe and . . .

Hence, accepting to withdraw from Afghanistan, considering the inclinations of the region and Europe and, at the same time, the political and military position of the Soviet Union, which is presently in no position to confront the United States, can also serve to remove any excuse from the United States to enter the region. In any case, more than ever before, a change is evident in the Soviet position in regards to following the policy of military withdrawal from Afghanistan and consolidating political positions.

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CSO: 4640/105

FOREIGN MINISTER OPENS POLITICAL SCIENCES ACADEMY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Feb 83 p 3

[Speeches by Prime Minister Musavi-Khamene'i and Foreign Minister Velayati on 15 Feb 83 in Tehran on the occasion of the opening of the political sciences academy]

[Text] The political sciences academy affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was opened in ceremonies yesterday afternoon in the presence of Engineer Mir Hoseyn Musavi, the prime minister; Dr Velayati, the minister of foreign affairs; Ahmad 'Azizi, the deputy, and several other officials of this Ministry as well as Gudarz Eftekhari, a member of the Council of Guardians, the representative of the president and a number of other officials of the country in that academy.

In these ceremonies in which a group of students of this academy were also present, after recitation of some verses from the Koran, Dr Velayati said in a speech: In the past, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs operated in keeping with the characteristics of the previous regime and took steps to protect the interests of those who had the country under their control. It had no complicated issues to consider, since its course of action had already been predetermined.

He added: After the revolution, one of the organizations in need of grassroots change was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But, unfortunately, despite this need, it suffered an unpleasant fate and more than two years after the revolution, no change had taken place.

The minister of foreign affairs said: Some of Bani-Sadr's viewpoints in the imposition of his policy in this Ministry did not allow any correct course of action. Considering our ever increasing needs at the present time, we intend to develop our agencies in the Third World and Islamic countries. Such an

action, naturally, requires sufficient manpower. In this academy, which has two programs of two to four years, about 100 persons have been selected for the first term, who will be trained in accordance with the program of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and appropriate to the needs of the Islamic Republic.

The Prime Minister's Speech

Then, the prime minister said in a speech: Today is a very good day for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because it will form the cultural foundation of our society.

He said: Today, we are facing an event which will result in the stability of the regime, because a number of people intend to engage in a critical study of foreign policy free of other issues. We have needed this institution for a long time, because our foreign policy will be shaped here.

The prime minister said: Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs is engaged in implementing the slogan of neither East nor West in practice. But, it has not had the opportunity to analyze the roots of this issue.

He added: I do not think that there is an academy in the Islamic Republic which is involved with the practical issue in this manner, which is one of the very advantageous attributes of the Islamic Republic. Essentially, one of the most important issues which this academy will seriously be engaged in is the field of political sciences. The humanities can be considered a field of ideological sciences only when it contains very beneficial values and is in some way combined with existing values.

He added: The values dominant in the Islamic Republic, and we emphasize them, are different from the values of other societies. The understanding of this issue will help us to find an answer to the issues of foreign policy. Another point is dealing with the various cultures in connection with your job, because you young people are the carriers of the messages of the revolution.

The prime minister then said: Every country has particular customs and habits which are different from the customs and habits of our country. A diplomat who goes to these embassies must be acquainted with and understand such differences and changes in the nature of human societies. If he is not thus aware, he will face difficult problems.

Engineer Musavi added: Those who study at the academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must know that human cultures have beautiful fruits and the important issue of understanding them in order to correctly deal with these cultures is the job of a political diplomat. In the embassies, there is constant contact

between us and the people of other countries and we mostly try to have contact with the people because this is a winning card.

Continuing his speech, the prime minister said: There is a very important issue to which sufficient attention must be paid. That is, our foreign policy is a part of our domestic policy and what happens within our nation determines our foreign policy. Our movement begins from this point and I think that we must show more sensitivity in this area.

He added: Another issue which must be pointed out in conclusion is that we have a great source for the activities of the brothers in the academy, which is the issue of the books of the Spy Nest. The political sciences academy which exists in our country cannot be compared with any of the political academies in the world because of its opportunities. We hope that the opening of this complex will be a beginning of the opening of other colleges, which will be a very great boon to our beloved Islamic revolution.

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CSO: 4640/125

GHAFFAR KHAN'S STAND ON AFGHANISTAN CRITICIZED AS UNREALISTIC

Karachi JANG in Urdu 23 Jan 83 p 3

[Editorial: "Ghaffar Khan's Logic"]

[Text] Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, founder of the Khudai Khidmatgar [Servants of God] movement, says that the war in Afghanistan is really a war between Russia and the United States. In an interview with the JANG correspondent in Lady Reading Hospital, he said, "The war in Afghanistan is not a war for Islam but a war between Russia and the United States. It is a useless war that is ruining the Pakhtuns. We should sit down and seek a solution to the problem." He said that the reason he did not go into Afghan refugee camps to help the refugees was that the government did not permit him to do so. As far as Ghaffar Khan's advice is concerned about solving the problem through negotiations, Pakistan has been a leader in this matter and has cooperated fully with the talks being arranged through the United Nations. But regarding his claim that the Afghan Mujahidin's war is in reality a war between Russia and the United States, no Pakistani would agree with him, whether he is a Pakhtun or not, nor would anyone support his proposal for negotiations when his real intent is direct talks with the Karmal government. The issue is quite simple and straightforward. Russia intervened militarily in Afghanistan and deprived the Afghan people of their freedom; and the Afghan Mujahidin are fighting to free their country. Afghan emigrants have chosen to live a life of hardship as refugees rather than live as slaves under the domination of Russian troops. The stand of the Afghan Mujahidin and their fight for freedom is supported by the world brotherhood of nations, by the entire Muslim world and by the nonaligned countries. The resolutions passed by the General Assembly, the Islamic conference and the conference of nonaligned nations are clear proof of this support. The United States has also joined this worldwide support for the war of freedom of the Afghan Mujahidin and the Afghan people. India, which is a friend of Russia's and whose prime minister has been avoiding a condemnation of Russian aggression, joined the supporters of the resolution passed by the nonaligned nations' conference. How can Abdul Ghaffar Khan call a war that has elicited such worldwide support a fight between Russia and America? He has been calling himself a champion of that war of freedom that was waged in this subcontinent against British domination. How is it that his war fulfilled all the requirements of Islam, but the war for freedom waged today by the Afghans and the

Pakhtuns has no connection with Islam? To him, the Afghan Mujahidin are no better than hired mercenaries. Can anyone in his right mind accept Ghaffar Khan's logic? His statements can be excused on the grounds that he is a very old man, but a few days ago, his son, Khan Wali Khan, addressed a press conference in Karachi and sounded like a spokesman for the Kabul government. This clearly shows that both father and son are trying to sabotage the struggle of the Afghan Mujahidin and to implant the idea in the minds of the brave Pakhtuns that the war has no connection with Islam. Such attempts to sow doubts are severely condemned in Islam.

In our view, it is because of Ghaffar Khan's stand that he and his Servants do not dare set foot in the camps of the Afghan refugees. The Afghan refugees consider their departure from their country an emigration [an emigration or hejira such as that of the early Muslims fleeing from oppression] and their young men's war as Jihad. Those who die in this jihad are considered to have attained martyrdom. Is Ghaffar Khan brave enough to go into the refugee camps and tell them that their departure from their country and their war has no connection with Islam? Ghaffar Khan has closed the doors of the refugee camps to himself and his Servants with his own hands; and now he lays the responsibility for this sometimes on the government and sometimes on a party.

The Karmal government has been established by Russian troops. It has not been recognized by Pakistan, nor does Pakistan wish to hold direct negotiations with it. Pakistan's stand is that Russian troops should withdraw; that the people of Afghanistan be allowed to establish a government and system of their own choosing; that Afghanistan's status as a free and nonaligned country be restored; and that Afghan refugees be guaranteed an honorable return to their country. If Ghaffar Khan is a true supporter of freedom and a patriotic Pakistani, he will support Pakistan's position, which has been accepted by the world community. If Ghaffar Khan were to condemn Russian aggression and the inhuman cruelties being inflicted by Russian troops on the Afghan and Pakhtun people, the doors of Afghan refugee camps would automatically be opened to him and he would have the honor of serving Afghan refugees in the true sense of the word.

9863

CSO: 4656/91

KAUSER NIAZI CLARIFIES POSITION ON PPP, BHUTTO

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 30 Jan 83 pp 1, 9

[Text] Lahore, 29 January--NAWA-I-WAQT dispatch--Kausar Niazi, the former federal minister, said that if the course of action that he suggested had been followed, Bhutto's life might have been saved. In an interview with a weekly paper in Rawalpindi, Kausar Niazi said that he did not deny that Bhutto was still his leader, nor did he repudiate his book "Deedavar" ["The Man of Vision"], which he wrote for Bhutto. He said that he differed with the People's Party on certain matters of principle, one of which was that the party should not be made a fief to be handed down from husband to wife, to daughter to sons, and so forth. Such methods cannot be justified in a democratic political party. Another point of difference was over adopting a course of violence, subversion and confrontation. Kausar Niazi said that he did not join any other party, but that there were always different groups to be found within a large party and his was one such group in the People's Party. The word "progressive" was added to prevent the press from using terms such as People's Party (Begum Nusrat group) and People's Party (Kausar Niazi group). Another reason for forming a new party was that if the People's Party was not able to participate in the elections on the grounds that it was not registered, individuals of his group who had a healthy mental outlook might be able to take part in political activity. Kausar Niazi was asked, "When you left Jamaat-e Islami, you accused the leaders of being dictatorial; but you joined another dictator, Ayub Khan. When you later joined the People's Party, Bhutto accused you at a public gathering of being Yahya Khan's spy. You then became a minister, wrote "Deedavar" and now you accuse the leaders of the People's Party of being dictatorial." Kausar Niazi answered, "The differences with the Jamaat arose not only over the autocratic leadership but also involved religious beliefs." He said that his meetings with Ayub Khan were of a personal nature and that he did not join the Convention Muslim League. As far as being a spy for Yahya Khan is concerned, that was merely a rumor. He said that there was nothing surprising about the fact that he had changed parties four times. Quaid-e Azam was at first a member of the Congress Party and joined the Muslim League later. Maulana Maududi published a newspaper for Jamiat-e Ulema-e Hind before he formed his own party. Bhutto was the secretary general of the Convention League and later formed the People's Party. In the same way, Asghar Khan changed parties three or four times. Who has not encountered changes in his life? Niazi was asked what he was doing when his "man of vision" was

hanged? He answered, "That was a judicial issue. But if my suggested course of action had been followed, Bhutto's life might have been saved." He said, "I think the political structure that will be presented this August will be based on the participation in power of the military forces." Criticizing the press, he said that it had become a money game; newspapers today are like a grocery store--each man paid the price and got what he wanted.

9863

CSO: 4656/100

ACCOMODATION ADVISED ON BALUCHI DEMANDS FOR FEDERALISM

Karachi JANG in Urdu 23 Jan 83 p 3

[Article by Irshad Ahmad Haqqani: "The Demand of Baludi Chiefs for a Particular Form of Federalism"]

[Text] An aura of mystery usually seems to surround most of the politically active chiefs of Baluchistan Province; but when they remove themselves from the open arena of public life, either because of the ban on political activity or the intervention of the federal government, this mystery deepens even more. Speculation and rumors start to circulate regarding their objectives, activities, relationships, aims and even their place of residence, so that it is no longer possible for anyone to say with any certainty why and what they are doing, what they want and where they are living. The views and priorities of most of these Baluchi leaders are controversial in some parts of the country, especially in Punjab. Their point of view regarding federalism and the rights of nationalities is unacceptable to many people, who accuse them of separatism, or in other words, of deviating from the ideology of Pakistan and the concept of Muslim nationalism. It is dangerous to express sympathy for any part of their stand or to try to find any element of truth or justification in their viewpoint; but the interests of the country and the people demand that an effort be made to understand and explain the facts.

Before any comment is made on the manner in which the chiefs and political pundits of Baluchistan talk of the division of powers between the federal [government] and the other units, it is necessary to remember that over the last 35 years, Pakistan has not been run according to any established system of federal government in the world. One cannot include the first few years following independence because the atmosphere was different and the problems had not yet fully taken shape. The first regular constitutional administration was started in 1956. Because of the one-unit concept, the problem of federal rights as it exists and is being discussed today was nonexistent then, because at that time the greatest priority was given to the creation of equality, understanding and practical arrangements between East and West Pakistan. After Ayub came into office, a new element was introduced into the conditions created by one unit when, first, Ayub became the all-powerful martial law administrator and then later, when his "presidential" form of constitution was introduced. How devoid it was of all safeguards or established presidential systems we are all aware. Ayub Khan ruled for 6 or 7

years under this unbalanced system. To add to the misfortune, during his term of office conditions reached the point where a military operation was launched in Baluchistan with resulting repercussions. Yahya Khan's 3-year term of office was the result of the Ayub rule. Although Yahya Khan ended the one-unit system and reinstated the provinces, provincial governments were not established until his fall from power; and the center continued to exercise full powers. The Bhutto government did allow ministries to be formed, but we all know what course of action it later adopted and what the regrettable and harmful outcome was. At the time of the decline of the previous government, it is well known what the situation of the Baluchi leaders and the nature of their relationship with the central government were. The present martial law was subsequently established and the constitution, whatever its merits or faults, was suspended. Military governors were appointed, and the new rulers tried sincerely to reduce bitter feelings and to remove Baluchistan's sense of deprivation. They took various measures aimed at winning over the people, which did produce positive results. But one cannot be satisfied with the constitutional and legal situation. The question is not about the temperament or attitude of the governors or other martial law authorities, though we are well aware of their importance. The question here is of constitutional provisions that do not follow or respect any of the well-known needs of federation. What are the possibilities for the present and the future? The country is under martial law and no one can say how long it will stay that way. Even if a civilian form of government is established, no one can predict how long it will last. In other words, one cannot rule out the possibilities of martial law in the future. Irrespective of what part of the country the majority of the armed forces belong to, military government has certain characteristics. The centralization of power becomes inevitable under martial law, which renders ineffective and inoperable any existing constitutional provisions.

It should be remembered at the same time that because of various historical, geographical, political, psychological and educational factors, it was not possible to do much for Baluchistan in the past. The supply of gas has only now become possible. In view of past history, present experience and future possibilities, it should not prove surprising if Baluchi chiefs and intellectuals emphasize a particular interpretation of federation and refer to the Lahore agreement. There is great scope for disagreeing with Sardar Mohammad Bagti's political record; one can ask him many questions and argue about the "lack of balance" in his speech and logic. But when he says that some safeguards are needed for the future, no one can deny the weight of his argument. Nothing can be gained by accusing him at once of separatism and provincialism. Sardar Bagti may be exaggerating when he says that the new generation thinks along different lines; but his statement that if suitable guarantees are given he can persuade his "friends" to remain in the federation shows that his primary emphasis is on obtaining guarantees, not on "thinking on different lines." This writer once asked Mir Ghaus Baksh Bazanji how many informed inhabitants of Baluchistan supported his views on federalism; he answered that he was the last important link in the chain of support for relations between Baluchistan and the rest of Pakistan. He said that others were thinking on different lines. Sardar Bagti has said that Ataulah Mengel demanded a free and independent Baluchistan, but his demand sprang

from great anger; if suitable safeguards were guaranteed, he could again be persuaded to support federation. All this shows that the true objective here is to gain redress for their complaints and obtain safeguards and any thinking on different lines is done perforce and in order to express the truth.

Whatever the view or arguments of Baluchi leaders, the fact remains that feelings for the restoration of democratic rights run deep in the different parts of Pakistan. People desire intensely to run their own political and economic affairs. In view of Pakistan's history and its political characteristics, it is important that a sense of deprivation not be allowed to deepen within a class, within a linguistic or a national unit. People want to be masters of their own political and economic fate. This desire is part and parcel of the general awakening taking place with great fervor throughout the developing world. When, for any reason, a class or a linguistic or national unit begins to feel that it does not have the freedom to run its own political and economic affairs, or feels that it is in danger of losing this freedom, the right approach is to strive to understand and alleviate this feeling, not to attribute erroneous motives to those individuals. The fact that all important and prominent Baluchi chiefs prefer to seek safeguards for the restoration of democracy should give us food for thought. Their attitude expresses their state of utter hopelessness and shows that repeated bitter experiences have made them cautious and changed their way of thinking. Pakistan's interests demand not only that the people of the provinces be given the right to run their own affairs through their elected representatives, but also that political government of the future show a level of wisdom and diplomacy that would give no excuse or justification to anyone seeking to end a political form of government. We are certain that if the irrefutable claims of federation are observed with honesty for the next 10 or 20 years, the intellectuals and spokesman of Baluchistan and other provinces will begin to show balance in their attitudes, and they will cease their habit of frequently expressing their far-fetched plans. But if their confidence is to be restored, they must be able to see at least a glimmer of hope. If, on the one hand, there exists no respect for or observance of constitutional and legal provisions and, on the other hand, those who demand these provisions are condemned, the outcome will only be bitterness and suspicion. We maintain that it is necessary to better understand the points of view of Baluchistan and all the other provinces. Nothing will be gained by merely flinging accusations at them.

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APPOINTMENT OF OMBUDSMAN SEEN AS FAILURE TO CHECK CORRUPTION

Karachi JANG in Urdu 2 Feb 83 p 3

[Article by Pir Ali Mohammad Rashidi]

[Text] The appointment of a high-level ombudsman, to great fanfare, is a good sign and shows that at least a sense of vulnerability exists. It is to be hoped that the real work will be accomplished with just as much fanfare. Every citizen should cooperate with the ombudsman, send complaints that are genuine and refrain from false charges. Efforts should be aimed at reforming the situation and dealing equitably with everyone.

The only cause for doubt is that the elements for whose reform this arrangement has been made have proved impervious so far to all efforts to make them stop their misconduct or to bring them to account. Here, for example, are the details of such efforts in the past:

1. Before Ayub Khan's term of office, there was democracy in the country; there were assemblies composed of over 1,000 members each, and each member could ask questions in the assembly and suggest [budget] cuts as a means of pressure on the government. There were innumerable debates during the budget period. It was possible to put on the ministers and, in fact, every measure that could be taken to keep the administration in line was taken. But the administration refused to pay any heed; complaints increased and mismanagement heightened.
2. The national representatives got tired of it all and passed an anti-corruption bill and established a special department for catching miscreants. Every anticorruption official had as much power as has been given to the present ombudsman, perhaps even more (for example, he had the right to make on-the-spot arrests). What was the result? Since the anticorruption measure increased the danger to bureaucracy, bribery rates have increased accordingly. The situation has persisted for 35 years; the people can judge for themselves if there has been any change.
3. The newspapers continued their outcry through it all. The press was not subject to censorship then and lost no opportunity to uncover the misdeeds of the administration. But did it do any good?

4. After Ayub Khan came to power, investigations were conducted under martial law. Nearly 150 high civilian officials were dismissed following a brief enquiry. In the same way, Yahya Khan dismissed 300 officials for malfeasance. Matters reached a climax during the late Bhutto's term of office; more than 700 officials were dismissed with a stroke of the pen. But the result was zero, for, in fact, corruption continued to increase, as did bribery rates.

5. General Musa Khan, a former governor general of West Pakistan, used to keep a complaint box outside his door, but to no avail.

6. During the previous government's term of office, a special office existed under the name of "the prime minister's inspection team" that had the same duties that have been entrusted to the present ombudsman, namely, to make enquiries and report directly to the prime minister. Everyone knows what a difference that made in the situation.

The question is, if all of these past efforts proved to be useless, how can this new step be expected to succeed? But man lives on hope, and we will have to hope that at least this time all of this work will not be wasted, and some good will come of it.

I have a few suggestions:

1) All of this corruption has resulted from the excess of rules and regulations; bureaucracy has made so many involved rules to tie up the people in red tape that no problem can be solved unless it has made the round of at least 50 departments. As for the waste of time, years pass while the mill continues to churn, but no decision is arrived at. It is inevitable that such a situation should increase the likelihood of bribery; palms have to be greased in each department before the file can make any progress. It is imperative to save the people from this web of rules.

2) A reduction in government employees is necessary. Formerly, retrenchment committee were occasionally formed to abolish unnecessary posts. This saved money and reduced departmental red tape. This system should be restored, and unnecessary jobs in each department should be abolished.

3) The ombudsman's powers should not be limited to merely making recommendations; rather he should be allowed to make suitable decisions and issue orders. Recommendations alone would start "department noting" again and no decision would be made on time.

4) The custom of building houses and renting vehicles is at the root of corruption. The houses built by officials connected with the administration and vehicles rented out by them should be taken over by the government. The onus of proving that these possessions were acquired with legitimate income should fall on the owners.

5) Those making false charges should be punished and the ombudsman should be given the power to mete out the punishment.

6) A time limit should be established for the final disposition of each complaint.

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